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The humanistic psychology movement, formally established in 1962,  sought to 
address broad questions of individual identity, expression, meaning and growth that had 
been largely neglected by post-war American cultural institutions in general and by the 
discipline of psychology in particular. By proposing a definition of mental health that 
went beyond the simple absence of illness, and by critiquing the American desire to 
reductively quantify even the nature of human existence, humanistic psychologists, 
including founders Abraham Maslow, Gordon Allport, Rollo May and Carl Rogers, 
offered a holistic, growth-driven theory of the self. They also attempted to formulate 
scientific methods that would be capable of adequately treating, rather than abstracting 
away, the complexity and subjectivity of the individual. Humanistic psychologists drew 
on the work of William James, and on the synthetic approach to the self and psyche that 
he described as “radical empiricism,” in an attempt to build upon dominant American 
psychological movements, namely psychoanalysis and behaviorism, which they 
perceived to have provided valuable, though incomplete, insights into human psychology. 
 viii 
In crafting humanistic methods, they also incorporated western European philosophies of 
holism, including phenomenology, existentialism and Gestalt. The movement they 
established produced enduring change in American psychology and American culture, 
though, for the most part, not in the ways the founders had envisioned. In the late 1960s 
and early to mid-1970s, humanistic psychology provided much of the vocabulary, and 
many of the techniques, of the human potential movement, of women’s liberation groups, 
and of psychedelic users. It also laid the foundation for the person-centered approaches 
that developed in psychotherapy, social work, pastoral counseling, and academic 
psychology. 
 ix 
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In one of his many attempts to articulate and refine the goals of humanistic 
psychology, Abraham Maslow, then already a noted psychologist and founder of 
humanistic psychology, wrote in his journal on October 5, 1966: “How would I define 
humanistic psych in one sentence? A move away from knowledge of things & lifeless 
objects as basis for all philosophy, economics, science, politics, etc. (because this has 
failed to help with the basic human problems) toward a centering upon human needs & 
fulfillment & aspirations as the fundamental basis from which to derive all the social 
institutions, philosophy, ethics, etc. I might use also for more sophisticated & hep people 
that it is a resacralizing of science, society, the person, etc.”1  
In a broad-brush way, Maslow captured the mission of the movement, which was 
to wrest psychology from those they felt had too narrowly defined human nature, 
experience and behavior. But, as in other articulations, Maslow’s description was 
incomplete, more evidence of the difficulty of condensing the purpose of the movement 
into a simple formulation.   
The questions that Maslow hoped to answer were endemic to modern society and 
had been asked before in many ways. How can individuals maintain a sense of agency in 
an increasingly mechanized and technologized world? How can Americans achieve a 
sense of identity based on values distinct from the interests of both capitalism and 
Christianity (or other traditional religions)? What does it mean to be psychologically 
healthy, beyond not being mentally ill? And, how can unique and divergent individuals’ 
experiences be quantified and meaningfully compared? Maslow also explored questions 
that were more universal in their scope: How can individuals find meaning in their lives? 
And, from where can we derive values? 
                                                
1 Abraham Maslow, October 5, 1966, The Journals of A. H. Maslow Vol. 2., ed. Lowry (Monterrey: 
Brooks/ Cole, 1979), 672. 
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By asking these questions publicly, and asking them in the 1960s in particular, 
humanistic psychologists like Maslow were responding to a deep cultural need. Confused 
by modernity, unsettled by World War II and its consequences, and alienated by 
technological change, many Americans found the positive and optimistic answers the 
movement provided compelling. This interest was evident in the humanistic psychology’s 
broad popularity from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s. It was demonstrated in high 
attendance rates at growth centers founded upon its theory, in widespread adoption of the 
techniques (like encounter groups and body work) that sprang from it, and in the 
permeation of American culture with the language of human potential and encounter.  
Humanistic psychology, which was established in its organizational form in 1962, 
was intended—in the minds of its founders—as a “third force” within academic and 
professional psychology, meant to build on the insights of psychoanalysis and 
behaviorism. Signaling his intention to preserve the insights of the previous forces, rather 
than renounce them, Maslow described the movement as “epi-Freudian” and “epi-
behavioristic,” as well as “epi-positivistic.” He explained that, “epi-Freudian means, or 
will mean from now on, building upon Freud. Not repudiating, not fighting, not either-or, 
no loyalties or counter-loyalties. Just taking for granted his clinical discoveries, 
psychodynamics, etc. insofar as they are true. Using them, building upon them the 
superstructure which they lack. This does not involve swallowing any of his mistakes.”  
“Epi-behaviorism” and “epi-positivism” signified, for Maslow, the grounding of 
humanistic psychology in the methods and traditions of science, as well as the attempt to 
fill in the gaps of prior theories. “I want to save this empirical, testing, checking, 
conservative emphasis,” Maslow wrote, “But also I want to build upon it, because a 
negative checking & continuousness amount to nothing in themselves—worse than 
nothing.” The movement Maslow envisioned would provide a more holistic conception 
of individual psychology, and would utilize scientific methods designed to capture the 
 3 
fullness of human experience (rather than distilling experience into distinct elements of 
human behavior and cognition). 2   
Carl Rogers, another founder of humanistic psychology, shared Maslow’s view. 
Describing his passion for science, Rogers wrote, “I have, deep within me, a feeling for 
science, for that relatively new invention in human history by which we have come to 
have a partial understanding of the awesome order in our physical and psychological 
universe. Consequently I value the concepts which are near and dear to the heart of the 
behavioral science.”3 But, he also argued for the necessity of balancing “hard” 
experimental science with consideration of complex subjective experience. “All 
knowledge,” he wrote, “including all scientific knowledge, is a vast inverted pyramid 
resting on this tiny, personal subjective base.”4 The solution, according to Maslow, was 
to create a humanized psychological science, “a real superstructure, higher ceilings, a 3rd 
Force,” which could “give behaviorism some worth & some usefulness.”5 
Maslow’s “higher ceilings” were humanistic psychology’s commitment to 
exploring human striving and achievement. This concept begins to get at what was so 
unique about humanistic psychology within the context of 1960s America; humanistic 
psychologists hoped to establish a theory of mental health and growth, and to advance 
from within the psychological profession an idea of human nature as inherently oriented 
towards positive ends. Based on his observations as a psychotherapist, Rogers noted that 
the motivation for development or growth “seems to be inherent in the organism, just as 
we find a similar tendency in the human animal to develop and mature physically, 
provided minimally satisfactory conditions.”6  
                                                
2 Maslow, April 1, 1963, Journals, Vol. 1, 297-298. 
3 Carl R. Rogers, “Some Thoughts Regarding the Current Philosophy of the Behavioral Sciences,” Journal 
of Humanistic Psychology, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1965), 184. 
4 Ibid., 186. 
5 Maslow, April 1, 1963, Journals, Vol. 1, 298. 
6 Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person: A Therapist’s View of Psychotherapy (New York: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1961), 60. 
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Humanistic psychologists also hoped to account for elements of human 
experience that couldn’t be quantified through experimental investigation. In discussing 
the “resacralization” of human understanding, Maslow was expressing humanistic 
psychology’s desire to reintroduce ineffable aspects of human experience to a field that 
had, out of professional necessity, excluded philosophical and metaphysical 
considerations.7 Towards this goal, Maslow and his colleagues had to venture onto pretty 
shaky scientific ground, re-examining the entire practice of psychology at the root of its 
“prescientific” assumptions.8 
In order to forge a prescientific theory of human growth and achievement, it was 
necessary to identify positive values, which, Maslow felt, could approximate “truth” 
through consistent refinement.9 Rather than espousing psychology’s goal of utter 
objectivity, he argued for the inextricable nature of human subjectivity, basing much of 
his “pre-science” on common sense theory and his own intuitions about values. His own 
studies of exceptional states, which explored the perceptions, experience and behavior of 
human beings at their best, relied heavily on Maslow’s tentative guesses about universal 
human values.10 Humanistic psychologist Sidney Jourard shared Maslow’s interest in 
forging a positive psychology, arguing for the scientific possibilities in developing 
reliable criteria of optimum health. “To those who despair of the possibility of arriving at 
an agreed-upon concept of positive health, let me remind them that in implicit terms, at 
least, we all are agreed on many of the dimensions of positive health.”11 In his own work, 
psychologist Gordon Allport outlined what these “healthful processes” might include. 
Healthy, or “normal” individuals, he wrote, would possess “a guiding direction […] 
                                                
7 William James, Psychology (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett Publications, 1963), 17. 
8 Maslow, October 8, 1964, Journals Vol. 1, 422. 
9 Maslow, November 5, 1961, Journals Vol. 1, 130. 
10 Abraham Maslow, “Self-Actualizing People: A Study of Psychological Health,” Reprinted in Richard J. 
Lowry, ed., On Dominance, Self-Esteem and Self-Actualization: Germinal Papers of A. H. Maslow 
(Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1973), 177-202. 
11 Sidney M. Jourard, “Notes on the ‘Quantification of Wellness,’” October 16, 1958 Sidney M. Jourard, 
“Quantification of Wellness,” October 16, 1958,  (Gardner Murphy Papers, Box 1076, Sidney M. Jourard 
Folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology), 2. 
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integration, insight, ego-strength, with a capacity for necessary and effective 
repression.”12 
THE ARC OF THE MOVEMENT 
This project specifically traces the first 20 years of humanistic psychology—a 
movement that was grounded in the specific frustrations and aspirations of several 
American scholars who found mid-century academic and professional psychology to be 
overly confining. They included Abraham Maslow, who provided much of the language 
of the movement and who proposed its defining theory, that of “self-actualization,” as 
well as an analysis of what he called “peak” functioning; Carl Rogers, whose client-
centered approach transformed the psychotherapeutic relationship; Rollo May, who 
reformulated psychological inquiry in light of existential and phenomenological 
considerations; and Henry Murray and Gordon Allport, whose scathing critiques of the 
“positivism” of academic psychology suggested the need for a more humanistic 
approach. These scholars (and others) connected, in the 1950s, through informal 
channels, including a mailing list that Maslow assembled to share their work. They 
coalesced more formally, in 1962, through the founding of the American Association of 
Humanistic Psychology (AAHP).  
In tracking the progression of the cultural, intellectual and psychological reform 
movement that Maslow and Rogers helped to found, this project inevitably comes into 
conversation with a number of diverse sources that, by drawing on a range of disciplines, 
have sought to place American psychology in a cultural context. Philip Rieff, for 
example, in The Triumph of the Therapeutic, explored the religious, spiritual and 
sociological aspects of the therapeutic ethos that came to dominate America in the latter 
half of the 20th century, focusing specifically on the way in which the individual concerns 
of the “psychological man” displaced the more communal moral and social concerns of 
                                                
12 Gordon Allport, ”Psychiatry in Neurotic America” (notes), Harvard Law Forum, December 1, 1950 
(Gordon W. Allport Papers, HUG 4118.50, Box 5, Law School Forum folder, Harvard University 
Archives), 7.  
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the prototypical American who proceeded him.  Writing in the 1960s, Rieff identified the 
“psychological man,” explaining that “the kind of man I see emerging, as our culture 
fades into the next, resembles the one once called ‘spiritual’—because such a man desires 
to preserve the inherited morality freed from its hard external crust of institutional 
discipline.”13 This man, he argues, is the “supreme” individualist, “opposed in depth to 
earlier modes of self-salvation,” including: through identification with “communal 
purpose.”14  
Christopher Lasch echoed Rieff’s concerns in the 1970s and 1980s, both in The 
Minimal Self and The Culture of Narcissism. Exploring psychology’s impact on the 
American individual, Lasch exposed what he perceived to be the pathological self-
concern that pervaded American culture in the 1970s. The turn towards self-interest, 
according to Lasch, can best be explained as a sort of psychic retreat from the 
overwhelming insecurity produced by a political and economic system in crisis.15 
Displayed in mass consumption and mass culture, American narcissism, Lasch explains, 
indicates not a strong sense of self or a spirit of self-love, but a underlying emptiness 
better described as self-loathing.16 
While humanistic psychology, with its strong self-focus, clearly enters into the 
conversation Rieff and Lasch initiate over the relevance of psychology to the American 
individual, it also resonates with works that seek to more broadly historicize the role of 
the psychological profession in 20th century cultural and political phenomena. In The 
Romance of American Psychology, for example, Ellen Herman chronicles the rise of the 
influence of psychologists in the American cultural consciousness, largely through events 
related to World War II. Herman links the ascendance of the psychological expert to 
                                                
13 Philip Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith after Freud (New York: Harper & Row, 
1966), 2. 
14 Ibid., 10. 
15 Christopher Lasch, The Minimal Self: Psychic Survival in Troubled Times (New York: W. W. Norton, 
1984), 16.  
16 Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1979), 31.  
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specific uses of psychological professionals in the war effort, challenging the notion that 
psychology’s presence in American is an ahistorical fact. “Psychology,” writes Herman, 
“may have seeped into virtually every facet of existence, but that does not mean that it 
has always been there or that what experts say has always mattered as much as it matters 
today.”17 Herman’s work helps to explain the ease with which the academic theory of 
humanistic psychology quickly produced a cultural movement, and later came to pervade 
American culture more broadly. 
Providing a specific model for this project, Andrew Heinze’s Jews and the 
American Soul effectively explores the impact of the psychological concerns of 
significant Jewish individuals on American culture and experience. Heinze opposes the 
“myth of Protestant Origins,” detailing the ways in which conceptions of human nature as 
formulated by Jewish thinkers were formative in the 20th century American conception of 
self. He attributes to Jewish thinkers the authorship of key psychological terms, including 
the “the search for identity, the desire for self-actualization, the wish to avoid an 
inferiority complex and to stop compensating for inner weaknesses, rationalizing inner 
desires and projecting them onto others and the quest for the I-Thou relationship.”18 
While Heinze explores a range of seminal figures, including Betty Friedan, Martin Buber 
and Rabbi Liebman, he also devotes specific attention to humanistic psychologists like 
Abraham Maslow. 
This project has also been shaped by the literature of the history of psychotherapy 
and psychoanalysis. Examining the history of psychotherapy in America, Philip 
Cushman’s Constructing the Self, Constructing America takes a hermeneutic approach to 
psychotherapy’s role in self-construction. Cushman details the changes that dominant 
theories have produced in the experience of the average American, and captures 
                                                
17 Ellen Herman, The Romance of American Psychology: Politival Culture in the Age of Experts (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995), 5. 
18 Andrew Heinze, Jews and the American Soul: Human Nature in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), 1-2. 
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effectively the way in which psychotherapeutic ideas have become inextricable from the 
notion of the “self” in America.19  
Two collections, Joel Pfister and Nancy Schnog’s Inventing the Psychological 
and Donald Freedhiem’s History of Psychotherapy, provide a diverse exposition of the 
impact of psychotherapy on American culture. Pfister and Schnog capture the 
pervasiveness of psychology in the experience of many Americans by exploring a range 
of topics, from literature and performance to gender and race.20 Freedheim’s collection 
provides a model for situating specific psychological movements within their broader 
historical and cultural context. 
The body of literature that traces the impact of psychoanalysis on American 
culture provides the most complete model for historicizing a psychological movement in 
a cultural context.  Eli Zaretsky’s Secrets of the Soul, for example, explores the enduring 
cultural value and meaning of psychoanalysis. Zaretsky takes up Rieff’s notion of 
personal autonomy replacing moral autonomy, and traces, through the 1960s in 
particular, the conflict between psychoanalytic theory and women’s liberation and the 
New Left. 21 
Nathan Hale’s two volumes on Freud in America provide a broad and detailed 
view of the American cultural response to Freud’s theory, examining the ways that 
psychoanalysis contributed to the self-understanding of many Americans.22 Hale explores 
the cultural function of psychoanalysis, specifically citing the manner in which it opposed  
Victorian standards of sexual morality that had grown oppressive and offered an 
                                                
19 Philip Cushman, Constructing the Self, Constructing America: A Cultural History of Psychotherapy 
(Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1995).  
20 Joel Pfister and Nancy Schnog, Inventing the Psychological: Toward a Cultural History of Emotional 
Life in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997). 
21 Eli Zaretsky,  Secrets of the Soul: A Social and Cultural History of Psychoanalysis (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 2004). 
22 Nathan G. Hale, Jr., Freud and the Americans: The Beginnings of Psychoanalysis in the United States, 
1876-1917 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971); Nathan G. Hale, Jr. Freud in America, Vol. 2, The 
Rise and Crisis of Psychoanalysis in the United States: Freud and the Americans, 1917-1985 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995). 
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explanation for the rise of nervous disorders in the early part of the 20th century. Tracing 
the historical arc of psychoanalysis, Hale looks at the popularization of Freud’s ideas, 
focusing on specific eras in which they held the most sway (the 1920s through 1940s) 
and in which they fell out of favor (the 1960s). In explaining these shifts, he attends to 
the economic, political and cultural circumstances in America in various periods. For 
example, he explores the significance of the Great Depression, of World War II and of 
women’s liberation. Hale’s work, like Zaretsky’s, exemplifies the depth with which 
scholars have examined the relationship between psychoanalysis and American culture; 
the field is rich, and any number of works could serve as comparably good examples. 
Although this project is, no doubt, indebted to several other bodies of literature, 
including those related to the social movements with which humanistic psychology 
intersected, the final area I’ll refer to is the relatively small body of work that exists on 
the history of humanistic psychology. Roy de Carvalho’s Founders of Humanistic 
Psychology provides brief intellectual biographies of five founders of humanistic 
psychology—Abraham Maslow, Gordon Allport, Rollo May, Carl Rogers and James 
Bugental. Tracing the roots of their theories to the intellectual influences of the 
philosophies of existentialism, phenomenology and others and to the specific personal 
influences of colleagues like Kurt Lewin and Karen Horney, de Carvalho’s work has 
provided a solid foundation for my own. De Carvalho’s historical description of the 
humanistic psychology movement has also served as a framework for this project.23 
Eugene Taylor’s Shadow Culture has offered insight into the long American 
tradition in which humanistic psychology fits. Beginning with the First Great Awakening, 
Taylor identifies the continuous dialogue between psychology and spirituality that was 
exemplified in the work of William James. Identifying humanistic psychology as a form 
of “folk psychology,” he identifies the diverse components of the movement, which 
                                                
23 Roy Jose de Carvalho, The Founders of Humanistic Psychology (New York: Praeger, 1991). 
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include transpersonal psychology, experiential encounter and radical therapy.24 Taylor 
holds up the Esalen Institute as exemplary of the “shadow culture” of the American 
visionary tradition.25 
Work on the Esalen institute has been integral to this project. By effectively 
integrating 1960s American religious interests, countercultural practices, and 
psychological theory, historians of Esalen have illuminated the cultural events that sprang 
from the theories of humanistic psychologists. Walter Truett Anderson’s Upstart Spring 
and Jeffrey Kripal’s Esalen have provided thorough historical investigations, while 
capturing the complexity of the institute’s significance to the human potential movement, 
to the counterculture and to the 1960s more broadly. Kripal’s work in particular has 
helped me to situate figures like Maslow and Rogers in relation to the cultural 
manifestation of their theory. Both books have also offered a means of unraveling the 
personal significance of humanistic psychology to the figures who most passionately 
adopted its principles.26 
Finally, this project is indebted to a number of seminal biographies that have 
broadened my perspective on the contributions of various psychologists to the movement. 
Robert Richardson’s biography of William James, in addition to providing essential 
information about the life and mind of James, served as a model for my work. Richardson 
expertly contextualizes James’ intellectual history in light of the culture of his time, as 
well as within the intellectual atmosphere in which he forged his theory. Identifying the 
contradictions in James’ own interests, Richardson captures the pluralism that defined the 
                                                
24 Eugene Taylor, Shadow Culture: Psychology and Spirituality in America from the Great Awakening to 
the New Age (Washington, D.C.: Counterpoint, 1999), 274. 
25 Ibid., 238.  
26 Walter Anderson, Upstart Spring: Esalen and the American Awakening (Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley, 1983); Jeffrey Kripal, Esalen: America and the Religion of No Religion (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2007). 
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New Psychology, tying it to the divided loyalties of the average modernist (torn between 
the forces of scientific and religious explanation).27  
Specific biographies of the founders of humanistic psychology have provided the 
factual underpinnings for this project, and have helped me to interpret the theoretical 
contributions of humanistic psychologists within their proper context. Edward Hoffman’s 
biography of Maslow places the creation of humanistic psychology within the context of 
Maslow’s career. Documenting his shift from behaviorism, Hoffman explains the 
necessity, for Maslow, of proposing an alternative.28 Howard Kirschenbaum’s biography 
of Carl Rogers provides a comparable context for Rogers’ theory, which (like Maslow’s) 
predated the birth of humanistic psychology by nearly three decades.29 Robert Abzug’s 
biography of Rollo May, of which I read pieces in manuscript form, added depth to my 
understanding of the circumstances that surrounded the humanistic psychology 
movement and provided insight into the questions the founders faced. All three 
biographies were indispensable to my understanding of the individuals and the 
chronology of the movement.  
By drawing on these diverse literatures, my project intertwines psychology with 
cultural studies and American history. Although, in the early 1960s, the humanistic 
psychology movement was novel, its aims reflected persistent historical themes in 
American psychology. Echoing 19th and early 20th century concerns, the founders 
grappled with the question of how to fuse a science of the self with religious and 
philosophical systems of meaning and practices of healing. In order to foreground the 
movement in this tradition, Chapter 1 traces earlier manifestations of these tensions in 
19th century enterprises like Mesmerism, phrenology and Spiritualism. It also explores, at 
length, the “New Psychology” of William James, which crystallized one of the 
                                                
27 Robert D. Richardson, William James: In the Maelstrom of American Modernism (New York: Houghton 
Mifflin, 2006). 
28 Edward Hoffman, The Right to be Human: A Biography of Abraham Maslow (Los Angeles: Jeremy P. 
Tarcher, 1988). 
29 Howard Kirschenbaum, On Becoming Carl Rogers  (New York: Delacorte Press, 1979). 
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fundamental questions—how can psychology quantify complex, subjective experience 
using effective, inclusive science?—of the humanistic psychology endeavor.  
From these bases, Chapter 2 describes the cultural and intellectual environment 
into which humanistic psychology was born. Mental health professionals, driven by 
competition and the pursuit of expertise, had by the mid-20th century grown increasingly 
divided on how to address cultural and individual needs. Rather than forging 
collaborative solutions, they had narrowed their conceptions of individuals to suit their 
unique niche (psychiatric approaches, for example, offered increasingly medicalized 
explanations of mental illness). Academic psychologists, too, were narrowly committed, 
in their case to a model of experimental behaviorism that had little use for subjectivity 
and introspection.  
In contrast to American psychologists’ commitment to behaviorism and 
experimentalism throughout the first half of the 20th century, Western European 
psychologists mined philosophies of holism for their relevance to individual psychology. 
Chapter 3 explores the migration of these philosophies to the U.S., a process that fueled 
the developing “humanistic” critique of academic and professional psychology in the 
1940s and 1950s. Phenomenology, existentialism and Gestalt psychology traveled, first, 
through the translation of key philosophical texts and, later, through the relocation to 
America of leading European thinkers fleeing fascism. Future humanistic psychologists 
absorbed these influences through direct contact (as in the case of Maslow and May), as 
well as through a kind of cultural and intellectual osmosis. 
The work of Rogers and Maslow in the 1950s paved the way for the formation of 
the humanistic psychology movement. Chapter 4 explores the theory, and the ideological 
stirrings in the minds of the founders, that led to the creation of the Journal of 
Humanistic Psychology in 1961 and AAHP in 1962. It also details the organization’s 
early attempts to articulate its goals and to develop a positive program, a theme further 
explored through the work of Allport, Murray and Sidney Jourard in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 6 tracks the changes in the movement as it migrated from the east to the 
west coast and from academic institutions to private research institutes and 
experientially-based growth centers in the mid 1960s. Settling in California, where it met 
a countercultural interest in physical sensation, interpersonal encounter, and altered 
consciousness, the humanistic psychology movement produced the human potential 
movement. An entirely cultural outgrowth, the new movement was best exemplified by 
the Esalen Institute in Big Sur, California, which was founded on the ideas of humanistic 
psychologists but took a decidedly sensational, experiential turn.  
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 consider the attempts of humanistic psychologists to deal with 
the pressing cultural issues of the 1960s. Chapter 7 explores the intersection between the 
civil rights movement and humanistic psychology, and focuses specifically on the black-
white encounter groups that grew from the movement and aimed to expiate interracial 
conflict using the encounter group techniques of the human potential movement. These 
groups demonstrated awareness, on the part of some human potential movement 
participants and some humanistic psychologists, of the significance of racial concerns, 
but also showed the limitations of the movements in terms of addressing racial conflict. 
Chapter 8 examines the use of humanistic psychology as a justification and 
motivation for psychedelic drug use. Many humanistic psychologists were fascinated by 
the opportunities that psychedelic experimentation provided for studying alternative 
forms of consciousness. But, others were deeply ambivalent, identifying the threat that 
the practice posed to the movement. The more chaotic and dangerous elements of drug 
use ultimately fueled the growing public skepticism of humanistic psychology and the 
human potential movement. 
Chapter 9 describes the relationship between humanistic psychology and the 
women’s liberation movement. Feminists, like Betty Friedan, seized on the consonance 
between theories of humanistic psychology and women’s goals of liberation and self-
actualization, as did members of consciousness raising groups, in the late 1960s and early 
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1970s. At the same time, humanistic psychologists, the majority of whom were white and 
male, struggled with the necessity of prioritizing gender considerations.  
By looking at the specific challenges that the humanistic psychology movement 
faced, Chapter 10 considers the difficulties of forging a humanistically-informed practice 
and theory while contending, on the one hand, with the cultural ferment of the 1960s and 
1970s, and on the other hand with academic departments and professional organizations 
that were unsupportive of the movement’s goals. Although external critique of the 
cultural outgrowths emerged in the media, the harshest criticisms tended to come from 
humanistic psychologists themselves, many of whom, by the mid-1970s, labored to 
remain committed to the struggling movement. 
The final chapter traces the decline of interest in the movement that marked the 
late 1970s, and concludes in the early 1980s, when a conservative political ethos 
dampened what remained of the rebellious spirit of the 1960s. Rather than describing the 
movement’s failure, however, the chapter details humanistic psychology’s successful 
absorption into mainstream culture and psychotherapeutic practice. It also explores 
specific outgrowths of humanistic psychology in academic psychology, pastoral 
counseling and social work.  
As a whole, this project seeks to establish the importance and enduring relevance 
of humanistic psychologists to American culture and American psychology. Regardless 
of the preliminary nature of their science and the cultural excesses with which they found 
themselves burdened, the difficult, honest questions they asked, including “What is the 
good life?” “How shall I believe?” “What can I believe in?,” and “How shall I live?” 
represented a significant continuation and clarification of historical attempts to keep 
science human and to address the complex and conflictual nature of human existence.30 
 
                                                
30 Maslow, April 22, 1962, Journals, Vol. 1, 158-159. 
 15
Chapter One: A Science of the Self 
William James’s career, which began in 1873, when he was hired as an instructor 
of physiology at Harvard, and ended with his death in 1910, spanned the birth and 
infancy of the “new psychology” in the United States.1 The first American psychological 
laboratory was established at Johns Hopkins University in 1883; J. McKeen Cattell 
became the first professor of psychology at the University of Pennsylvania in 1888; and 
the American Psychological Association was established in 1892.2 James’s career 
developed simultaneously: he taught his first class devoted explicitly to the relationship 
between physiology and psychology in 1875 and published one of the first American 
psychology texts in 1890.3  
The questions that haunted James—existential questions over the nature of the 
soul and the self, spiritual questions surrounding free will and the afterlife, and scientific 
questions of the feasibility of mental science—represented significant American concerns 
that would persist throughout the 20th century.4 A catalyst in the separation of psychology 
from metaphysical and philosophical realms, James’s psychology nevertheless reflects 
                                                
1 Richardson, William James, 141. Although there are several thorough biographies of James, I have relied 
most heavily on Robert Richardson’s 2006 intellectual biography. Other biographies I have consulted 
include: Gerald E. Myers, William James: His Life and Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1986); Linda Simon, Genuine Reality: A Life of William James (New York: Harcourt, 1998); and Gay 
Wilson Allen, William James: A Biography (New York: Viking Press, 1967). 
2 Duane P. Schultz, A History of Modern Psychology, (New York: Academic Press, 1969), 118. Though the 
date of the birth of psychology as an academic discipline is at issue, most link it to the creation of Wilhelm 
Wundt’s psychological laboratory in Leipzig, Germany in 1880. This date represents a break from the 
religiously and morally informed psychology that preceded it. Rand B. Evans argues in “The Origins of 
American Academic Psychology,” however, that academic psychology actually began decades earlier, as 
evidenced by the proliferation of psychology textbooks in the 1820s through the 1860s and in the inclusion 
of standard psychology courses even at the smallest colleges by the 1870s. Instead of marking the creation 
of a distinct discipline, Evans contends, the 1880s saw a dramatic shift in the philosophy and curriculum 
underlying academic psychology.  “The Origins of American Academic Psychology,” in Josef Brozek, ed. 
Explorations in the History of Psychology in the United States (Lewisburg, Bucknell University Press, 
1984), 48-56. 
3 Richardson, William James, 167-168. Although James signed a contract in 1878 to write Principles of 
Psychology, it took him 12 years to complete the project. In the meantime, James Dewey published the first 
American psychology text, The New Psychology in 1884. William James, The Principles of Psychology, 
Volumes 1 and 2 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1890).  
4 Richardson, William James, xiv. 
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the entangled nature of psychic processes and the difficulty of isolating objective from 
subjective description of them. In The Principles of Psychology, James argues that “In 
order not to be unwieldy, every such science has to stick to its own arbitrarily-selected 
problems, and to ignore all others.” 5 Yet James’s work reflects his own difficulty in 
keeping questions of meaning and values distinct from psychology. Although he 
remained committed to the scientific paradigm he set forth in Principles, of describing 
and explaining “states of consciousness,” he selectively explored religious experience 
and belief, as well as noetic and mystical states, in an attempt to characterize ineffable 
subjective experience.6   
The productive tension between the conscious and unconscious and the rational 
and irrational in James’s theory tapped into competing American desires. Even in periods 
of diminished religious authority, many Americans have manifested a keen interest in the 
soul and in spiritual understandings of the contours of the psyche.7 At the same time, they 
have displayed a parallel reverence for scientific rationality, a reverence that’s 
exemplified in the significant role that science plays in the veneration of Founding 
Fathers like Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson and that’s been consistently fueled 
by the centrality to the American narrative of technological and industrial growth.8 In the 
tradition of the mental healers who had preceded him, James captured American interest 
by combining religious with scientific concerns.9 By exploring irrational, subjective 
                                                
5 William James, Psychology, 17. 
6 Richardson, William James, 412-415.;  James’s writings on the intersection of religion and psychology 
include: William James, The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: 
Longmans, Green and Company, 1897); William James, Human Immortality: Two Supposed Objections to 
the Doctrine (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1898); William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A 
Study in Human Nature (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1902). 
7 James G. Moseley, A Cultural History of Religion in America (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), 
139-141.; Mark Chaves, “Secularization as Declining Religious Authority,” Social Forces Vol. 72, No. 3 
March (1994), 749-774. 
8 Howard P. Segal, Technological Utopianism in America (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 
2005), 98-129. 
9 Peter Gay, A Godless Jew: Freud, Atheism, and the Making of Psychoanalysis (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1987), 21-30. 
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experience using the scientific method, he offered Americans a means to ease the conflict 
between their often competing interests. 
William James’s legacy to American psychology was, like his philosophy as a 
whole, thoroughly pluralistic.10  It was at once humanistic, pragmatic, and radically 
empirical.  It was sensitive to spiritual concerns and self-consciously scientific, interested 
in sickness and committed to health. As a whole, it was new, but its elements were rooted 
in European and American theories and practices from the centuries that preceded it.11  
With James, numerous, powerful threads of psychological thought and practice 
converged, paused just long enough to crystallize a bit, and then progressed with a force 
that would profoundly influence not just the practice of professional psychology but the 
way that many Americans understand and talk about the self and the psyche. The present 
chapter will trace some of the threads that predicated James’s career, while the 
subsequent chapters will explore the flowering of James’s thought in divergent strands of 
20th century American psychology and in particular in the mid-century movement that 
came to be known as humanistic psychology. 
SCIENTIFIC AND RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS OF PSYCHIATRY 
Despite forced bifurcations between religious and scientific approaches to mental 
illness, scarcely a theory existed, before the 20th century, that didn’t, at least conceptually, 
incorporate elements of both. Likewise, even the treatment of mental illness, which was 
overtly oriented toward pathology, implicitly acknowledged human inclinations towards 
health.  
Prior to the establishment of academic and professional psychology at the end of 
the 19th century, administration of the psyche was confined to the medical specialty of 
psychiatry, which was most often practiced in asylums. The profession of Psychiatry was 
                                                
10 Myers, William James, 325-326. 
11 Richardson discusses the complexity of Jamesian psychology, and the influences upon James, at length. 
Richardson, William James. 
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formalized in America with the founding of the Association of Superintendents of 
American Institutions for the Insane in 1844, an early precursor to the American 
Psychiatric Association.12 Benjamin Rush, a hospital-based Philadelphia physician and 
the officially acknowledged “father of American Psychiatry,” published the first 
American psychiatry textbook in 1812, in which he cited the brain as the basis of mental 
illness.13 His biological emphasis, however, didn’t preclude a complementary vision of  
psychiatric treatment as “moral therapy,” and his work’s emphasis on strengthening 
patients’ self-control suggests the enmeshment of psychiatry, from its inception, in both 
religious and personal discourses.14  
Nineteenth century psychiatric understandings were typically framed in 
physiological terms, often referring to the nervous system or to brain structures, but were 
heavily tinged with religious ideas. Explanations of mental illness ranged from the 
concept of “bad” humours or “bad” blood to the notion of satanic possession.15 Likewise, 
some psychiatric treatments of the 19th century reflected puritan ideas of asceticism and 
redemption through suffering. Blood-letting, leaching and mercury poisoning were 
common treatments for mental illness until the mid-nineteenth century.16 Asylum care 
                                                
12 In 1894, the American Medico-Psychological Association was formed, which, in 1921 became the 
American Psychiatric Association , which exists today. For a complete history of the American Psychiatric 
Association, see: Walter E Baron, The History and Influence of the American Psychiatric Association 
(Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press, 1987). 
13 Roy Porter, The Greatest Benefit to Mankind: A Medical History of Humanity (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company, 1998), 384.; Edward Shorter, A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age 
of Prozac (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 1997), 15. Rush’s psychiatry text was: Benjamin Rush, 
Observations and Inquiries upon the Diseases of the Mind (Philadelphia: Kimber & Richardson, 1812). 
14 Shorter, History of Psychiatry, 15. Shorter opposes social-constructionist histories of psychiatry and 
argues for the objective validity of historical psychiatric practices, especially those that incorporated 
biological and proto-neuropsychiatric elements. Rather than apologizing for psychiatry’s more extreme 
“medical” treatments, he is apologetic for psychiatry’s period of interest in psychoanalysis, believing Freud 
to be a pseudo-scientist and dismissing, perhaps unfairly, the era of American interest in psychoanalysis as 
gaffe. His history has been most useful to me as a resource for factual, historical information. 
15 Charles Rosenberg, “The Therapeutic Perspective: Medical practice, Knowledge, and Identity in 
America, 1820-1885,” in The Therapeutic Revolution: Essays in the Social History of American Medicine, 
ed. Morris Vogel  (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979), 3-22. 
16 Ibid., 17. 
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tended to be comparably punishing.17 In spite of Benjamin Rush’s campaign for asylum 
reform in the 1780s, the greater proportion of asylums remained squalid and primitive. In 
the worst cases, mentally ill “sinners” were oppressively confined and often literally tied, 
with rope and chains, to the walls of cold, dark cells.18 
The excesses of psychiatry, however, also mobilized opposition and fueled a 
number of reform movements throughout the 19th century. Attempting to humanize and 
personalize treatment, some doctors developed a philosophy of mental illness as a 
product of physiological imbalance, and implemented treatment aimed at restoring 
“homeostasis” between the individual and the environment. Psychiatrists instructed 
individuals to alter food and water intake, climate, work and relationships to sustain 
psychological balance.19  
Asylum reform of the 1840s, led by Dorothea Dix, embodied this holistic 
perspective, and was premised on the notion that everything from the architecture to the 
practices of the institution itself held curative power.20 Striving for extremes of 
cleanliness, punctuality and precision, many asylums developed a moral mission to uplift 
the character of the mentally ill.21 Unfortunately, governmental financial neglect, 
overcrowding, and understaffing caused many asylums to revert to programs of mere 
custodial care by the turn of the century, a situation that persisted until the Mental 
Hygiene movement adopted a moral mission of humane reform in 1909.22 
                                                
17 From a 21st-century vantage point, many historical psychiatric practices appear thoroughly inhumane. 
Scholarly histories are apologetic and some interpret unpleasant psychiatric practices to be abusive 
exercises of power on the part of the medical professionals, intended to punish social deviance and secure 
doctors’ cultural power and esteem. Examples of social-constructionist perspectives on psychiatry include: 
Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization; A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1965); Norma C. Ware and Mitchell G. Weiss, “Neurasthenia and the Social Construction 
of Psychiatric Knowledge,” Transcultural Psychiatry, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1994): 101-124. 
18 Francis Tiffany. Life of Dorothea Lynde Dix (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1891), 61. 
19 Rosenberg, “Therapeutic Perspective,” 5. 
20 Thomas J. Brown, Dorothea Dix: New England Reformer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1998), 220. 
21 David J. Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic (New 
York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1971), 206-236.  
22 Norman Dain, Clifford Beers: Advocate for the Insane (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980), 
xvii-xviii. 
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Although emergent humanitarian movements reformed various aspects of 
psychiatric practice, tensions remained between what psychiatrists considered efficacious 
treatments and what critics perceived to be inhumane. Lesser known late 19th and early 
20th century treatments included malaria fever therapy, administered by subcutaneous 
injection or by mosquitoes, which were intended to cure syphilitic insanity through a 
course of 106 degree fevers, and insulin shock therapy, which brought patients to the 
brink of death and (ideally) back through 50-60 days spent in a coma.23 American 
psychiatrists also performed cauterization of the clitoris (as women were more often 
perceived to be hysterical and insane), sterilization, and hydrotherapy, which involved 
either continuous baths or tight wrapping in wet sheets.24 Critics of these somatic 
approaches to mental illness argue that whatever limited successes accompanied these 
therapies were likely attributable not to biology but, ironically, to the subjective 
experience of faith, the “hope to heal and be healed.”25 
THE PROBLEM OF COMPROMISE 
Explicit compromises between scientific and spiritual approaches to mental 
illness tended to arouse the disdain and denunciation of both pure scientists and staunch 
religious figures. Among the many movements and theories that emerged to offer 
Americans a way to fuse their religious and scientific impulses, three in particular laid the 
                                                
23 Joel Braslow, Mental Ills and Bodily Cures Psychiatric Treatment in the First Half of the Twentieth 
Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) 96-98. 
24 Ibid, 39, 56, and 165-168. 
25 Ibid., 94.;  Twentieth century treatments would continue to tread the boundary between inhumane 
treatment and efficacious medical practice. Prefrontal lobotomies, for example, which were widely popular 
in the US in the 1940s (in 1949 alone, 5,074 psychosurgeries were estimated to have been performed), 
appeared to decrease agitation in severely mentally ill patients, but also to significantly impair their 
memory and functioning. Lobotomies dropped off in the early 1950s, as critics highlighted the overuses/ 
abuses of the treatment by practitioners like Walter Freeman.  
Comparably, electroconvulsive shock therapy (ECT) earned both praise and disdain. Although it was found 
to be beneficial in the treatment of major depression in the 1930s, many psychiatrists were reluctant to 
utilize a practice whose mechanisms were scarcely understood. At present, the majority of research 
suggests that the practice is both safe and efficacious. Shorter, History of Psychiatry, 207-229.; For 
contemporary reviews of the efficacy of ECT, see Max Fink, “Convulsive therapy: a review of the first 55 
years,” Journal of Affective Disorders, Vol. 63, March (2001), 1-15.; Zigmond M. Lebensohn, “The 
History of Electroconvulsive Therapy in the United States and its Place in American Psychiatry: A Personal 
Memoir,” Comprehensive Psychiatry, Vol. 40, Issue 3 (1999): 173-181. 
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groundwork for “humanistic” psychological approaches in the 20th century. Mesmerism, 
phrenology and spiritualism demonstrated the kinds of compromises that occupied the 
murky middle ground between science and religion. The magio-religious practice of 
Mesmerism, founded on Franz Mesmer’s speculative science of “animal magnetism,” 
typifies the kind of treatment that provoked both scientific and religious criticism.  
Franz Mesmer, a French physician and self-identified empirical scientist, 
developed the theory of animal magnetism in 1774.26 Mesmer described health as the free 
flow of fluid through thousands of channels in our bodies, and illness as the frustration of 
this flow. A crisis, which could be expedited by the influence of an individual possessing 
a high degree of animal magnetism, was required to remove the obstacles and restore the 
healthy flow. Mesmer’s valuation of the healing effects of the physician’s presence 
represented an early formulation of psychotherapy, and his actual practice laid the 
groundwork for the hypnotic trance that became widely popular in the 19th and 20th 
centuries.27 
Many scientists, including the Viennese and Parisian physicians to whom Mesmer 
appealed, considered Mesmerism an “empirically elusive medium,” criticizing the 
dubiousness of the underlying physiological processes that produced trances and 
                                                
26Based on his experimentation on a young female patient (Fräulein Oesterline) with physical magnets, 
Mesmer concluded that his ability to heal various ailments was attributable, not to physical procedures, but 
to his own “animal magnetism,” which he described as a “universally distributed fluid,” flowing freely 
between the cosmos, animals and plants.  He remarked that, “I used the most accredited remedies to 
counteract [her] different ailments, but only my attention, never losing sight of her, put me in a place to pull 
her away from the evident dangers of death.” Franz Mesmer, “Letter from F.M. Mesmer, Doctor of 
Medicine at Vienna, to A.M. Unzer, Doctor of Medicine, on the Medicinal Usage of the Magnet,” in 
Mesmerism: A Translation of Original Medical and Scientific Writings of F.A. Mesmer, M.D., ed. and 
trans. George J. Bloch (Los Altos, CA: William Kaufmann, Inc, 1980), 23-29. 
27In individual treatment, Mesmer sat opposite his patient, with his back to the north, his feet touching the 
patient’s feet, and his thumbs resting lightly on the “nerve plexes,” at the pit of the stomach. Mesmer made 
“passes,” moving his hands from the patient’s shoulders down the length of his arms. He then pressed his 
fingers beneath the patient’s diaphragm—the “hypochondria”—holding them there for hours if necessary. 
Patients often experienced strange sensations and some had convulsions, which he considered to be the 
“crises” that would bring about cure. Franz Mesmer, “Catechism on Animal Magnetism,” in Mesmerism: A 
Translation of Original Medical and Scientific Writings of F.A. Mesmer, M.D., ed. and trans. George J, 
Bloch (Los Altos, CA: William Kaufmann, Inc, 1980), 81-86. For a fuller explication of Mesmerism, see 
Frank A. Pattie, Mesmer and Animal Magnetism: A Chapter in the History of Medicine (Hamilton, NY: 
Edmonston Publishing, Inc, 1994); and Robert Darnton, Mesmerism and the End of the Enlightenment in 
France (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968). 
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skeptical of the potential of enduring reform achieved in hypnotic states.28 Mesmer wrote 
in 1779 on the reception of his theory: “I soon became aware that I was being accused of 
eccentricity, that I was being treated like a dogmatist, and that my tendency to quit the 
normal path of Medicine was being construed as a crime.”29 Churchmen were equally 
disapproving of the practice of Mesmerism, referring to it as a “spectacular dissolution of 
spirit.”30 While his careful notes, scientific methods, and medical practices placed him in 
the realm of naturalistic science, Mesmer’s suggestibility hypothesis appeared to 
invalidate some of the natural laws that scientists had come to accept and to negate the 
idea of free will that was implicit in most Protestant systems of belief.31  
The controversial nature of Mesmer’s theory and practice, and its unique 
combination of spiritual and scientific elements, provoked lay interest, leading Mesmer to 
extend his individual treatments to groups and to “perform” his treatments in the 1780s.32 
Audiences were enthralled by the magical nature of the “cure,” equating spiritual 
qualities with an element of mystery as elusive as the causes of mental disturbance 
themselves. At the same time, they were appeased by the vague scientific theory that 
satisfied their rationalistic leanings.33 
The embellished theatrical qualities of Mesmer’s performances, however, 
ultimately proved too much for the Viennese public to digest. Mesmer’s colorful robes, 
iron wands, and ponderings on telepathy and clairvoyance elicited a sense of the occult, 
                                                
28 Donald Meyer, The Positive Thinkers: Popular Religious Psychology from Mary Baker Eddy to Norman 
Vincent Peale and Ronald Reagan (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1965), 68. 
29 Franz Mesmer, “Dissertation on the Discover of Animal Magnetism,” In George J, Bloch, in 
Mesmerism: A Translation of Original Medical and Scientific Writings of F.A. Mesmer, M.D., trans. 
George J, Bloch (Los Altos, CA: William Kaufmann, Inc, 1980), 43-80. 
30 Meyer, Positive Thinkers, 68. 
31 Ernest R. Hilgard, introduction to A Translation of the Original Medical and Scientific Writings of F.A. 
Mesmer, M.D., ed. and trans. George J. Bloch (Los Altos, CA: William Kaufmann, Inc.: 1980), xi-xxiii. 
32 In applying this treatment to groups, Mesmer devised a vessel, called a “baquet,” around which 
participants gathered. Metal rods extended from the vessel to the individuals, and hemp rope connected 
individuals to one another. Mesmer himself moved around the group and laid his hands on individuals who 
seemed to be nearing crisis. Mesmer, “Catechism on Animal Magnetism,” 81-86. 
33 Thomas Hardy Leahey, A History of Psychology: Main Currents in Psychological Thought, 6th ed., (New 
York: Prentice Hall, 2003), 217. 
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discrediting any implication of legitimate science.34 While most Americans never 
witnessed Mesmer’s performances firsthand, they came to imagine them, by the 1780s, as 
more of a circus than a science.35 What remained of Mesmer’s ideas, after enthusiasm for 
his particular program waned, was an enduring interest in the mesmeric trance (also 
known as hypnosis).36 William James used the terms mesmerism and hypnosis 
synonymously, and, himself, experimentally hypnotized Harvard students in March of 
1886.37  
Phrenology, the scientific theory that related localized brain functions to human 
behavior, occupied a comparable space in the American imagination. Originating with 
the work of Franz Joseph Gall in the early 19th century, phrenology was popularized by 
Johann Gaspar Spurzheim when he began a speaking tour of the US in the 1820s. 
Spurzheim, in lectures and in print, departed from Gall’s theory by deliberately excluding 
categories of brain faculties that were inherently evil, instead promoting a vision of 
human potential and perfectibility through the study of phrenology.38 
American phrenology had wide appeal, and proved compelling even to serious 
thinkers.39 The main channels for phrenological theory were lecture tours and European 
books in translation, which began to proliferate in the 1820s.40 Popularizers, who often 
                                                
34 Pressured by harsh critique and the abandonment of his followers, Mesmer disavowed the movement in 
1784, though the movement abided in various forms. Leahey, History of Psychology, 216-217. 
35 Ibid., 216-217. 
36 In spite of a dearth of evidence for the usefulness of Mesmerism in ameliorating psychological 
conditions, scientists continued to pursue studies in this vein. Mesmer’s successor James Braid abandoned 
the analogy of magnetism and the specifics of Mesmer’s treatment in the 1840s, but the tenets of 
hypnosis—namely the power of suggestion—endured in Braid’s practice of evoking a somnambulistic 
trance as an anesthetic. Jean Charcot resuscitated the psychiatric interest in hypnosis with his application of 
the treatment to hysteria in the 1880s. Leahey, History of Psychology, 218 and 293-295.; Meyer, Positive 
Thinkers, 68-69. 
 
38 John B. Davies, Phrenology: Fad and Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), 8. 
39 One notable intellectual convert was Henry Ward Beecher, who despite his initial skepticism, 
enthusiastically subscribed to phrenology. Robert Abzug, Cosmos Crumbling: American Reform and the 
Religious Imagination (New York: Oxford, 1994), 167-168.  
40 Interest in phrenology peaked around 1838-1840 with the lecture tour of the world-famous phrenologist 
George Combe. Davies, Phrenology, 34. 
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lacked a scientific background, were able to evoke a sense of the theory’s scientific bases 
in their appeals to academia and to the American lay public in general.41  
Practical phrenology, a distinctively American outgrowth, diverged from the 
scientific bases of Gall’s original theory more dramatically. The goal of applied practice 
was to “explain each man to himself,” and the most common manifestation was the 
individual character reading, in which the bumps on individuals’ skulls were examined in 
order to identify weak and strong character traits. Subjects were then counseled to 
compensate for deficient faculties and to diminish excessively strong characteristics by 
sheer force of will.42 Combining religious themes of moral rectitude and self-
improvement with a pioneering form of psychotherapy, phrenology concretized formerly 
elusive ideas of character and upheld a doctrine of self-improvement.43 Also, by offering 
moral imperatives to compensate for genetic deficits, phrenology constructed a spiritual 
and scientific world view that rendered individual problems intelligible and 
manageable.44 
Like phrenology, the mid-19th century movement that came to be known as 
Spiritualism promised answers—to questions of how to live and where to find meaning—
that blended scientific and spiritual language and methods. Characterized by the belief 
that the dead could be contacted through a medium in order to provide worldly and 
spiritual guidance to the living, Spiritualism arose in 1848, when Kate and Margaret Fox 
                                                
41 Founded on correlation studies of the physical appearance of individuals’ skulls and personality traits, 
phrenology alleged that the brain was divided into 37 faculties which corresponded precisely with physical 
locations on the skull. The measurement of such locations could yield explanations of impairments in 
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of Hydesville, New York, reportedly contacted the spirit of a murdered peddler who 
communicated through loud, rapping noises.45 Burgeoning in the “burned-over district” 
of upstate New York among Radical Quakers who first received the Foxes’ report, 
Spiritualism soon gained an American following, comprised mainly of “circles” of 
reformers and Radical protestants who gathered for organized séances. The gatherings 
tended to be solemn, well-ordered and formulaic affairs, characterized by dim lighting, 
prompt beginnings and endings, the circumscribed formation of a gender-mixed circle 
and the induction of a mesmeric or trance-state in the medium, followed by physical 
manifestations of the presence of spirits. The rigid execution of the séance ritual, 
combined with careful observation of the physical manifestations of spirits, were 
essential to Spiritualists’ belief in the objective bases of the practice and the harmonious 
coexistence of science and religion in their minds.46 The founding of the American 
Society for Psychical Research in 1882, in which William James was a leading figure, 
and the Society for Psychical Research, launched in London the same year, testifies to the 
presumed scientific element of the mystical practice.47  
Spiritualists subscribed to an “electric cosmology” that paralleled Mesmerists 
“magnetic cosmology.”48 Essential to their worldview was the belief in a universally 
pervasive but invisible fluid, called “ether,” that entwined the human with the divine, and 
subjected the human to the influence of the spiritual. Through the scientific theory that 
grounded their spiritual belief, 19th century Spiritualists were able to reconcile their need 
for spiritual solace with the cultural thrust towards individualism and scientific 
materialism. Séance participants were instructed to infuse the collective circle with their 
individual beliefs, feelings and desires, and to look to the spiritual realm for ministration 
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of their damaged spirits.49 They were uniquely able to receive “cosmic comfort” from a 
spiritual realm that they perceived to be thoroughly grounded in physical science.  
Unlike the strictly medical psychiatric practices of bleeding, purging and mercury 
poisoning, which focused on the toxic elements of individuals, Spiritualists affirmed the 
positive value of the individual, highlighting the proximity of the human to the divine, 
opposing orthodox medicine (which viewed the individual as inevitably prone to disease) 
and orthodox religion (which viewed the individual as constitutionally predisposed to 
sin). 50  At the same time, Spiritualists affirmed personal experiences of powerlessness, 
encouraging individuals to turn over their own sense of power and control to the medium 
(who was herself giving over control to the trance state) and to the spirits who 
communicated spiritual truths.51  
More mainstream religious practices began to display the subtle influence of 
psychological theory at the end of the 19th century. Some ministers appropriated the 
emerging notion of the unconscious, for example, linking spiritual, individual, and 
scientific worlds in a distinctively American form of romantic individualism.52 Others 
evoked the emotionalism of the Second Great Awakening, infusing it with a social 
mission to be achieved through individual reform.53 
Christian Science, for instance, explicitly connected mainstream Christianity with 
science’s potential for mental healing.54 Founded by Mary Baker Eddy upon the 
publication of her book Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures in 1875, Christian 
Science, a form of what William James called “Mind Cure,” introduced a religious 
perspective that encouraged individual reform through will and action in the service of 
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mental health.55 By invoking the suggestive power also characteristic of Mesmerism, 
Mind Cure aimed to mobilize the healing forces of the individual. Medicine, according to 
Eddy and others, was progressing too slowly—creating a gap between individual 
expectations and experience which had to be filled by placing faith in an ideology of 
mental reform.56 Tapping into notions of human potential and perfectibility, Christian 
Science placed the power of cognitive change in the hands of the individual, elevating 
individuals’ sense of agency beyond the productive capacity of science. 
Enterprises like Christian Science reflected the awareness that Americans 
increasingly understood themselves in terms of both science and religion.57 By 
holistically conceptualizing mental illness, in terms of both body and spirit, Christian 
Science also worked in conjunction with late 19th and early 20th century humanitarian 
efforts to de-criminalize and de-stigmatize mental illness, giving individuals a means to 
understand their own psychological problems that was congruent with their meaning 
systems.58  
The Emmanuel Movement, which began in 1906, was another attempt to 
holistically integrate religious and scientific elements into the treatment of the individual. 
Founded by the credentialed academics and well-respected rectors Elwood Worcester and 
Samuel McComb, the earliest manifestation of the Emmanuel movement was a weekly 
class for impoverished tuberculosis patients that combined medical advice and faith-
based healing. This course became a model for later treatment programs designed to aid 
those suffering from everything from nervous disorders and physical maladies to alcohol 
addictions. 59 Operating on the belief that certain disorders had religious and medical 
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components, the program sanctioned the treatment of mental problems by medically 
informed ministers.60 
Like the less grounded compromises of the 18th and 19th century, the Emmanuel 
Movement received its share of criticism from both scientists and religious figures.61 
Foreshadowing the professional conflict over psychotherapeutic credentials that would 
become an almost permanent part of the psychotherapeutic landscape in the 20th century, 
vociferous psychiatrists argued that the treatment of mental disorders rightfully belonged 
to the physician rather than to the clergyman, who lacked knowledge of the nervous 
system and the brain.62  
Although movements attempting to marry religion and science in mental healing 
expanded, and often elevated, the roles of clergymen, they also inspired criticism from 
religious institutions. Religious opponents of the Emmanuel Movement scrutinized the 
instrumental use of religion and contended that the selective use of religious principles 
for therapeutic ends impoverished the gospel.63 Most protestants had similarly castigated 
the Mind Cure movement and Spiritualism. In spite of these initial protests, though, 
religion would find it impossible to stay out of the therapeutic realm, particularly as 20th 
century psychology threatened to displace traditional religion.64  
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Scientists found it comparably difficult to stay out of the religious realm in their 
explanations of mental illness. Their attempts to supplant early American concepts of the 
religious causes of mental afflictions were often superficially successful; lay people were 
increasingly persuaded by behavioral and biological elucidations of the psyche. But, as 
events of the subsequent century demonstrated, less quantifiable desires—for spiritual 
affirmation, for meaning and values, for recognition of subjectivity and consciousness—
repeatedly and tenaciously asserted themselves.65  
Although Freud made an explicit attempt to forego religious considerations, 
relying instead on an entirely scientific conception of the structure and development of 
the psyche, his critics and followers tried to account for the spiritual dimensions of 
human existence.66 Carl Jung, for example, revised Freud’s theory to include a 
“collective unconscious,” a component of the psyche comprised of shared religious 
archetypes, or symbols. Jung also directly explored the link between psychology and 
religion in his later work, including Psychology and Religion, first published in English 
1938.67 
Freud had originally envisioned psychoanalysis as a potential replacement for 
religion and as an alternative conception of individual identity.68 American psychologists, 
who increasingly perceived religious elements to threaten the explanatory integrity of 
objective theory, were compelled by Freudian theory in the teens and 1920s. Lay 
Americans, as well, were drawn to the way that the explicitly non-religious theory 
undermined oppressive Victorian and traditional religious standards of morality.69  
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But Freud’s theory could neither assuage individuals seeking a strongly religious 
nor a firmly scientific psychology. For many, Freud’s scientific bases were inadequate.70 
He dismissed rigorous experimental methodology, and his scant scientific observations 
were made on the basis of very few case studies.71 Further, his findings were difficult to 
replicate.72 Detached from the academy, Freud’s followers among academic 
psychologists, including Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, Erik Erikson, and Harry Stack 
Sullivan, only grew less research-oriented in the 1920s and 1930s, many of them 
choosing to refine theoretical assertions rather than gather empirical support for the 
theories.73  
Although Freud’s ultimate impact on popular conceptions of the psyche and the 
self was vast—communities of psychoanalysts thrived into the 1930s and 1940s, and 
popular representations of Freudian theory appeared throughout the century—Freudian 
theory grew increasingly vulnerable to attack, both within and outside academic 
psychology.74 Psychoanalysis seemed to disregard the historical and personal significance 
of the major foundational institutions that gave Americans meaning.75 Science and 
religion, etched indelibly even in the minds of the founders of American psychology, 
proved to be cornerstones of America’s cultural system of meaning that could not be 
ignored. 
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COMPETING TENSIONS IN THE FOUNDERS OF THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY 
Those who attempted to define the New Psychology as a purely scientific 
enterprise, disentangled from its philosophical and spiritual roots, neglected the 
experiences of its founders. Even William James, who attempted to establish psychology 
as a natural science, was plagued by religious and philosophical questions. A self-avowed 
pluralist, James felt that monism didn’t do justice to the complexity of individual 
experience.76 Instead his theory emphasized “process, growth, and an ever shifting frame 
of reference.”77 James’s book The Varieties of Religious Experience, which described a 
wide variety of religious and psychological experiences, attempted to broaden 
psychological religious understanding more than to empirically limit the categories or 
narrow the analysis.78  
Although James is credited with establishing the empiricist and experimentalist 
tradition that came to characterize American psychology, the brand of empiricism he 
advocated foreshadowed the holistic experimental methods of humanistic psychology.79 
Trained in the experimental tradition, James infused the New Psychology with a 
scientism grounded in physiology and a pragmatism that disarmed the more tenuous 
philosophical leanings of mentalism.80 Throughout his work, though, he maintained a 
critique of the narrow and exclusive perspective of the laboratory approach that 
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humanistic psychologists, later in the century, would so clearly position themselves 
against.81  
For James, the necessity of accounting for spiritual and philosophical dimensions 
of individual experience in his work sprung from the salience of these dimensions in his 
personal life. On multiple occasions, James’ own struggles with philosophical questions 
actually induced psychological symptoms. James was eminently “neurasthenic” and, 
during one of his episodes of religious questioning and clinical depression, was so 
impaired as to be unable to rise from his bed for weeks.82 James’ personal experience 
solidified, for him, the connection between spiritual questions and the physiological 
experience of mental illness.  
James was at once a positivist and a phenomenologist, distrustful of binary 
solutions and ever pursuing “productive paradoxes.”83 He possessed an ability to 
fruitfully integrate conflict, the complexity of which would drive many of his successors 
to reductionistic extremes.  
The same religious, philosophical, and scientific tensions which granted fullness 
to James’s work posed relatively insurmountable problems to the academic psychologists 
who followed him. G. Stanley Hall, James’s student and the first American to receive a 
PhD in Clinical Psychology in 1878, was deeply conflicted, even confused, about his 
religious and scientific sensibilities. Hall took a stand against philosophically informed 
models of psychology, whose efforts in psychology, he believed, had been informed “not 
by the patient attitude of the scientist but by the speculative urge of the philosopher to 
grasp the whole of things.”84 His position was supported by younger experimentalists, 
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who desired to adhere strictly to the scientific method, eliminating all metaphysical and 
philosophical questions from consideration. Yet, he met his share of opponents, including 
colleagues like George Trumbull Ladd, whose recognition of philosophical questions 
infused his own empiricism.85  
Ironically, Hall believed that religious “sentiment” could infuse psychological 
science, and that psychology, in turn, could transform religion. The “religious cant” with 
which he embellished his psychology disturbed even James.86 Although his interest in 
religion was subtle in his earlier publications—it was one of many areas of interest, for 
example in Adolescence, which he published in 1904—Hall grew increasingly committed 
to developing a psychology of religion. 87 Demonstrating his specific interest in the 
psychology of Christianity, Hall published Jesus, the Christ, in Light of Psychology in 
1917.88 After James’ death in 1909, the turn-of-the-century younger generation of 
psychologists, ushered in on a tide of increasing commitment to experimental science, 
proved even more critical of Hall’s attempt to reconcile religious sentiment with the 
scientific world view. Never in moderation, Hall’s intensity tended to divide 
psychologists, whether solidifying their position for or against him. 89 
Hall brought to his science a demeanor more characteristic of religious fervor than 
pragmatic science. Rather than paving the way for productive philosophical and 
theoretical compromise or compelling an integrationist agenda, Hall’s pressing internal 
conflicts led him to sublimate spiritual questions in the pursuit of rigorous positivism. 
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Humanistic elements of Hall’s theory include his belief in the natural human inclination 
towards growth and improvement and his concern for the possibility of abuse in 
psychological testing and quantification.90 But he was also an avid proponent of 
adjustment (the measurement of psychological health by the extent to which an 
individual’s cognitions and attitudes align with those of the wider culture), of severing 
philosophy from psychology, and of privileging biological over cultural factors. Instead 
of incorporating a topical consideration of spirituality into psychological inquiry, Hall 
tended to channel his spiritual passion into radical scientific pursuits, which he valued to 
be the “apex of civilization.”91 Often beginning carefully and critically, Hall often got 
carried away by his excitement over the implications of his theories, recklessly leading 
American psychology on a positivistic course.92  
Although Hall personally displayed the irrepressibility of personal values and 
subjective perspective in scientific inquiry, he supported the suppression of subjectivity 
within psychological inquiry. Hall, like other American academic psychologists who 
were influenced by the popularity of Darwinism and the prestige of medicine, discarded 
the psychology of consciousness and introspection in favor of pragmatic functionalism. 
The supposed impartiality of the new methods, which concealed the individual interests 
and passions that drove them, predictably helped move psychology into a position of 
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professional respect and cultural authority. 93 The new experimental psychology, by 
dismissing pre-1880s psychology endeavors as mere “mental philosophy,” attempted to 
establish itself as a purely scientific enterprise,  more capable of capturing the “truth” of 
human experience.94  
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Chapter Two: America’s New Psychology 
William James’ psychology was at once atomistic and holistic. Modeled on 
German experimental psychology, it both declared itself a natural science and took as its 
subject matter the unquantifiable arenas of observed and lived experience and psychic 
commonalities and differences. 1 Rather than deriving intractable laws of human 
behavior, Jamesian psychology sought to encompass the full range of human experience.2 
Many of the issues that were important to James are reflected in the work of 20th 
century psychologists, particularly in holistic branches of psychology like social work, 
pastoral counseling and postwar psychotherapy.3 But 20th century American psychology 
was also influenced by pervasive American cultural currents that demanded practicality 
and scientific precision of psychological explanations. One historian describes 20th 
century American psychology as “rough, direct, highly practical, aggressively ambitious 
and self-assured.”4 Its dominant perspectives in the first half of the 20th century were 
positivism and behaviorism in its academic form, and medicalization and utilitarian 
categorization in its applied forms. These emphases fueled the tension between atomism 
and holism. On the one hand, the narrowing of their subject matter helped psychologists 
carve out their turf, distinguishing them from other professionals concerned with mental 
health.5 On the other hand, the insistence on positivism and behaviorism as singular 
standards for psychology provoked a sustained critique of the mainstream of the 
profession from psychologists of other persuasions, who were concerned more with 
holistic and humanistic study of the psyche. 
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The tension  between atomism and holism also played out in the division between 
the academic study and clinical application of psychology. The generation of American 
psychologists who followed James rejected almost all philosophical speculation and 
turned from mentalist to exclusively physicalist explanations. Psychologists like Robert 
Mearns Yerkes (1876-1956), Edward Lee Thorndike (1874-1949), and John B. Watson 
(1878-1958) argued against the practice of psychology as a social science. They focused 
instead on physiology and behavioral study, and chose to align the emerging discipline 
with the natural sciences. 6 Consequently, those who worked with the mentally ill found 
themselves increasingly estranged from the scientific study of psychology, concerning 
themselves with the experience of their patients and looking toward more holistic 
attempts at cure.7  
Changes in the American university system around the turn of the century 
hastened the split between academic and applied psychology, encouraging professors 
interested in psychology to define themselves as pure researchers.8 Prior to 1880, the 
classical college was a one-curriculum system, with undifferentiated departments, which 
rewarded professors for the breadth rather than the depth of their knowledge, stressed the 
accumulation of factual knowledge, and tended to stifle creative thought and discourage 
scientific probing. It wasn’t until the late 19th century that scientific research, formerly 
relegated to extra-academic spheres funded by the American government, found a home 
in American universities. 9  
In 1861, Yale University awarded the first American PhD, and in 1876 Johns 
Hopkins was established as the first American graduate school, marking the birth of the 
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modern university, uniquely devoted to research and professional education. The new 
university consisted of differentiated disciplines and was modeled on European—
particularly German—educational systems, in which scholars were free to guide their 
own scientific inquiry and were encouraged to display creativity in their pursuits.10 
American psychology departments were also shaped by German models.11 A 
number of the leading psychologists at the turn of the century—including G. Stanley 
Hall, James McKeen Cattell, and Lightmer Witmer—had studied in the laboratory of 
Wilhelm Wundt, and others, including William James, had studied more broadly in 
Europe. Early American psychology took shape under the direct influence of European 
immigrants like Hugo Munsterberg and E. B. Tichener, who had been recruited to 
permanent posts at American universities for their expertise in scientific methods.12  
By the late 19th century, psychology, which had been previously housed in 
departments of philosophy and physiology, ventured out on its own. The first doctorate in 
psychology was awarded to Joseph Jastrow, a student of G. Stanley Hall, at John Hopkins 
University in 1886. James McKeen Cattell became the first professor of Psychology at 
Penn in 1888. After the founding of the American Psychological Association (APA) in 
1892, distinct departments of psychology proliferated, invariably modeled on scientific 
foundations and devoted to the extrication of psychological study from metaphysical 
concerns. The APA was, from its inception, an association primarily geared towards the 
interests of the academic researcher rather than the clinical practitioner.13  
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Although founding members of what became known as the “New Psychology,” 
like James, advocated a form of psychology broad enough to include mentalist and 
physicalist explanations, academicians increasingly relegated considerations of 
introspection and unconscious mental processes to applied spheres. The years 1911 and 
1912, in particular, marked a major shift in the content of American psychological 
research: while proceedings from the APA conference of 1911 were dominated by broad-
ranging discussions of consciousness, the subsequent year’s conference was comprised 
almost exclusively of physicalist studies focused on observed behavior.14 
THE TRIUMPH OF BEHAVIORISM IN ACADEMIC PSYCHOLOGY 
In 1912, Max Meyer published a comprehensive theory of behaviorism in The 
Fundamental Laws of Human Behavior.15 Meyer, a recent immigrant to America, was 
uniquely attuned to the places in which American psychology was likely to diverge from 
European, correctly anticipating the popular appeal of the theory.16 But it was John B. 
Watson’s “behaviorist manifesto”—an article entitled “Psychology as the Behaviorist 
Views It,” published in 1913—that marked the formal emergence of behaviorism as a 
school of American psychology.17  In his manifesto, Watson proclaimed: “Psychology as 
the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science. Its 
theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior. Introspection forms no essential 
part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness 
with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness.”18 Watson 
believed that the field must leave behind mentalist emphases to secure its scientific status, 
arguing that psychology should “discard all reference to consciousness,” and that it “need 
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no longer delude itself into thinking that it is making mental states the object of 
observation.” 19 
American interest in behavioral psychology spread rapidly and pervaded the field 
thoroughly, often perplexing European psychologists who lacked the same kind of 
cultural interest in pragmatic applications and didn’t share the reverence for objective 
experimental study.20 European critics of behaviorism, namely psychologists Kurt Koffka 
(1886-1941) and Wolfgang Kohler (1887-1968), called on Gestalt Psychology for 
support, arguing for the necessity of mentalism in psychological study and for the role of 
perceived structures and relationships, rather than sensations, in constituting human 
consciousness.21  
The rigidity of American subscription to behaviorist theory was experienced as 
oppressive by many, but particularly by immigrants schooled in a more philosophically 
informed, humanistic model of progress in which psychological theory would evolve 
through dialogue rather than achieve a final, scientifically-verifiable resting place. 
Jacoby, in The Repression of Psychoanalysis, argues that the insecurity of immigrants, 
who were traumatized by Fascism and were struggling with a new language and culture, 
compelled them to conform to rigid and isolationist theories of American psychology that 
held no place for the social and political ideas with which they’d infused their theories 
when still in Europe. He writes, “[t]he catastrophe of exile and their ineluctable 
Americanization buried their nonconformist theories, hopes, and commitments. In the 
end, they fit in, and succeeded by sacrificing their own identities.”22  Many immigrants 
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found the mandate for behaviorist study stultifying, and indicative of intellectual 
constraints and specialized notions of what should constitute and define a discipline that 
were incompatible with the subject of human psychology.23  
Immigrant concerns echoed those of a minority of American psychologists who 
were disturbed by the rapidity with which psychology was becoming a “cult of 
empiricism,” in which “methodological imperatives […] were proposed as perquisites for 
the establishment of rigor and objectivity within psychological science.”24 American 
psychologists Gordon Allport, Gardner Murphy and Lois Barclay Murphy, though 
dedicated to the scientific elements of psychology, grew increasingly dismayed in the 
1930s and 1940s by the narrowing of the discipline of psychology, in American 
psychology departments, down to a reductionistic pursuit of “the objective truth” of 
psychological phenomena. Gordon Allport felt that, “just as chemical analysis of living 
tissues destroys life, rendering the mere chemical description inadequate as a description 
of the total reality, so the reduction of mental states to elements destroys that unity, that 
organization, which is mental life itself.”25  
Empiricist emphases were not unfamiliar to European immigrants, who were 
well-versed in the structuralism that dominated European psychology. In fact, many 
immigrants who were grounded in phenomenological and Gestalt traditions held 
empiricism, which for them was a much more encompassing notion than it was for 
Americans, to be a primary and significant element of their theory and research. They 
were repelled, however, by the way that certain American behaviorists translated 
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empiricism into what, to the Europeans, seemed an extreme form of reductionism, and by 
the willingness of many to disregard human complexity in pursuit of distilled and 
comprehensible psychological phenomena. 26  
Both American critics and many immigrant psychologists found the criteria for 
behavioral study incompatible with the study of a subject matter as complex as human 
psychology. Leading second generation behaviorists like B. F. Skinner, however, 
dismissed this charge, defending the elimination of mental events from the study of 
psychology. He argued that “if we are to call anything oversimplified, it must be those 
mentalistic explanations, so readily invented on the spot, which are appealing because 
they seem so much simpler than the facts they are said to explain.”27 Even if we were to 
conceive humans as akin to machines, Skinner averred, humans and the laws that 
governed them were infinitely more complex than the simple machines—like 
refrigerators—to which we were accustomed. 28 
Skinner affirmed Watson’s attempt to divorce psychology from mentalism, but 
took issue with Watson’s strategy. He criticized Watson’s effort to redefine the subject 
matter of psychology by attacking the introspective study of mental life. Skinner, who 
established himself as a behaviorist in the 1930s, argued in his 1974 book About 
Behaviorism that Watson  should have instead proposed a new science, to be called “the 
experimental analysis of behavior.” Skinner defined Watson’s behaviorism as 
methodological behaviorism, a study which “ could be said to ignore consciousness, 
feelings, and states of mind” and his own as radical behaviorism, a science that “does not 
thus ‘behead the organism’” or “sweep the problem of subjectivity under the rug.” 
Instead, Skinner’s radical behaviorism incorporated consciousness by studying the role of 
autonomic stimulation in behavior.29  
                                                
26 Ibid., 9. 
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28 Ibid., 263. 
29 Ibid., 241-242. 
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Skinner’s claim that the study of human behavior would make man more 
understandable (he argued that behaviorism was intended to “dehomunculize” man, 
rather than “dehumanize” him) appealed to the American commitment to progress and 
mastery.30 Practical applications of behaviorist theory, which emerged in personal and 
social realms in the 1940s, served both empirical and practical ends.31 One historian 
traces American behaviorism’s line of descent to turn-of-the-century Progressive reform, 
a movement influenced in turn by societal reform. This impulse was characterized by an 
inclination to optimize social betterment through objective findings.32  
Methodological behaviorists like John B. Watson and Edward L. Thorndike, and 
radical behaviorists, or neobehaviorists, like Skinner, were actively engaged in empirical 
research, rather than social application.33 Although Skinner theorized that a science of 
behavior could yield “the design and construction of a world which [frees man] from 
constraints and vastly extend[s] his range,” he left the application of behavioral theory to 
practitioners and policy makers.34 With different motivations and interests, practitioners 
found the greatest use for behaviorist theory in the application of mental testing.35 
Meanwhile, behaviorists tended to remain in the laboratory. 
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THE FRAGMENTATION OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 
Applied psychology was, by its very definition, more “humanistic” than 
experimental academic study. Faced with real human problems and varied individual 
conflicts, practitioners were forced to confront the messiness of human experience that 
behaviorists tried to reduce and control. But this hardly meant that they agreed on how 
best to do it. Applied psychology grew in the interwar and postwar years exponentially 
faster than experimental psychology, but also witnessed greater philosophical and 
professional conflicts, which led to increased differentiation between, and specialization 
among, groups of psychologists.36 While psychiatrists, psychotherapists, social workers, 
and pastoral counselors shared the common goals of easing personal and social 
dysfunction, they shared little consensus regarding treatment theory. The pressure to 
make their own specialty indispensable and to achieve professional supremacy accented 
their differences—by framing them in competitive terms that often undermined the 
respectability of neighboring professions. It also produced a host of uninvited 
consequences, which included the almost complete medicalization of psychiatry, the 
professionalization of psychology based on a scientist-practitioner model, and the 
marginalization of social workers and pastoral counselors.37 
Protecting the Medical Status of Psychiatry and Psychoanalysis 
Psychiatrists, backed by the American Medical Association (AMA), laid the 
groundwork for the battles over exclusivity that would come to define psychotherapy. In 
addition to enforcing informal standards for the practice of reputable psychotherapeutic 
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practice, psychiatrists sought formal measures to protect their turf, limit competition and 
ensure the longevity of their profession.38 
In the first half of the 20th century, psychiatrists either managed mental asylums or 
engaged in private practice where they treated the mentally ill.39 Trained in medicine, 
they were schooled in biological theories of mental illness, attuned to physiological 
components of psychopathology, and aware of early neuropsychiatric theories of the role 
of the nervous system.40 Influenced by the work of Emil Kraeplin, they performed the 
work of diagnosis, which at the turn of the century consisted of just a few categories of 
pathology, including Kraeplin’s manic depression and dementia praecox.41  
American psychiatrists, particularly those who practiced after Freud’s visit in 
1909, also performed psychotherapy, or “talk therapy,” and advanced psychological 
theory. 42 Psychiatrists viewed psychoanalysis as a new opportunity for expanding their 
turf. Formerly lacking a cohesive theory of the psyche that could apply to mental health 
or illness, they found the explanatory framework of psychoanalysis, and the technique of 
talk therapy, to be highly marketable in the treatment of mental distress. Psychoanalysis 
also extended psychiatrists’ clientele beyond severely impaired psychotics to the much 
larger pool of functional neurotics.43 
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Freud’s theory, which had been trickling into the US from the first years of the 
20th century, formally arrived with his visit to Clark University in 1909. But the lay 
popularity of psychoanalysis developed in the 1920s, when Freud’s ideas appeared in 
national magazines and newspapers. The American public’s understanding of 
psychoanalysis tended to be an eclectic mix of the theories of Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung 
and Alfred Adler, underlined by the scientific status of the psychiatric profession.44  
Freud, unlike other medically trained psychoanalysts, ardently opposed the idea 
that medically trained individuals were inherently the most appropriate providers of 
therapy. In fact, he argued in 1929 that medical training is “almost the opposite” of what 
would prepare a person to be an effective psychoanalyst.45 He wrote that the medical 
student’s attention “has simply been focused upon facts which may be objectively 
ascertained, such as present themselves in astronomy, physics, and chemistry, and which 
must be understood properly and applied correctly, to achieve results.46 By carving out an 
exclusive sphere in psychotherapeutic practice, psychiatrists fueled the illusion that 
psychological distress could be objectively comprehended and that treatment could be 
precisely applied (by medical experts).  
The debate over lay analysis also forced psychologists, even those trained in 
psychoanalytic methods, out of the practice of psychoanalysis.47 The result was a great 
deal of professional insecurity both for non-medically trained psychoanalysts (who were 
forced out of professional societies and denied work) and medically trained 
psychoanalysts (who had to carefully monitor their associations with non-medically 
trained psychoanalysts). It also created a rigid defensiveness within psychoanalytic 
societies that extended to inflexible requirements of professional and theoretical 
orthodoxy.48  
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Psychologist Karen Horney’s experience demonstrates the unavoidable insecurity 
that characterized even open-minded and creative psychiatrists. Horney, who was 
expelled in 1941 from the New York Psychoanalytic Society (NYPS) for “disturbing” 
students with her theoretical breaks from strict Freudianism, began the Association for 
the Advancement of Psychoanalysis (AAP) the same year. In her resignation letter to the 
New York Society, she wrote, “The Society has steadily deteriorated. Reverence for 
dogma has replaced free inquiry; academic freedom has been abrogated; students have 
been intimidated; scientific sessions have degenerated into political machinations.”49 
 In 1943, however, succumbing to the pressure from key figures like William 
Silverberg, whom she respected and relied upon for professional sustenance, Horney 
allowed the new association to become punitively restrictive in its own right. She was 
compelled to support the withdrawal of training analyst privileges from her friend and 
colleague Erich Fromm out of the fear that his status as a lay analyst would imperil the 
association’s relationship with New York Medical College.50 Harry Stack Sullivan, who 
sided with Fromm, observed that “Personal and professional insecurity often find 
expression in distrust of the judgment if not the integrity of others, particularly colleagues 
who are actively discontented with somewhat useful things as they are, and insistent that 
something constructive can and should be done.”51 This insecurity combined with 
motives for profit and prestige tended to hinder the advancement of psychological theory 
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and practice. Sullivan repeatedly found himself the target of such distrust, first when the 
American Psychoanalytic Association split from the Washington School of Psychiatry, 
which was dominated by Sullivan, and later in his search for academic positions in 
medical schools. 52 
The fate of psychologists and psychiatrists whose credentials or beliefs differed 
from the status quo of professionals within their fields was often expulsion from 
mainstream universities and institutions. Alternative private institutions tended to be most 
hospitable to lay analysts and those who supported interdisciplinary collaboration. The 
advantage of affiliation with a private institution was that analysts were free from the 
rigid empirical and positivist constraints of psychology departments steeped in 
behaviorism or psychiatry departments devoted to medicalization. But the limited 
influence of these affiliations was a definite disadvantage.53 
Meanwhile, the American Psychiatric Association pushed for even greater 
hegemony and professional control, intervening in the credentialing of members of 
neighboring professions. Even as psychologists fought internal battles for safeguards 
against “charlatanism” or “quackery,” psychiatrists oversaw them, dictating certification 
and licensure standards intended to regulate and standardize psychological practice. As 
reflected in the AMA’s 1951 recommendation that the American Psychiatric Association 
support “certification” but oppose “licensing” of psychologists, doctors demanded the 
appointment of psychiatrists to licensing boards for psychologists, and argued for 
required medical examinations of psychological patients.54 
 Pursuing the practice of diagnostic classification that had begun in the late 19th 
century with Emil Kraeplin, psychiatrists made a greater leap towards the medicalization 
of mental disorder in 1952, with the American Psychiatric Association’s publication of 
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the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).55 The manual gave 
psychiatrists another tool for perpetuating a cultural perception of the expertise required 
for proper diagnosis and treatment. Comprised of sixty concrete disorders, DSM-I named 
disorders and specified symptom criteria for diagnosis.56 Although DSM critics pointed 
to the lack of empirical validity behind diagnostic categories, the introduction and 
widespread use of the DSM met the growing American need for a simplified and less 
stigmatized approach to mental illness.57  If medical standards could be applied to mental 
distress, the diagnosis of mental illness could seem as straightforward as the diagnosis of 
a broken arm and the treatment as routine as the setting of a cast. The perceived ease of 
psychological diagnosis and treatment also helped normalize mental distress at an 
historical moment when Americans were searching for alternatives to religious 
elucidations of personal struggles.58  
The medicalization of mental illness, as represented by the DSM, drastically 
altered cultural perceptions of mental distress. No longer intended solely for “lunatics,” 
psychiatric treatment became more accessible to the average American citizen and the 
stigma of diagnosis markedly diminished. The DSM also gave psychiatrists a new 
legitimacy, ushering them into the sphere of “medical science” and positioning them as 
experts on formerly elusive and thoroughly disturbing disorders.  
The DSM was by no means exclusively a tool for cultural legitimacy of 
psychiatry. Instead, it was one of many sites where psychiatrists and psychologists 
overlapped in their professional roles.59 Many psychologists embraced the new diagnostic 
categories and the medicalized concepts of mental distress they embodied, hoping that 
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such concepts would grant greater legitimacy to their own practices. Medicalization, 
though problematic in certain respects, offered a cultural esteem previously unknown to 
mental health professions. But it held potentially harmful consequences. Perpetuating the 
mental health field’s drive for exclusivity, inculcating an aggrandized notion of 
professional expertise, and undermining any potential for harmony between professionals 
with similar goals but different methods, medicalization left in its wake a thoroughly 
fragmented field.60 
The Creation of the Scientist-Practitioner and an Expanded Role for Psychologists 
Psychiatrists were not the only ones perpetuating the professional rifts between, 
and even within, mental health professions. Psychologists, who came to differentiate 
themselves through the acquisition of PhDs in psychology, also wanted an independent 
professional identity, and were threatened by those in neighboring disciplines—
psychiatrists and social workers—who threatened to make their practice redundant and 
obsolete. There was no consensus, however, over how best to achieve the independence 
they desired.61 Most psychologists focused on erecting certification standards that would 
make their profession more exclusive and on expanding applied psychology into realms 
that had been previously unclaimed (most notably, psychological testing).62 
The American Association of Clinical Psychologists (AACP) was formed in 1917 
with the intention of establishing and protecting clinical psychology as a service 
profession—able to administer psychological tests, offer vocational guidance, and help 
industries solve their personnel problems.63 Members were particularly concerned with 
establishing a reputation for psychology independent of those who they had determined 
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were “pseudoscientists,” including psychiatric social workers and phrenologists.64 
Though many members of the American Psychological Association (APA) were 
antagonistic to clinicians, in part because they hoped to secure their own positions in the 
field, the AACP was absorbed as a division of APA in 1917.65 Numerous conflicts 
ensued and the relationship was often tenuous, but the groups agreed to a set of 
certification standards for consulting psychologists in 1921. Although the certification 
standards remained in place for six years, only twenty-five consulting psychologists were 
certified, and the standards were largely ignored. 66 
To distinguish themselves from psychiatrists, who attempted to oversee their 
organizations and to co-opt their therapeutic duties, psychologists reconceptualized 
themselves as scientist-practitioners, merging practice with scientific investigation.67 
Graduate programs began to teach psychologists to be scientists first and practitioners of 
a craft second (an orientation which persists to this day) in order to differentiate their 
graduates from competitors in the field. Psychiatric training, in contrast, lacked the 
scientific element. Scientific training, however, ultimately only gave psychologists a 
small leg up in internal turf battles. Americans vested the field of medicine with so much 
implicit scientific authority that even when its practices had very little grounding in 
science—as in psychiatry’s case—the medical degree was granted an aura of much 
greater scientific standing than was the psychology PhD.68 
Psychologists’ greatest success as scientist-practitioners was in establishing their 
sole reign over the domain of psychological testing, which proliferated between the first 
and second world wars. During this time, psychologists made remarkable strides in 
intelligence, aptitude, personality and projective testing. Intelligence testing, though it 
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occurred before World War I, developed significantly during the first war, in particular 
with Robert Yerkes’ creation of the Army Alpha and Army Beta tests—verbal and 
nonverbal tests designed to help place, advance, or eliminate military personnel. Out of 
the Army Alpha and the Army Beta grew numerous intelligence and aptitude tests, 
including the National Intelligence Test that was created in the 1920s and administered to 
approximately 7 million children.69  
The interwar years also saw pioneering attempts in the creation of personality and 
projective tests. Robert Sessions Woodworth created the Personal Data Sheet, intended to 
determine predispositions of army recruits to psychoneurosis. Though the test was 
developed too late to prove useful in World War I, it laid the foundation for numerous 
personality inventories, including the popular Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory (published in 1940) and the Thurstone Personality Schedule (published in 
1930). Americans made use of the Rorschach Ink Blot test (developed in 1921 by Swiss 
psychiatrist Hermann Rorschach) and the Thematic Apperception Test (created by 
humanistic psychologist Henry Murray and his colleague Christianna Morgan in 1935).70 
Recognizing the potential for professional legitimation and a broadened sphere of 
influence, psychology, like psychiatry, was also more than willing to serve as a tool for 
the American government during World War II. In their new role of scientist-practitioner, 
even humanistic psychologists like Henry Murray, Carl Rogers, and Gordon Allport 
found themselves performing psychological testing in the military, matching military 
personnel to positions best suited to their personality. Professionals who had been 
considered mere technicians prior to the war were suddenly considered expert 
consultants, uniquely qualified to provide structure and organization to the military and to 
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advise the government on war strategy.71 The American government’s new esteem for 
psychology was demonstrated in their employment of Henry Murray, who was 
commissioned to compose a psychological profile of Adolf Hitler, intended to enlighten 
military strategists on the character of the “megalomaniac” they were combating. Murray 
described Hitler as counteractive, masochistic, and a “hive of secret neurotic 
compunctions and feminine sentimentalities.”72 Carl Rogers also became involved in the 
war effort: he published Counseling with Returned Servicemen with John Wallen in 1946, 
applying his client-centered technique to the challenge of treating “shell-shocked” 
soldiers returning from World War II.73 
The government continued to utilize psychologists and to promote their cultural 
status after WWII as well. Faced with legions of “shell-shocked” or “battle-fatigued” 
soldiers experiencing what would soon be diagnosed as post-traumatic stress disorder, the 
US government thought it wise to promote the role of psychotherapy as a panacea for all 
forms of mental suffering. In 1945, the government commissioned director John Huston, 
then a Captain in the US Army’s Signal Corp-based film unit, to produce a documentary 
film touting the efficacy of therapy for soldiers. Let There be Light, completed in 1946, 
followed 75 emotionally troubled soldiers who enter Mason General psychiatric hospital 
in New Jersey, receive treatment, and by the end of their time at the hospital (and the end 
of the film) demonstrate remarkable recoveries.74  
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Other films of the forties reinforced the narrative of psychotherapy as a 
scientifically precise tool of mental adjustment, suggesting Hollywood’s complicity in 
the cultural construction of psychotherapy. Films like Curtis Bernhardt’s Conflict (1945), 
Robert Siodmak’s The Dark Mirror (1946), Robert Stevenson’s Dishonored Lady (1947) 
and Curtis Bernhardt’s Possessed (1947) conflated psychologists and psychiatrists with 
detectives, portraying omniscient therapists/ detectives whose keen psychological 
insights enable them to solve crimes. As inaccurate as the image of the super-sleuth or the 
omniscient soothsayer may have been, the mysticism and implicit authority surrounding 
it were compelling to doctors and patients alike.75 
In an immediate and practical respect, the government’s elevation of 
psychological experts was extremely propitious for the field. Despite the inaccuracy of 
popular depictions—which distorted the reality of recovery, suggesting that individual 
problems were easily and consistently remediated through the simple administration of 
psychotherapy—the media attention the field received only reinforced the status of the 
thriving profession. 
The growth of psychology was a self-perpetuating cycle. A field supersaturated 
with practitioners prior to the war, psychology was thirsty for new professionals after the 
war. The New York Times estimated a need for as many as 27,000 new clinical 
psychologists in 1949.76 Large foundations reacted to this perceived need with an 
infusion of funding into the training of new psychologists. The Rockefeller Foundation 
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and other charitable trusts infused university departments and research centers with 
monies that would facilitate the growth of the field. In 1946, Congress responded by 
passing the National Mental Health Act, which appropriated greater government support 
for psychological research and education and created the National Institute of Mental 
Health (NIMH), which would be a center for psychological research and would receive 
considerable government funding in the years to come. 77 
Research funds for psychology flowed from American confidence in the value of 
psychology’s “scientific” basis.78 But the individuation of psychology from psychiatry 
was incomplete. Both maintained a stake in psychotherapeutic practice and both, through 
the construction of newly rigorous certification standards and requirements, fought to 
expand their realms and to specialize professionally. The fuzziness of the distinction, and 
the conflation of the two professions that was common in the cultural consciousness, was 
to persist throughout the century.79 
 
Social Roles for Social Workers 
The profession of social work, which emerged from charitable movements of the 
19th century (including settlement houses), sought a broader role in the 20th century.80 
Initially engaged in casework that was devoted almost exclusively to vocational and 
domestic rehabilitation of the mentally ill and infirm, social workers struggled in the 
early decades of the 20th century to reinvision their “identity” at the same time that they 
borrowed roles and theories from psychology. Lacking a unique knowledge base, social 
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workers sought to tailor psychological theory, including Freudianism, to their unique 
needs as a profession.81 
As with psychology and psychiatry, increasing the exclusivity of professional 
standards served as a tool to heighten the field’s esteem. Social work established official 
professional standards in July of 1929, three years after the founding of the American 
Association of Social Workers (AASW). By 1930, a more flexible credentialing standard 
that looked at experience, general education, and apprenticeship was replaced by a 
standard that used specialized professional education as the primary criterion for 
membership.82 
Unfortunately, the newly rigorous standards, which had appealed to the majority 
of social workers when they were adopted, were poorly suited to the unique situation that 
1930s America presented. The Depression years produced a soaring demand for social 
services soon after the more rigorous standard had begun to produce a contracting supply 
of actual social workers. Many academic programs responded to the changing market by 
increasing their enrollment and offering part-time programs, yet academic requirements 
continued to perpetuate a narrow professional monopoly. 83 
The depression years also intensified the debate about whether social work should 
take a stronger social and cultural role.84 Within psychology, theorists like Karen Horney, 
Erich Fromm, and Gordon Allport, who highlighted the applicability of social and 
cultural forces to individual psychology, generally failed to consider the reverse; the 
potential influence that individuals could have on social and cultural forces. Social work 
deviated from psychology in this respect. Mainly employed by public agencies and 
supported by government funds, social workers had more firsthand knowledge of the 
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mechanisms of social inequality and dependence, and more belief in the possibility of 
remedying them, than psychologists or psychiatrists did.  
Internal divisions over the emerging identity of social work ultimately prevented 
the field, however, from engaging in meaningful involvement in the development of new 
public programs. A 1930s AASW survey showed that more than two-thirds of 
respondents believed that social agencies shouldn’t take an active part in any political 
activity.85 For most members, establishing professional prestige was AASW’s primary 
objective; they felt that any political stance other than utter neutrality would compromise 
the association’s legitimacy. Consequently, social workers strategically passed up 
opportunities presented during the depression and World War II to gain a larger role in 
social planning and service.86 
Social work seized the opportunity to move into the expanded realm of 
psychology by working to construct a unified professional identity through the 1940s. By 
1952, the American Association of Schools of Social Work (AASW), which had made 
graduate education the criteria for recognition as a social worker, and the National 
Association of Schools of Social Administration (NASSA), an organization committed to 
encouraging undergraduate education for social work, agreed to merge into one entity, 
signifying their newly acknowledged common goals and the solidified professional 
foundation of social work. Subsequently, social work, like psychology, gained status by 
merging science with practice, attracting research funding from benefactors like the 
Russell Sage Foundation.87   
Tensions remained high between social work and neighboring fields, despite the 
infusion of funds and the increased demand for mental health services. Feeling 
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threatened, psychologists often sought to discredit social workers, who had grown 
progressively psychoanalytic after World War II. 88 Instead of moving in the direction of 
social and community welfare, which was by definition under their umbrella, social 
workers sought to translate psychological theory into practice, an attempt that had 
contemporaneous parallels in psychology, psychiatry, and pastoral counseling. Instead of 
differentiating themselves, social workers threw themselves into the ring, positioning 
themselves in direct competition for psychotherapeutic primacy.89 
Despite continued tensions within the field over the social role of the profession, 
social work continued to grow. From 1930 to 1960, ASSW membership increased more 
than fivefold and the association expanded to contain 6 separate sub-organizations for 
medical, psychiatric, school, group, research, and community organization practitioners.90 
Social work’s growth preserved its position, but its failure to expand into social and 
cultural realms or to produce novel theories granted to psychology and psychiatry, by 
default, greater intellectual and theoretical influence in the coming decades.  
PSYCHOLOGY IN THE RELIGIOUS REALM 
Faced in the 1940s with America’s dwindling liberal protestant religious 
sentiment, protestant ministers perceived an opportunity to increase their relevance in the 
newly popular psychological sphere and threw themselves in the ring with psychiatrists, 
psychologists and social workers.91 What began with a small group of ministers 
attempting to construct a program of professional psychotherapeutic training in the 1920s 
soon burgeoned into a profusion of clinical seminars and training programs designed for 
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ministers. Ministers also found a niche in popular psychological realms, combining 
religious and psychological ideas in the medium of self-help literature and sermons.92 
Like social work, pastoral counselors entered the psychological realm in the 
1920s and 1930s, guided largely by a paradigm of social adjustment. But in contrast to 
social workers, whose client-base was insecure and whose primacy was contested by the 
numerous talented psychiatrists and psychologists who saturated the field, pastoral 
counselors entered the realm with a predetermined and pre-secured clientele—their 
parishioners.93 
Protestant ministers first dabbled in psychological matters with the introduction of 
counseling techniques and theory into their sermons. In the 1920s, Harry Emerson 
Fosdick—outspoken liberal Baptist minister and New Yorker—was the prototypical 
psychologized minister, persuading liberal clergy of the efficacy of using pastoral 
speaking as a form of counseling.94 The positive response of Protestant ministers to the 
idea of combining theological and psychological theory was evinced by the publication of 
Karl Stolz’s  Pastoral Psychology in 1932 and The Church and Psychotherapy in 1943, 
which collectively argued that pastors must become central in facilitating the adjustment 
of parishioners to the demands of modern life.95 Following on its heels, Charles 
Holman’s 1936 publication of The Cure of Souls attempted to offer “a sort of guide 
book” for the integration of pastoral counseling into ministry.96 
One historian writes that,”[t]he pastoral theologians of the 1930s did a 
considerable amount of stumbling around, but they laid the foundations for a postwar 
renaissance that would have surprised even them.”97 With the theoretical foundations that 
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many theologians had advanced prior to the war, universities and seminaries were in a 
good position to fly into action immediately following the war. Harvard led the charge by 
establishing a curriculum in pastoral care in 1944.98 Clinical educators were in high 
demand, and seminaries competed over those qualified to lead clinical training programs. 
By the 1950s, there were 117 centers for pastoral education, affiliated with more then 40 
theological schools, that provided clinical experience to students.99 
In addition to foreseeing the need for clinical training, many theologians actually 
anticipated some of the trends that would challenge, in post-war popular psychology, the 
dominance of the adjustment-oriented theories of the 1930s. For example, Richard Cabot 
and Russell Dicks, both members of the Boston Movement—a branch of the original 
Council for Clinical Training of Theological Students—espoused principles of growth 
and insight-oriented therapy in The Art of Ministering to the Sick, which they published 
in 1936.100 Exploring the notion of instinctual individual growth (which would be further 
developed by humanistic psychologists in subsequent decades), Cabot argued that 
ministers were responsible for finding individual strengths, what he termed an 
individual’s “growing edge,” and creating an environment hospitable to growth and 
development. Anticipating the client-centered theory of Carl Rogers that would hold 
sway over pastoral counseling for decades, Cabot focused on the necessity of listening on 
the part of the minister, and on empowering the patient’s self-discovery rather than 
directing it.101  
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After the war, pastoral counselors responded quickly to the shift in the dominant 
psychological climate. According to one historian, pastoral counselors “began to speak a 
new language after World War II.”102 This language included humanistic concepts like 
“empathy,” “self-awareness,” and “self-realization,” and tied pastoral counselors more 
intimately to the cultural interests of the time. 
Authors like Norman Vincent Peale popularized an insight-based association of 
psychology and religion in the popular consciousness. Proposing a notion of applied 
Christianity that expanded religious responsibility into the realm of mental health, The 
Power of Positive Thinking—published in 1952—enjoined ministers to gain training in 
psychological technique. Peale’s popular message met mixed reception.103 The book’s 
success demonstrated the appeal of the conflation between psychology and religion. It 
also demonstrated the desire Americans felt for a reformulated psychological theory that 
would offer optimism and encourage health. Yet within theological circles, Peale’s 
popularization of pastoral counseling diminished its significance. Many counselors didn’t 
want to be associated with mass market positive thinkers whose use of psychological 
theory was selective and reductionistic. Faced with mainstream appeal, pastoral 
theologians felt protective of their doctrine. While ministers could certainly benefit from 
psychological training, the wholehearted espousal of psychological principles seemed to 
diminish the significance of the religious aspect—making it seem utilitarian.104 
The controversy over Peale’s book epitomized the problems implicit in forging a 
hybrid formulation of psychological science and religious theory. Replete with 
testimonials from unnamed “experts” and unidentified references to psychological 
“facts,” Peale’s book tended to anger those with a commitment to psychological 
science.105 At the same time, Peale incensed religious critics, who felt that his brand of 
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Christianity represented a diluted form of theology created more for the mass market than 
for the religiously attuned. Practicing in the wake of the Emmanuel movement, which 
had garnered wide attention and interest, but which had inspired the criticism of those 
made anxious by the blurring of theology and therapy, even lesser known pastoral 
counselors faced significant criticism.106 
Despite opposition, the postwar popularity of psychology ensured that pastoral 
counseling would maintain a stake in turf battles. Acknowledging Americans’ deeply 
ingrained religious sensibility, pastoral counselors were able to distinguish themselves 
from psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers, and to renew their relevance to 
parishioners whose ideas of psychological healing had long been connected to concepts 
of religious ministry.107 
FOMENTING DISSENT 
The overpowering absorption of academic psychology with behaviorism, 
psychiatry and psychoanalysis with medicalization, and applied psychology, social work 
and pastoral counseling with professional differentiation served to carve out specialized 
realms of practice that often precluded holistic approaches to patients’ problems. The 
narrowness with which professionals were compelled to define their sphere of influence 
also created a climate generally oppressive to dissenting perspectives.108 For some, 
however, professional narrowness intensified the urgency of dissent, ensuring that those 
with differing perspectives not grow too complacent.  Humanistic and holistic critiques 
punctuated even the early decades of modern American psychology.  
Several theorists, for example, were wary of the mental health fields’ neglect of 
the social and cultural context of individual experience. Aware that “sick” cultures would 
produce “sick” individuals, critics sought to integrate an analysis of social and cultural 
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experiences into the diagnosis and treatment of mentally distressed individuals. 109 
Primary among these theorists were Karen Horney in psychoanalysis, Erich Fromm in 
psychology/ psychotherapy and Harry Stack Sullivan in psychiatry. Though all three 
were well respected, aspects of their theories met with strong resistance in their 
respective disciplines. 
Karen Horney, referred to by her biographer as the “gentle rebel of 
psychoanalysis,” advanced one of the first feminist critiques of Freudian theory, and in so 
doing acknowledged the influence of social and cultural forces on the creation of 
psychological turmoil and in its expression in the form of disorders.110 Unsatisfied with 
the purely mentalist analysis of disorder that characterized much of psychoanalytic 
theory, Horney grounded anxiety in cultural (as well as individual) drives—for affection, 
power, prestige—and looked to culture to provide understanding of the possible modes of 
expression for thwarted desires.111 Horney prioritized “self-realization,” arguing for the 
value of personal conflict in the achievement of higher forms of mental health. The 
Neurotic Personality of Our Time, published in 1937, Our Inner Conflicts: A 
Constructive Theory of Neurosis, published in 1948, and Neurosis and Human Growth: 
The Struggle Toward Self-Realization, published in 1950, represented Horney’s 
combined interest in health and growth psychology and in the social context of individual 
experience.112  
                                                
109 Richard H. Pells, Radical Visions and American Dreams: Culture and Social Thought in the Depression 
Years (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1973), 114. Pells argues that although theorists like 
Horney and Sullivan argued for the contextualization of individuals within their social and cultural milieus, 
they ultimately endorsed an adaptational psychology, which favored “socially acceptable” behaviors over 
“personally disruptive” approaches. 
110 Rubins, Karen Horney, xii. 
111 Ibid., 199-207. For an example of Horney’s integration of cultural factors into the study of individual 
psychology, see: Karen Horney, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 
1937).   
112 For examples of Horney’s work, see: Karen Horney, Our Inner Conflicts: A Constructive Theory of 
Neurosis (London: Kegan Paul, 1948).; and Karen Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth: The Struggle 
Toward Self-Realization (New York: W.W. Norton, 1950). As compared to other medically trained 
psychoanalysts, Horney was unconventional in her influences. Her greatest influence was likely theologian 
Paul Tillich, from whom she absorbed a greater attention to culture, an interest in the role of historical 
development, and a prioritization of the actualization of one’s potential. Other significant influences for 
 64
Like Horney, Harry Stack Sullivan criticized the overly intrapsychic emphases of 
mainstream psychological theory. He prioritized instead the value of interpersonal 
relationships in the formation of mental health. This perspective, in combination with his 
adherence to fundamental aspects of Freudian theory, ultimately worked against his 
academic aspirations. This was exemplified in his 1939 offer from Georgetown 
University to serve as professor and chair of their new department of psychiatry. Upon 
hearing of Sullivan’s interest in charting new directions for the department, which 
included forays into psychoanalysis, Georgetown rescinded the offer.113 While 
psychiatrists had relatively more latitude than psychologists in considering non-empirical 
theory, they were still singularly accountable to the medical model. 
Sullivan continued, however, to make his interest in interdisciplinary integration 
plain. Though trained medically, Sullivan argued, “I think it would be a very difficult 
proposition to show wherein psychiatry is more of a medical than social science.”114 
Attempting to preserve the context of psychological problems, Sullivan attempted to join 
its study with those in other disciplines. In particular, Sullivan continued to focus on 
collaboration between sociology, anthropology and psychiatry, as he had at The 
University of Chicago in the 1920s and continued to do at Yale—with Edward Sapir’s 
cooperation—in the 1940s. Sullivan was also seminal in establishing in 1938 the “first 
significant interdisciplinary journal in America,” The Journal of Psychiatry. 115  
Like Sullivan, Erich Fromm attempted to push psychology into social and cultural 
realms. However, Fromm, a lay psychoanalyst trained as a psychologist, was more 
explicitly political, advancing theories that attacked directly the structures of both Soviet 
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communism and Western capitalism. Beginning with his publication of Escape from 
Freedom in 1941, Fromm analyzed interpersonal style in the context of a modern 
democratic system that offers individuals freedom from negative strictures, like fascism 
and dictatorship, but doesn’t provide them with a positively formulated notion of freedom 
for something. In The Sane Society, published in 1955, Fromm further politicized his 
psychological theory by articulating an altered form of classical Marxist theory that was 
infused with a strong valuation of personal freedom. 116 
Fromm contended that capitalism was dehumanizing and alienating and that legal 
definitions of freedom often obscured a lack of existential and emotional freedom. He 
developed an interdisciplinary approach to psychological theory—one that integrated 
social theory, economics, ethics, and anthropology and provided a blueprint for future 
humanistic critiques. 117 
In the face of professional alienation, scholars like Fromm maintained a 
discursive critique of the isolationist psychological scholarship of the 1930s and 1940s. 
These pioneering critiques paved the way for a more organized movement against 
dominant paradigms in the 1950s and 1960s. The snowballing critiques of Horney, 
Fromm, Sullivan, and others created more impetus for the emergence of a more formal 
humanistic psychology.   
American cultural conditions in the 1950s broadened psychology’s sphere of 
influence, producing a popular demand for psychotherapies that could treat the problems 
of average Americans (not just those of the more pathological cases).118 Psychologists’ 
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realm of utility and influence widened at the very moment that the national psyche was 
feeling most bruised.  Numerous historians have explored the angst and distress that 
lurked beneath the prosperity of the 1950s.119  One historian wrote, “In only one place do 
the twin themes of outward prosperity and inward dread come together, and that is in the 
figures for tranquilizer sales.” Sales rose from $2.2 million in 1955, the year the popular 
sedative Miltown was introduced, to $150 million by 1957.120 Psychiatrists and 
psychologists promised not just temporary sedation but also greater self-understanding 
which would “logically” lead to increased satisfaction. In this vein, they had more to 
offer than social workers who were, at this point, merely seeking to emulate them. They 
could not, however, offer spiritual assistance, a “cure for sick souls,” or a system of 
meaning that would help reconstruct what the experiences of war, depression and 
modernity had so thoroughly undermined.121 
Much of the post-war popular psychological literature suggested the American 
interest in a positive form of psychology, but still located the problems within individuals 
and maintained adjustment-oriented emphases. In 1948, the bestseller list included such 
self-help titles as Dale Carnegie’s How to Stop Worrying and Start Living (#2), Joshua 
Liebman’s Peace of Mind (#3), and Norman Vincent Peale’s A Guide to Confident Living 
(#9).122  These titles suggest the ways in which Americans located sources of distress and 
anxiety within themselves, rather than within society, and sought positive ways to 
channel or ameliorate these inner conflicts. 
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The broadened psychological arena and the persistence of the American need for 
psychological affirmation created a space for the emergence of a theory of humanistic 
psychology.  Although the dominant ideas of experimentalism and radical behaviorism 
were fairly entrenched in academic psychology departments, popular interest ensured that 
a positive, humanistic psychology would receive a hearing. 
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Chapter Three: Intellectual Roots of Humanistic Psychology 
Abraham Maslow, a principal player in what would become the humanistic 
psychology movement, described his introduction to behaviorism as “an explosion of 
excitement.” Coming from the man who later founded a school of psychology that 
directly opposed behaviorism, the statement is a bit surprising. Yet, as is the case with 
many belief systems, behaviorism’s most persuasive opponents tended to be those who 
had, at one time, most whole-heartedly subscribed to it. Maslow encountered behaviorism 
in the late 1920s, when he was young and impressionable, and became fully engaged in 
the romance that many novice psychology students initially develop with their subject 
matter.1 “Bertha [Maslow’s new bride] came to pick me up at New York’s 42nd Street 
library,” he remembered, “and I was dancing down Fifth Avenue with exuberance. I 
embarrassed her, but I was so excited about Watson’s behaviorist program. It was 
beautiful. I was confident that here was a real road to travel: solving one problem after 
another and changing the world.”2 
Maslow’s exuberance soon landed him, in the early 1930s, in Harry Harlow’s 
laboratory at the University of Wisconsin studying learning in primates. In line with the 
dominant behaviorism of the time, Harlow’s research was both experimental and 
observational. It was also comparative, attempting to make generalizations about humans 
based on evolutionary deductions about related primates.3 Harlow and Maslow co-
authored an article in 1932 which appeared in the Journal of Comparative Psychology 
and was titled, “Delayed Reaction Test on Primates from the Lemur to the Orangutan.”4 
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Continuing to study with Harlow, and intent on basing his career on monkey research, 
Maslow performed further observational studies on Harlow’s monkeys related to food 
preferences. He ultimately wrote a dissertation on sexual behavior and social dominance 
in monkeys.5 Although Maslow hesitated to apply his findings to humans, the dissertation 
had been inspired, in part, by his discovery of Freudian and Adlerian theory in 1933, and 
his research, in turn, sparked his interest in exploring the idea that sexual behavior in 
humans was directly related to social power.6  
As his reading of Freud and Adler demonstrated, Maslow continued reading 
deeply in areas other than experimental psychology. He also studied embryology, read 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s articulation of systems theory, immersed himself in Bertrand 
Russell and English philosophy in general, and then fell in love with Alfred North 
Whitehead’s vitalism and Henri Bergson’s process philosophy. According to Maslow, 
“Their writings destroyed behaviorism for me without my recognizing it.”7 Still unaware 
of the ideological change overtaking him, Maslow decided to study human sexuality at 
Columbia under behaviorist E.L. Thorndike, an educational psychologist whose work 
focused on animal behavior and associationism in learning processes. He also settled in 
New York at the same time that many impressive European theorists, including Erich 
Fromm, Karen Horney and Alfred Adler, were illuminating the New York intellectual 
scene with their expansive cultural and social theories.8 
Maslow had found the fuel for the fire that his reading had ignited. Maslow later 
credited Gestalt psychologist Max Wertheimer, in particular, with catalyzing his shift 
towards a more humanistic form of psychology. In a 1962 discussion with students at the 
                                                                                                                                            
Orangutan,”  Journal of Comparative Psychology 13 (1932): 313-343. 
5 Maslow published several articles from this work, including, but not limited to: Abraham Maslow,  
“Appetites & Hungers in Animal Motivation," Journal of Comparative Psychology 20 (1932): 75-83; 
Abraham Maslow, "Self-esteem (Dominance-feeling) and Sexuality in Women," Journal of 
Social Psychology 16 (1932): 259-294. 
6 Hoffman, The Right to be Human, 49-62. 
7 Hoffman and Maslow, ”Interview,”  6. 
8 Ibid., 6. 
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New School in New York, Maslow explained that his true education “began when I came 
from the Midwest, as an experimental psychologist, to the seminars of Max Wertheimer, 
who all alone [at the New School] formed the best psychology department in the world.”9 
In 1942, Maslow attended Wertheimer’s course “Being and Doing,” where he began to 
rethink the methodology of his comparative research, which failed to consider uniquely 
human values, and which didn’t recognize the need for balancing the study of 
psychopathology with studies of healthy individuals.10 
Maslow’s personal experiences began to add flesh to the skeletal structure of the 
humanistic theory he was mentally constructing. Throughout his studies and research 
pursuits, Maslow maintained a passionate investment in his family, never putting his 
work before them. It was through his family, in fact, that he experienced his first peak 
experience (defined in his own theory as a life-changing moment of self-transcendence). 
He explained, “When my first baby was born, that was the thunderclap that settled things. 
I looked at this tiny, mysterious thing and felt so stupid. I felt small, weak, and feeble. I'd 
say that anyone who’s had a baby couldn’t be a behaviorist.”11 
During the same time that Maslow was peaking, he was experiencing a 
comparably strong negative reaction to the devastation wrought by World War II. 
Maslow described the sudden and overwhelming reaction he felt on a day soon after Pearl 
Harbor was bombed:  
I was driving home and my car was stopped by a poor, pathetic parade. Boy 
Scouts and old uniforms and a flag and someone playing a flute off-key. As I 
watched, the tears began to run down my face. I felt we didn’t understand—not 
Hitler, nor the Germans, nor Stalin, nor the Communists. We didn’t understand 
any of them. I felt that if we could understand, then we could make progress. […] 
That moment changed my whole life. Since then, I've devoted myself to 
developing a theory of human nature that could be tested by experiment and 
research. I wanted to prove that humans are capable of something grander than 
                                                
9 Maslow as quoted in Mildred Hardeman, “Dialogue with Abraham Maslow,” in Politics and Innocence: 
A Humanistic Debate, ed. Thomas Greening  (San Francisco: Saybrook Publishers, 1986), 75. 
10Brett King and Michael Wertheimer, Max Wertheimer & Gestalt Theory (New Brunswick, Transaction 
Publishers, 2005), 300; Hoffman, The Right to Be Human, 92. 
11 Hoffman and Maslow, “Interview,” 6. 
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war, prejudice, and hatred. I wanted to make science consider all the people: the 
best specimen of mankind I could find.12  
Over the next decade, Maslow integrated the influences from his reading in 
organismic theory and process philosophy with the knowledge he gained from his 
immigrant professors and peers in New York and with his own uniquely passionate and 
optimistic philosophy of life.13 Maslow’s humanistic theory coalesced in the 1950s under 
the influence of Kurt Goldstein, a German neurologist and psychiatrist best known for his 
holistic theory of the organism. Maslow met Goldstein while serving as the chair of 
Brandeis’s psychology department. Extending Goldstein’s preliminary ideas on self-
actualization, Maslow developed a theory that would serve as a foundation for humanistic 
psychology in the decades to follow.14    
Abraham Maslow’s intellectual development is testament to the idiosyncrasies of 
his own psyche and intellect, but also to the significance of the historical moment at 
which the theorists who were to found humanistic psychology were developing their 
ideologies. The group that Maslow encountered in New York, which also included Czech 
psychologist Max Wertheimer and German Gestalt psychologist Kurt Koffka, was no 
ordinary set of scholars. Much of Central Europe’s intellectual talent had fled  fascism 
and come to America, infusing places like  New York’s New School for Social Research 
with vital energy. For many psychologists, the influx of European thought coincided with 
a growing awareness of the limits of the behaviorist paradigm.15  
EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL ROOTS: PHENOMENOLOGY 
To begin to unravel the intellectual bases for humanistic psychology, it is useful 
to explore the Central European roots of the philosophical and psychological concept of 
holism. Ideas of holism, the concept that organisms are defined by a unitary existence 
                                                
12 Hoffman and Maslow, “Interview,” 5. 
13 de Carvalho, “Abraham H. Maslow,”  43. 
14 Maslow’s concept of self-actualization was first proposed in the paper: Abraham H. Maslow, "A Theory 
of Human Motivation," Psychological Review 50 (1943): 370-396. 
15 de Carvalho, Founders of Humanistic Psychology, 1. 
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that is greater than the sum of its parts, echo through the “classical modern era” and are 
manifest in a range of philosophies.16 The privileging of subjective, conscious experience 
that arose from these holistic philosophical approaches infused, in particular, the 
discipline of phenomenological psychology that emerged in the late 19th century.17  
Phenomenology, the study of the subjective experience of consciousness, was 
defined by the premise of intentionality, or the belief that individual experiences are 
always directed towards an object that the individual deems meaningful.18 This concept 
of human striving was exemplified in the philosophies of Edmund Husserl and Martin 
Heidegger.  
Edmund Husserl, the so-called “father” of phenomenology, advanced a 
philosophy that began with the intuitive experience of phenomena, as perceived with 
conscious awareness, and attempted to extract the essential features of subjective 
experiences in the hope of a fuller comprehension of being.19 Husserl’s first statement of 
phenomenology appeared in 1900, with the publication of Logical Investigations,  in 
which he argues for the necessity of a phenomenology that “has, as its exclusive concern, 
experiences intuitively seizable and analysable in the pure generality of their essence, not 
experiences empirically perceived and treated as real facts, as experiences of human or 
                                                
16 Andrew Brook and Paul Raymont, "The Unity of Consciousness", in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2006 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/consciousness-unity/. 
17 David Woodruff Smith, "Phenomenology," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2005 
Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta , http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/phenomenology/. 
18 Ibid. 
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theoretical orientation to the philosophy.  Weckowicz refers to Husserl’s first phase as descriptive 
phenomenology (what he also terms “prephenomenology”), second phase as transcendental 
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Husserl’s phenomenology progressed through three stages, his transcendental phenomenology, stage two, 
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practice of humanistic psychology. Thaddeus E. Weckowicz, "The Impact of Phenomenological and 
Existential Philosophies on Psychiatry and Psychotherapy." In Humanistic Psychology: Concepts and 
Criticisms, ed. Joseph R. Royce, and Leendert P. Mos (New York: Plenum Press, 1981), 57. 
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animal experiments in the phenomenal world that we posit as empirical fact.”20 
Stemming from the school of Franz Brentano, Husserl’s phenomenology combined 
qualitative with quantitative methods to produce a contextualized inquiry into specific 
phenomena—phenomena which would elude rigid experimental inquiry by virtue of their 
very complexity. For example, to study the phenomena of love, a phenomenologist would 
first seek a subjective description of an individual’s experience of love. He would then 
interpret the experience by drawing on relevant contextual features, including an 
individual’s past experiences, present environment, etc. Finally, he would analyze the 
“form” of the experience, quantifying elements common to numerous individuals’ 
experience of love. 21 
Husserl defined phenomenology in direct opposition to the dominant 
psychologism of his time. 22 Psychologism, a term first originating in 19th century 
Germany, was meant to designate the practice of solving problems with objective 
psychological science.23 John Stuart Mill’s System of Logic, published in 1843, inspired 
19th century psychologism. In this book, Mills argued for a science of reasoning, and a 
prescriptive art of reasoning based on that science.24 Psychologism held that logic 
                                                
20 Edmund Husserl,  Logical Investigations, Vols. 1 and 2, Second Edition,  trans. and ed. J. N. Findlay  
(New York: Routledge, 2001), 166. The first edition was published as Logische Untersuchungen (Halle: M. 
Niemeyer, 1900-01). 
21 Smith, ”Phenomenology.” 
22 Herbert Spiegelberg, “Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction,” in 
Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, ed. John Wild (Evanston, 
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1972), 7. 
23 The term “psychologism” was originally meant to refer to the solving of mathematical problems using 
psychology. Psychologism was defended most notably by Jakob Friedrich Fries and Freidrich Eduard 
Beneke. Historian David Leary points out that Kant’s critique of rational psychology, and thus of what 
would be termed “psychologism,” preceded Husserl’s critique, but that Fries, Herbart, and Beneke revised 
this critique in spite of Kant’s intention in favor of “scientific psychology.” David Leary, “The 
Philosophical Development of the Conception of Psychology in Germany, 1780-1850,” Journal of the 
History of the Behavioral Sciences 14 (1978), 113-121. For a good history of psychologism, see Martin 
Kusch, Psychologism (New York: Routledge, 1995). 
24 Martin Kusch, "Psychologism", in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2007 Edition), ed. 
Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2007/entries/psychologism/. Although Kusch 
credits Mills with inspiring psychologism in the 19th century, he presents contradictory evidence as to 
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dictated certain laws of human psychology, and that these laws were objectively true and 
testable. To deduce these laws, psychologism relied on the scientific method.25  
 Husserl resisted psychologism’s contention that knowledge and ideas were 
reducible to empirical facts, claiming that this kind of objectification was overly 
skeptical. 26 Consciousness, instead, had to be separated from empirical reality, thus 
preserving meaning and the possibility of knowledge. Rather than viewing consciousness 
as “stuff” of which the mind is comprised, Husserl saw it as a process by which an 
individual becomes, by interacting with objects in the world. Consciousness, then, was a 
process of continual creation.27  
Scientific psychological methods employed by psychological researchers, Husserl 
argued, could never appropriately capture their subjects. According to psychologist C.E. 
Spearman, Husserl felt that trying “to cope with psychological problems by means of 
experiments was like trying to unravel lace with a pitchfork.”28 Husserl was not arguing 
for the elimination of the empirical elements of psychology, however. He sought only to 
reenvision the dominant scientific methods currently in practice by broadening the 
psychological realm of inquiry. Rather than advocating empiricism, which held that 
psychological knowledge could only be gained through the description of pure sensory 
experience, Husserl argued for a “radical empiricism” that would supplement the 
information gained by the study of sensory experience with contextual information, 
including prior experiences and common forms of experience.29 
In 1927, Martin Heidegger published Being and Time, extending the ideas of 
Husserl, who had served as his mentor in 1916 and whom he had succeeded as chair at 
                                                
25 Leary, “Psychology in Germany,” 113-121. 
26 Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 91. 
27 Weckowicz, “Impact on Psychiatry and Psychotherapy,” 55. 
28 Spearman as quoted  Spiegelberg, Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry,” 35. 
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the University of Freiburg.30 Like Husserl, Heidegger focused on the fullness of 
conscious experience, on the dynamism involved in the process of existing, and on the 
relevance of context in understanding the individual. Heidegger’s phenomenology, 
though, was more relational. While Husserl emphasized perceived experience and the 
role of subjectivity, Heidegger was more interested in the experience of existing in 
relation to others and to material objects.31  
In Being and Time, Heidegger proposed the concept of Dasein, a state of being in 
which one is capable of recursively comprehending the ontological and authentic nature 
of one’s own Being. Heidegger perceived man, as the possessor of both an ontological 
and ontic awareness, to be uniquely required to grapple with his own existential 
predicament. His theory helped create a bridge, albeit a largely unacknowledged one, 
between phenomenological methods and existential ideas.32 
EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY 
Existential phenomenology, one of many diverse strains of Husserlian theory that 
emerged in the first half of the 20th century, was focused on the concrete experience of 
human existence, and specifically on the experience of free will. Rooted in Heidegger’s 
emphasis on the meaning of Being, in Being in Time, existential phenomenological 
approaches were adopted by French philosophers, most notably Jean Paul Sartre and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in the 1930s and 1940s. Touching on the theme of the meaning 
of being in the novel Nausea in 1936, Sartre grappled more explicitly with existential 
phenomenology in Being and Nothingness, published in 1943,  in which he explored 
concepts of intentionality and freedom of choice.33 
                                                
30 Smith, “Phenomenology.” See, Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962); originally published as Sein und Zeit ( Halle: Max Niemeyer, 
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31 Spiegelberg, “Phenomenology,” 21. 
32 Spiegelberg, “Phenomenology,” 20-21. 
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In 1945, Merleau-Ponty published Phenomenology of Perception, which 
integrated phenomenological thought with experimental psychology by considering the 
bodily experience of amputees. He wrote, “To have a phantom arm is to remain open to 
all the actions of which the arm alone is capable; it is to retain the practical field which 
one enjoyed before mutilation. The body is the vehicle of being in the world, and having 
a body is, for a living creature, to be invovled in a definite environment, to identify 
oneself with certain projects and be continually committed to them.”34 Merleau-Ponty 
explored the indivisibility of consciousness from the body and from the world, 
constructing being as a truly context-bound experience.35 
The union of existentialist phenomenology and psychology had several conduits, 
including Merleau-Ponty, Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss. Swiss psychiatrists 
Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss applied Heidegger’s concept of Dasein to 
psychotherapy, advocating a holistic approach to human experience and a quest for 
essence and authenticity that recognized the “problem of being,” the temporality of 
human existence, and the challenges of self-positioning in relation to the anguish of 
modern society.36 Binswanger applied Heidegger’s theory of being-in-the-world in his 
phenomenological anthropology (termed daseinsanalyse). His was one of the first 
applications of Heidegger’s ideas to actual individuals rather than abstract categories of 
being, and it extended the notion of Dasein to the contextualized individual, defined by 
his existential relatedness to others. Boss, who had philosophically allied himself with the 
teachings of Heidegger, continued the practice of daseinsanalyse after Binswanger’s 
death in 1966.37   
                                                
34  Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (reprint, London: Routledge, 
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35 Bernard Flynn, "Maurice Merleau-Ponty", in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta (Summer 2004 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/merleau-ponty/. 
36 After the death of Binswanger, who was considered the “father of existential psychology,”  Boss became 
the representative of daseinanalyse, a direct application of Heidegger’s dasein. Weckowicz, “Impact on 
Psychiatry and Psychotherapy,” 61. 
37 Ibid., 60-61. 
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Existential philosophy served more as a foundation for conceptualizing patients’ 
humanness than as a specific approach to psychotherapy.38 Boss, who was skeptical about 
the assumptions that medicine and psychology made about human beings, argued in his 
Existential Foundations of Medicine and Psychology (1979), for instance, for a more 
holistic understanding of the experience of patients, and of their own attitude towards 
being.39 
A psychotherapeutic approach informed by existential phenomenology provided, 
in particular, a sensitivity to the darker side of human existence, to patients’ experience of 
anxiety, guilt and fear related to their own mortality.40 Although existential approaches to 
psychotherapy varied widely, they tended to incorporate at least some notion of the 
darker side of human existence. Some existentialists were explicitly concerned with a 
concept of evil, and many emphasized the catalytic and unremitting presence of the 
reality of death.41 Existential phenomenologists united in their conception of an 
irreducible consciousness that existed only and always in the world.42  
EXISTENTIALISM  
Existential ideas as applied to psychology also made their way into American 
psychology through theorists like Viktor Frankl, who had experienced the rise of fascism 
and the horrors of death in the concentration camps of Auschwitz, Kaufering, and 
Türkheim. Frankl, an Austrian psychiatrist imprisoned from 1944 to 1945, witnessed the 
creation of meaning and the persistence of optimism in individuals facing the deaths of 
themselves and their loved ones. Frankl himself, by remaining, during and after his 
internment, focused on the memory of his wife and on the creation of his theory of 
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logotherapy (which he was finally able to put on paper after his release), concluded that 
the strength of the conscious ability to construct meaning was what differentiated 
individuals who survived inhuman obstacles more than anything else.43 Thus he 
proclaimed the “will to meaning” to be primary among successful human characteristics; 
instead of imagining that suffering could be avoided, Frankl identified the catalyzing 
power of horrific pain to push individuals to transcendent levels of individual existence.44 
Quoting Nietzsche, Frankl asserted, “He who has a why to live can bear with almost any 
how.”45  
Viktor Frankl applied existential theory to therapy through his practices of 
ontoanalysis (a form of existential therapy that focuses on uncovering hidden meaning in 
everyday actions and experiences) and logotherapy (a type of therapy focused on “will to 
meaning”). According to Rollo May, existentialism was most basically concerned with 
ontology, or the science of being, where being was understood as the points of balance 
that individuals negotiated between a deep fear of non-existence and meaninglessness 
and a positive drive to explore existential freedom and possibility. Frankl’s ontoanalysis 
and logotherapy aimed at uncovering meaning in even the most minute of objects and 
events, enabling individuals—many of whom had been entirely stripped of existential 
freedom—to reanimate their existences. This constructive approach infused 
psychotherapy with a dialogue of meaning and values that had been absent in 
psychoanalysis, and increased the perceived relevance of existentialism to psychology. 46 
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AMERICAN RESISTANCE 
 “So subtle was the spread of existential thinking in psychotherapy that for a 
quarter-century it made no mark in the English-speaking world,” wrote a reporter for 
Time Magazine in 1958.47  For the most part, Americans psychologists were resistant to 
the tenets of existentialism and to the incorporation of them into their practice. When 
Rollo May’s seminal collection Existence appeared, in 1958, to challenge the dominant 
conceptual frameworks, May himself articulated the inevitable resistance that Americans 
would present. “It requires no brilliance […] to predict that this approach will encounter a 
good deal of resistance in this country, despite the fact that it has been rapidly growing in 
importance in Europe and is now reported by some observers to be the dominant 
movement on the continent.”48 May ascribed this resistance in part to the “still-Victorian” 
nature of the United States, but also to the narrowly scientistic approach of American 
psychology.49 May argued that widespread subscription to behaviorism, combined with 
the “Lockean” or pragmatic tradition of American psychology, further inhibited their 
adoption of new paradigms that would probe beyond technique.50 
Americans wrongly assumed that phenomenology implied a disavowal of science, 
thus counterpositioning philosophy and scientific inquiry in a forced antagonism. May 
argued that the existential-phenomenological movement in psychiatry and psychology 
had arisen “precisely out of a passion to be not less but more empirical.”51 By empirical, 
May meant that it would depend on observable evidence or consequences. Taking 
Binswanger as an example, May argued that scholarship and practice that attempted to 
erect a bridge between psychiatry and phenomenology was “anything but anti-
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scientific.”52 Binswanger had advocated phenomenology for the fullness with which it 
treated data, the meaning of which had been previously obscured and hidden by narrow 
naturalistic methods.53  
GESTALT THEORY 
Gestalt Psychology, which formally emerged in Germany in 1912 and peaked in 
popularity in America in the 1950s (and again in the late 1960s with Fritz Perls’ 
application of its principles), provided another lens through which to holistically conceive 
of the human subject. Gestalt Psychology had in common with existentialism a 
comprehensive approach to individuals that opposed more reductionistic theory and took 
into account subjective experience, the ascription of meaning and values to ideas and 
objects, and a consideration of the individual’s present circumstances. Also like 
existentialism, Gestalt’s appeal in America trailed behind its European counterpart, in 
part because of the predominance of behaviorism and in many cases due to the delay in 
translation of key writing. Yet Gestalt differed from existentialism by undertaking 
naturalistic (as opposed to laboratory) experimentation aimed at understanding 
phenomena as a product of total consciousness. Many Gestalt studies involved 
observation of people in natural environments, without minimal experimenter 
interference. 54 
Max Wertheimer laid the foundation for Gestalt psychology in his 1912 article 
“Experimental Studies on the Seeing of Motion,” in which he advanced a theory of 
apparent motion, focused on holistic human visual perception, in which the parts of an 
image were automatically incorporated into an understanding of the whole. Impressed by 
the psychical phenomena behind visual perception, Wertheimer wrote, “One sees motion 
[…] One does not merely see that the object is now some place else than before, and so 
                                                
52 Spiegelberg, “Phenomenology,” 195. 
53 May, “Introduction,” 8. 
54 Spiegelberg, “Phenomenology,” 67-72. 
 81
knows that it has moved […] rather one {actually} sees the motion.” 55 In 1935, 
Wölfgang Kohler and Kurt Koffka, both younger peers of Wertheimer who, like 
Wertheimer, worked under Karl Stumpf at the University of Berlin, expanded on 
Wertheimer’s theory of holistic perception by integrating comparable observational 
studies with experimental investigation (using the scientific method).56  
Gestalt offered a place for value and subjective experience in a field that had been 
dominated by positivistic structuralists (in Europe) and behaviorists (in America). 
Beginning with phenomenological methods, Gestaltists initiated scientific inquiry by 
collecting data through the direct report of experience, then moving to qualitative, and 
finally quantitative, demonstration and experiment. Through these methods, Gestalt 
psychologists attempted to preserve the human fullness of their subjects and to stay 
connected with the phenomena they were investigating. For example, as in the case of 
Wertheimer’s methods, when individuals were presented with a visual picture on a 
stroboscope, the experimentor noted not only their subjective visual perceptions, but their 
“subjective behaviors,” including eye movement and “posture of attention.”57 Implicit in 
this revision to structuralist experimentation was a Gestalt critique of the methods that 
scientistic psychologists employed to explore phenomena, which often dismissed 
contextually relevant factors.58  
Gestalt theory supplied to American psychologists pieces of the puzzle of a 
reconceptualized American psychology. Psychological science, which—according to 
critics—had become reductionistic, positivistic and erroneously devoted towards 
scientistic objectivity, needed to more fully consider the human subject. At the same time 
that American behaviorist E.B Titchener warned researchers, “Facts are all important. 
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Carry your theories lightly,” critics yearned for a revitalization of theory, a reintroduction 
of human complexity and the preservation of the romance and beauty that characterized 
human life.59 For these critics, German scientists provided a model. 
Gestalt psychology was one flowering of a long tradition of holistic European 
theory.  Romanticism, for example, in the late 18th and early 19th century had attuned 
philosophers, artists and writers to the primacy of the individual will and the importance 
of subjectivity.60 Holistic concerns reached far beyond the arts, appearing as well in the 
natural sciences. In the field of biology, for example,  scientist Hans Driesch sought to 
reanimate vitalism in 1905, and embryologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy proposed 
nonvitalistic approaches to holistic consideration of living processes.61 Influenced by 
Kant’s notion that causal categories of human reason were inadequate paradigms for 
viewing living processes, scientists like von Bertalanffy and others attempted to 
recognize the teleological purposiveness of organisms and to oppose atomistic 
approaches by considering the role of discrete processes in total organismic functioning.62  
Though theories of modern holism emerged in Germany at the turn of the 20th 
century, they encountered periods of unique appeal that seemed to coincide with bouts of 
cultural insecurity. Although Hans Driesch could have been characterized as a vitalist as 
early as the 1890s, his lectures and work gained the most recognition in the troubled 
1920s, when he was president of the Society for Psychical Research and published The 
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Crisis in Psychology, and his early works continued to be translated into the 1930s.63 
Bertalanffy’s theories received considerable attention— in part for the timeliness and 
context of their emergence—in inter-war Vienna during the late 1920s and early 1930s. 
According to historian Anne Harrington, holistic theories like Gestalt garnered the widest 
European intellectual enthusiasm in and around Germany after World War I. Defeated in 
war, fragmented by class, and polarized politically, German intellectuals demonstrated a 
radical affinity for restorative science that could help make sense of the ruin and resurrect 
for them even a fraction of the culture’s former grandeur.64 
GESTALT CROSSES THE ATLANTIC 
For the most part, Gestalt psychology was unpalatable in the American academic 
climate of the time, which was saturated in behaviorism. In 1935, George W. Hartmann, 
a rising public intellectual, published Gestalt Psychology: A Survey of Facts and 
Principles, in which he detailed the barriers to the American acceptance of Gestalt 
psychology. He cited the first as the obstacles that translation and interpretation of 
German writings presented; these obstacles were particularly relevant because of the 
highly “technical nature of the field.” Second, Hartmann referred to the dissolution of 
intellectual networks wrought by the rise of fascism. Finally, he identified the high 
intellectual pitch of Gestalt psychology, which would make it more difficult to translate 
for public consumption than behaviorism was.65 
Gestalt psychology, like existential phenomenology, appealed mainly to a 
minority of American academic psychologists and practitioners who, at mid-century, 
were dissatisfied with the limited approach of behavioristic science. American 
proponents were compelled by its pragmatic explanatory framework and its dynamism. 
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Gestalt psychology offered psychologists the opportunity to work within the existing 
framework of scientific psychology, but also enabled them to extend scientific 
investigation to encompass subjective experiences, values and beliefs, and philosophical 
frameworks.66 
The implications of an applied Gestalt psychology offered a democratic promise. 
By affirming the value and uniqueness of individuals and emphasizing the significance of 
personal context and experience, Gestalt psychology opposed psychological theories that 
privileged superior specimens (particulary those who excelled in tests of intelligence and 
cognitive capability). Wertheimer himself was a staunch democratic socialist who 
combated institutional hierarchy and elitism. Gestalt also offered a response to 
modernity, by reifying the importance of the individual and the primacy of experience in 
an age that increasingly privileged technology and scientific laws. 67  
Gestalt psychology also assuaged American pragmatists by invoking the 
experimental method in the pursuit of basic philosophical questions.68 “This was the good 
news of Gestalt theory—,” wrote Harrington, “it showed that the scientific study of mind 
and consciousness, no less than of the physical world, could reconnect with the dynamic, 
whole-processes that people cared about because such processes corresponded to their 
lived experiences.”69  
Fleeing political unrest, several Gestalt psychologists immigrated to the US, and 
by way of lectures and published work, directly transmitted their ideas to American 
psychologists. Kurt Koffka, for example, was a major conduit for Gestalt theory. In 1922, 
he published Principles of Gestalt Psychology, the first formal exposition of Gestalt 
theory for American psychologists. In Principles, he proposed an integrative psychology 
which opposed simple, “materialistic” systems of the past that attempted to interpret the 
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whole through “the contribution of one part.” The Gestalt psychology he described 
integrated “quantity and quality” (the quantitative measurement of mental functions and 
the qualititave evaluation of their relations to other functions), “order” (the intentional 
and evaluative “arrangement” of mental events) and “significance” (the subjective 
valuing of experience).  
Of the three elements, he perceived “signficance” to be the most problematic in 
terms of American acceptance, though the most appealing to Germans. He wrote: “In 
America the climate is chiefly practical; the here and now, the immediate present with its 
needs, holds the centre of the state, thereby relegating the problems essential to German 
mentality to the realm of the useless and non-existing. In science this attitudes makes for 
positivism, an overvaluation of mere facts and an undervaluation of very abstract 
speculations, a high regard for science, accurate and earthbound, and an aversion, 
sometimes bordering on contempt for metaphysics that tries to escape from the welter of 
mere facts into a loftier realm of ideas and ideals.”70 
Despite his apparent disdain for American science, Koffka traveled to the US in 
1924, serving as a visiting professor at Cornell University and lecturing. He maintained 
intellectual connections with Wertheimer and Kohler through his returns to Europe for 
lectures and through Kohler’s sabbatical year spent teaching at Clark University, also in 
1924-25.  In 1927, Koffka permanently settled in the US, accepting a professorship at 
Smith College, in Northampton, Massachusetts.71  
In 1933, Max Wertheimer, the father of Gestalt psychology, accepted the 
invitation of Alvin Johnson, enterprising president of the New School for Social Research 
(which was termed “the University in Exile” during the wave of European immigration), 
to teach in the graduate division of the college. This division had been freshly 
established, the same year, as a refuge for scholars who had been dismissed from their 
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teaching positions under totalitarian regimes. Wertheimer, sensing the growing unease in 
Germany, accepted the invitation and thirteen days later received word from the 
University of Frankfurt, where he was a full professor, that he had been terminated from 
his professorial chair, because he was Jewish.72 Wertheimer, however, never received in 
the United States anything like the recognition he had earned in Germany, due in part to 
the scarcity in America of his published writings. 73 
In contrast, Wolfgang Kohler, who immigrated to the US in 1935, met with a 
surprising amount of professional success. Kohler, Director of the Psychological Institute 
at the University of Berlin from 1920 to 1935, had worked with Wertheimer and Koffka 
to form a Gestalt forum. While Wertheimer and Koffka (both Jewish) fled to the US in 
search of political asylum, Kohler remained in Berlin but maintained his connection to 
them through his three sabbaticals to American Universities. Although Kohler was not 
Jewish himself, he was forced to flee Nazism in 1935 after publishing an article in a 
Berlin newspaper which was critical of the Nazi government. In America, Kohler was 
employed at Swarthmore College and later Dartmouth College.74  
Kohler’s work epitomized the marriage of the concrete experimental and the 
abstract philosophical that Gestalt theory provided. He had based his dynamic model of 
human behavior on his research with problem-solving in chimpanzees. In contrast to the 
reigning model of stimulus-response, Kohler found that chimpanzee behavior was not so 
mechanistic. These animals, instead, were capable of insight and able to actively organize 
perceptions.75 Having provided his chimpanzees many tests requiring problem-solving 
behavior—for example, using a stick to reach a target—Kohler observed his most 
advanced chimpanzee (Sultan) assisting a peer in solving a problem. “Sultan’s behavior,” 
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he wrote, “shows no trace of ‘altruism,’ but, though he takes no part in the procedure, we 
feel his complete comprehension of it, and his imperative impulse to do something 
towards the solution which remains so long undiscovered.”76 
Kohler’s maintenance of his commitment to experimental methods facilitated his 
transition from life as a preeminent academic in Germany—where his theories were more 
or less in favor—to life as a successful American academician in the context of a strong 
behaviorist current. Evidence of Kohler’s positive reception in the US was his election  to 
the presidency of the American Psychological Association (APA) in 1959.77 
Due to the rapid influx of European intellectuals like Koffka, Wertheimer and 
Kohler, New York City became, according to Maslow, “the center of the psychological 
universe.”78 The common struggles with the horrors of Nazism united the new 
immigrants personally and often intellectually. The result was a melting pot of German 
theory that sometimes glossed over the once nuanced distinctions between theorists. 
Gestalt psychologists united with phenomenologists, recognizing their common and 
complementary elements and often dismissing their differences. Wolfgang Kohler’s 1959 
APA Presidential Address presented Gestalt theory as a tide of relief that overcame 
German psychologists. Kohler claimed, “It was not only the stimulating newness of our 
enterprise which inspired us. There was also a great wave of relief—as though we were 
escaping from a prison. The prison was psychology as taught in the universities when we 
were still students.”79  
German Jewish intellectuals from disparate disciplines united personally and 
intellectually within the forced camaraderie of their oppression. Often psychically 
damaged by the oppression and violence of the National Socialist regime, many of them 
discovered a compensatory interest in morality, ethics, and relatedness. According to 
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historian Andrew Heinze, “new ideas about fragility and divisibility of the psyche 
developed alongside new anxiety about ethnic fragility and divisibility of nations.”80 This 
experience clearly stretched beyond Gestalt psychology. It was evident in Alfred Adler’s 
intensified social commitment and interest in altruism, which followed his experience 
with fascism, and in the lesser-known theory of  Richard Cabot, who, after working with 
Jewish mental patients, attempted to generalize his ideas of treating the ‘whole man’ to 
the regeneration of American democracy.81  
Although many American universities and colleges were hospitable to the new 
influx of European talent, they tended to be squeezed for funding, and were often forced 
by the Great Depression to cut, rather than to expand, faculty. Some scholars got lucky, 
as in the case of Kurt Lewin, who fled the Nazis to Cornell University in 1933, when the 
department of Home Economics offered him a two-year visiting professorship. Though 
Cornell was unable to extend the contract, which had been hastily thrown together with 
foundation funds, he subsequently received a three-year appointment at the University of 
Iowa, also financed by foundation funds. Fortunately for Lewin, Iowa was able to extend 
his appointment beyond the three years, as by that point the University’s financial 
situation had improved somewhat.82 
A more common case, though, was that of psychologist Karl Buhler, who, having 
turned down a position at Harvard in the 1920s, was unable to secure permanent 
employment upon his return in 1938. After Buhler had been taken into protective custody 
by the Nazis for six weeks, he and his wife Charlotte fled Germany on foot and soon 
returned to the United States, seeking employment. By this time, available positions were 
virtually nonexistent, particularly for a psychologist whose theory directly opposed 
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behaviorism. Buhler spent the remainder of his life moving from one minor position to 
another.83 
Buhler’s work was largely dismissed by American psychologists. His theory 
reflected elements of Gestalt, sharing common elements with the work of his wife, 
psychologist Charlotte Buhler, who would become actively involved in humanistic 
psychology. Buhler espoused a situational model of action—one that was dynamic and 
that valued the individual as an agent in shaping her environment—and focused on areas 
of action that included creativity, inventiveness and transcendence of individuality.84  
Many of his ideas were irreconcilable with behaviorist conceptions of the human subject. 
Even psychologists who were institutionally supported in the U.S. were adversely 
affected by strongly behaviorist departments that resisted their ideas. Kurt Lewin, for 
example, initially experienced only a modicum of the recognition in the U.S. that he had 
garnered in Germany. Lewin’s first book, A Dynamic Theory of Personality, received 
only limited scholarly attention and several negative reviews.85 
Lewin proclaimed himself to have moved beyond the Gestalt psychology he had 
encountered as a doctoral student at the University of Berlin, but remained indebted to 
the influence of Gestaltists.86  The holistic and experience-oriented nature of Lewin’s 
theories testifies to this debt. Many of Lewin’s concepts—such as “vector,” “valence,” 
“life space,” “field theory,” and “tension system”—became indispensable parts of 
American psychology.87  
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Of the German émigrés, Kurt Goldstein was the most seminal in introducing 
Gestalt principles to American psychology. Beginning not as a psychological theorist but 
as an eminent neurologist, Goldstein’s most shaping experience occurred in the 1920s at 
the Institute for Research into the Consequences of Brain Injuries, where he treated 
soldiers who had incurred brain injury during World-War I. In the course of his 
neuropsychological work, Goldstein was impressed by the resiliency of the soldiers he 
treated. The manner in which they reorganized their functioning, compensating for 
deficits by developing strengths in other areas, suggested to Goldstein an intrinsic 
tendency towards wholeness in humans. Their continual striving, which entailed a certain 
amount of anxiety and vulnerability, demonstrated what he perceived as their inherent 
actualizing tendencies.88  
In 1935, Goldstein immigrated to New York City. Outside of a circle of 
sympathetic scholars, which included fellow exiles like Wertheimer, Koffka, Kohler and 
Horney and American psychologists like Gordon Allport and Abraham Maslow, 
Goldstein’s reputation was greatly diminished. But in the last decades of his life (which 
ended in 1965), he continued to pursue the theoretical implications of his previous work. 
He remained concerned, in particular, with a distinction he had laid out between “abstract 
capacity” and “concrete capacity”—the abstract attitude was the ability to arrange 
experience into logical wholes and the concrete capacity was the ability to pragmatically 
compartmentalize experience into logical categories. He found that the abstract attitude 
was often suppressed at the expense of routine life. In the 1950s, he explored more 
relational ideas of wholeness, including those of  “encounter” and “communion,” and 
expanded on his idea of self-actualization, positing that it always occurred in relation to 
others.89 
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ABSORBING THE EXILES  
The relationships between interested American psychologists and prominent 
European émigrés tended to be a reciprocal, hermeneutic one. Rather than simply 
importing their theories and influences intact to America, many European émigrés 
remained open to the influence of the American academic scene and to the reactions of 
their American students. Lewin’s biographer argued that his students were drawn to him 
in part because of his practical appeal in considering “life problems”—his theories “were 
tools to attack everyday human problems” at a cultural moment when such tools were 
scarce. In turn, Lewin’s students “led Lewin, in chicken-and-egg fashion, to place 
increasing emphasis on experimental studies of how and what-for of individual and social 
change-studies which later were consummated as ‘action research’ and ‘group 
dynamics.’”90 
Despite arguments, like those of Russell Jacoby in The Repression of 
Psychoanalysis, that blame the American climate for suppression of the fervor and 
originality of immigrant theory, immigrant theorists brought a dynamic depth and a 
philosophical expansiveness to psychological theories that would oppose the status quo in 
most academic departments in the 1930s and 1940s.91 They did this, in part, by crossing 
disciplinary lines.  
Holistic theories of the person, as transmitted through Gestalt psychologists, were 
complemented by the theories of exiled theologians whose work reached the U.S. around 
the same time.92 The theories of Martin Buber and Paul Tillich, in particular, informed 
psychological dialogues in the 1930s and beyond. 
 In 1923 Austrian philosopher Martin Buber proposed the philosophy of dialogue, 
which encompassed his theories of the “I-thou” relationship, characterized by genuine 
encounter, openness, and mutuality, and the “I-it” relationship, defined by its absence of 
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“I-thou” qualities. For Buber, the “I-thou” relationship included the relation of man to the 
world and of man to God. It focused on the idea of genuine, authentic encounter and the 
ultimate truth contained in experience.93  
Like many of his Jewish intellectual peers, Buber was forced to flee his post 
under National Socialist rule, abandoning his professorship in Jewish and Religious 
History at the University of Frankfurt and seeking refuge in Palestine where he continued 
his intellectual pursuits and invested his energy in teaching. Nonetheless, Buber directly 
influenced American theory through the extensive lecture tours he undertook after World 
War II in the U.S. and England and through the publication of I & Thou in 1923, 
translated into English in 1937.94 
In 1933, Paul Tillich, a Protestant theologian, immigrated to the U.S. after losing 
his position in Frankfurt, due to his opposition to Nazism. His work incorporated 
existential philosophy with theological themes, focusing heavily on the concept of 
relation. Tillich’s most celebrated book, 1952’s The Courage to Be, outlined his 
existentialist views and appealed widely because of its interpretation of the existential 
roots of everyday anxiety and experience.95  
Tillich was seminal in the transmission of existentialist ideas to America.96 
Having met Rollo May in 1933 while May was pursuing his Bachelor’s of Divinity at 
Union Theological Seminary, Tillich encouraged him to push deeper in his quest for the 
philosophical underpinnings of psychological problems. May came to adopt Tillich’s 
belief in the significance of individual struggles for meaning in the face of uncertainty 
and mortality, endorsing in particular his concept of “essence” as the infinite ground of 
being, which contrasted with the finite ground of “existence.”97 These themes were 
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apparent in May’s 1949 doctoral thesis, The Meaning of Anxiety, in which he argued  that 
humans possess an underlying non-neurotic anxiety related to their rational fear of their 
own mortality. When repressed, this existential anxiety blocks individual potentialities, 
producing an “ultramodern” form of neurotic anxiety. It was the duty of psychotherapists, 
he felt, to be aware of this “normal form of anxiety, rather than pathologizing it, and thus 
perpetuating to blockage.” 98 The themes appeared again in May’s essays in the 1958 
volume Existence. 
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Chapter Four: The Foundation and Founding of Humanistic 
Psychology 
In 1909, William James identified the need for a humanistic psychology, one that 
employed phenomenological methods to capture subjective experience. He asserted: “The 
world of concrete personal experience […] is multitudinous beyond imagination, tangled, 
muddy, painful and perplexed. The world to which your philosophy professor introduces 
you is simple, clean and noble. The contradictions of real life are absent from it…”1 The 
psychology which James envisioned, by broadening the realm of empirical inquiry, 
sought to capture the complexity of experience rather than its distillation by combining 
Swedenborgian and transcendentalist philosophies with James’ own brand of 
pragmatism, religion, and empiricism. These diverse elements suggest not only the 
complexity and contradictions of James’s psyche—one that was plagued by religious and 
existential angst and often paralyzed by neurasthenia—but also of the science through 
which he tried to preserve this complexity.2  
The foundation of humanistic psychology as it emerged in the 1940s and 1950s 
was as pluralistic as William James himself. It was essentially a hybrid of numerous 
sympathetic influences that joined the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger, the 
existentialism of Kierkegaard, Frankl and Binswanger, the vitalism of Goldstein, the 
holism of Wertheimer, Koffka and Kohler, the pragmatism of John Dewey and James, 
and the social and cultural emphases of Fromm, Horney and Sullivan.3 Its founders 
shared a dissatisfaction with the prevailing scientific reductionism, a desire to consider 
individuals in their social and cultural contexts, a concern for the values and meaning that 
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individuals ascribed to their pursuits, and a recognition of the irreducible subjectivity of 
the individual as psychological subject.4 
THE FOUNDATIONAL WORK OF ABRAHAM MASLOW AND CARL ROGERS 
The work of Abraham Maslow in the 1940s and 1950s epitomized the concerns of 
the humanistic psychology he would formally found in 1962. While serving as a post-
doctoral fellow for E. L. Thorndike from 1935-1946, Maslow began to diverge from his 
comparative research with primates, taking up, instead, the study of sexual dominance, 
self-esteem and motivation in college women.5 Then, after connecting with Adler, 
Fromm, Horney, Goldstein, Wertheimer, and Koffka in the years between 1935 and 
1940, Maslow again reoriented his work towards the formation of a more holistic theory 
of human psychology that would incorporate realms as diverse as religion, work, 
marriage and biology.6 In 1943, he published “A Theory of Human Motivation,” which 
served as a basis for the book, Motivation and Personality, published in 1954.7  
In “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Maslow proposed his notion of the 
hierarchy of needs. The basic thrust of Maslow’s theory was that humans are innately 
motivated to reach their fullest potential, but to do so they had to ascend through a series 
of “prepotent” needs; one set of needs, said Maslow, must be fulfilled in order for an 
individual to focus on the next set of needs. The first four levels of Maslow’s hierarchy 
were comprised of basic needs, beginning with physiological needs, which include those 
for water, air, food, sleep, etc. Once the basic needs were met, an individual would strive 
to meet what Maslow called “safety” and “security” needs, including the need for 
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structure and order. The third level of the pyramid was comprised of  “love” and 
“belonging” needs, and the fourth, “esteem” needs. If the attainment of any one of these 
basic needs was thwarted, an individual would fixate on that particular level, and possibly 
never reach the very highest needs—the attainment of which Maslow characterized as 
“self-actualization.” Maslow wrote, “This term, first coined by Kurt Goldstein, is being 
used in this paper in a much more specific and limited fashion. It refers to the desire for 
self-fulfillment, namely, to the tendency for him to become actualized in what he is 
potentially. This tendency might be phrased as the desire to become more and more what 
one is, to become everything that one is capable of becoming.”8 
Maslow’s theory departed markedly from previous work he had published. It was 
entirely theoretical, and made no reference to any experimental research that would 
support his hypothesis. But it by no means represented an abandonment of his value of 
experimental research. Maslow conceived his theory as a starting point for future 
research; it provided a testable theory of human motivation. In the paper itself, he 
warned: “The present theory then must be considered to be a suggested program or 
framework for future research and must stand or fall, not so much on facts available or 
evidence presented, as upon researches to be done, researches suggested perhaps, by the 
questions raised in this paper.”9 
In 1950, Maslow pursued further the theme of self-actualization in his paper, 
“Self-actualizing People: A Study of Psychological Health.” In this study, Maslow 
identified 13 traits of “healthy” individuals who had reached the peak of the hierarchy of 
needs. He selected as his subjects both historical figures and his own contemporaries 
whom he perceived to be fully using their “talents, capacities and potentialities,” and who 
were relatively free from psychopathology. Among the historical figures he included 
were Abraham Lincoln, Thomas Jefferson, Albert Einstein, Eleanor Roosevelt, Jane 
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Addams, William James and Spinoza. Their common qualities, which he inferred mainly 
from his own impressions, included “more efficient perceptions of reality and more 
comfortable relations with it,” “continued freshness of appreciation” of the “basic goods 
of life,” a “philosophical, unhostile sense of humor,” “creativeness,” acceptance of self 
and others, a need for privacy, esthetic sensitivity, a democratic outlook, involvement in a 
cause or mission outside oneself, and frequent transcendent experiences.10  
As in his theory of motivation, Maslow emphasized the need for experimental 
research to follow, qualifying his hypothesis as preliminary at best. He wrote: “I consider 
the problem of psychological health to be so pressing that any leads, any bits of data, 
however moot, are endowed with a certain temporary value. This kind of research is in 
principle so difficult—involving as it does lifting oneself by one’s axiological 
bootstraps—that, if we were to wait for conventionally reliable data, we should have to 
wait forever.”11 
Still, Maslow recognized that he was going out on a limb with the theory. He later 
commented on the “anxiety, conflict, and self-doubt” that plagued him in his marked 
departure from accepted experimental practice. He wrote in 1970: “My study of self-
actualizing persons […] was a great gamble, doggedly pursuing an intuitive conviction 
and, in the process, defying some of the basic canons of scientific method and of 
philosophical criticism. These were, after all, rules which I myself had believed and 
accepted, and I was very much aware that I was skating on thin ice.”12 
In 1954, Maslow published Motivation and Personality, a book that pursued in 
greater depth the themes he had briefly outlined in 1943, and included his 1950 study of 
self-actualized persons. Exploring the themes of “higher” and “lower needs,” of instincts 
and of health, the book was entirely oriented toward a holistic conception of the 
individual. “Holism,” Maslow wrote, “is obviously true—after all, the cosmos is one and 
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interrelated, etc.—and yet the holistic outlook has a hard time being implemented and 
being used as it should be, as a way of looking at the world.”13  
The publication of Motivation and Personality served to broadcast Maslow’s 
theory to a wider audience than any academic journal could have captured. Maslow 
himself was pleased with the results, remarking, in January of 1961, at his pleasure in the 
royalties and in the still-increasing sales.14 The book also aligned his theory with parallel 
developments in psychotherapy. He praised psychotherapy as “need-gratification via 
interpersonal relations,” and described the psychotherapeutic relationship as “good 
human relations.”15 He also called for increased experimental study of psychotherapy, 
referring to it as “an unworked gold mine.”16 
Maslow’s inclusion of psychotherapy alluded to developments in therapeutic 
practice that paralleled his own interests. In 1942, Carl Rogers had published the 
pioneering book, Counseling and Psychotherapy, in which he forged a humanized 
conception of “client-centered” practice.  Rogers, who at the time of the book’s 
publication was a full professor of psychology at Ohio State, had been trained in liberal 
protestant theology at the Union Theological Seminary before switching to Columbia’s 
doctoral program in clinical psychology in 1926.17 Rogers’ work, in the 1930s, was 
oriented to personality adjustment, social work, and children’s welfare, but turned to the 
study of therapeutic practice in the 1940s. The emphasis of his work in the 1940s and 
beyond was on the importance of the attitude of the therapist; he specifically outlined a 
model of therapy in which the counselor valued his client unconditionally and engaged 
fully and openly in the therapeutic process.18 
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Rogers hoped to demystify therapy, providing concrete examples of his own 
therapeutic ideals and literally walking the reader through the therapeutic process. In 
Counseling and Psychotherapy, his chapter, “Characteristic Steps in the Therapeutic 
Process,” includes sub-sections that range from “The Client Comes in For Help” and 
“The Situation is Defined” to “Increased Independence” and “The Decreasing Need for 
Help.”19 In the final section of the book, Rogers included the first-ever verbatim 
published therapeutic case, the case of “Herbert Bryan” as presented in eight interviews.20 
To foster growth, Rogers wrote, it was necessary for a therapist to be warm, responsive, 
“permissive in regard to expression of feeling, structured, and non-coercive.”21  
In 1951 Client-Centered Therapy extended the themes of Counseling and 
Psychotherapy. In the introduction, Rogers wrote: “This book is, I believe, about life, as 
life vividly reveals itself in the therapeutic process—with its blind power and its 
tremendous capacity for destruction, but with its overbalancing thrust toward growth, if 
the opportunity for growth is provided. But the book is also about my colleagues and me 
as we undertake the beginnings of scientific analysis of this living, emotional experience 
[…] though science is slow and fumbling, it represents the best road we know to truth, 
even in so delicately intricate an area as that of human relationships.”22  
Rogers then proceeded to describe the process of individual growth, blending his 
theoretical ideas about the role of the therapist with excerpts from therapy sessions and 
supporting research. Through his exposition of the goals of therapy, he also argued for a 
concept of human nature that had much in common with Maslow’s own conception. If 
provided the right conditions for growth, including an atmosphere of acceptance and 
respect, he argued, individuals would inherently strive for health.23 He referred to this 
                                                
19 Carl Rogers, Counseling and Psychotherapy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942), 30-44. 
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Houghton Mifflin, 1951), 13. 
21 Rogers, Counseling and Psychotherapy, 85-87. 
22 Rogers Client-Centered Therapy, xi. 
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process as organismic “valuing” or “sensing,” suggesting that individuals know what is 
good for them and innately strive to attain it.24 
In the 1950s, Rogers continued to publish widely on the topic of client-centered 
therapy. His articles displayed specifically his developing interest in psychological health 
and striving. For example, a 1955 article, entitled “Facilitation of Personal Growth,” 
explored the conditions necessary for an individual to seize upon his full potential.25 His 
articles also highlighted his growing disconnection from the methods in which he was 
trained. Reflecting on his 1955 article, “Persons or Science? A Philosophical Question,” 
Rogers wrote in 1961 that the origin of his conflict was “between the logical positivism 
in which I was educated, for which I had a deep respect, and the subjectively oriented 
existential thinking which was taking root in me because it seemed to fit so well with my 
therapeutic experience.”26 
Rogers didn’t read existential philosophy until the 1950s, when, at the urging of 
his University of Chicago students, he delved into the work of Kierkegaard and Buber, 
but when he finally had direct exposure to their existential philosophy, he responded to 
their “deep insights and convictions which beautifully express views I have held but 
never been able to formulate.”27 Rogers’ reorientation culminated, in 1961, in the 
publication of On Becoming a Person, a collection of the articles Rogers published 
between 1951 and 1961 intended for the “intelligent layman,” rather than the professional 
psychological audience to which his previous work had been directed.28  
THE JOURNAL OF HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY 
Maslow’s 1950s articles, like Rogers’ articles, reflected his new orientation 
toward personal growth and human motivation. They focused on topics like deficiency 
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and growth motivation, power relationships and personal development, and normality, 
health and values. As prolific as ever, Maslow published 27 articles in the 1950s (he had 
published 21 and 23 in the 1930s and 1940s, respectively).29 He found it increasingly 
difficult, however, to publish his theory in mainstream journals.30 While in previous 
decades his work appeared consistently in top journals, like the Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology, the Journal of Comparative Psychology, and the Psychological 
Review, his work in the 1950s appeared, with a few exceptions, in journals like Merrill-
Palmer Quarterly and Dialectica (published out of the University of Liege).31 
By the late 1950s, Maslow had left Brooklyn College, where he had taught from 
1937 to 1951, and had accepted a prestigious academic position as chair of the 
psychology department at Brandeis.32 From his new post, Maslow drafted a mailing list 
of 175 individuals he knew to be sympathetic to his critique of psychology and his vision 
of a growth-oriented alternative. In the mid to late 1950s, the list helped Maslow to 
intellectually unite a nationally dispersed group of “Creativeness, Self, Being and Growth 
People,” who shared a common frustration with the direction in which American 
psychology was headed. The list included scholars like Gordon Allport, Kurt Goldstein, 
Lewis Mumford, Carl Rogers and Paul Tillich, some of whom would become primary in 
the movement Maslow was angling to establish.33 
The mailing list helped to broadcast theory and research within a “kind of 
Committee of Correspondence and Interchange.”34 And the rapid growth of the list and 
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the interest it provoked soon necessitated the creation of a journal to formalize the 
intellectual exchange. After turning down an offer from the editor of the American 
Journal of Individual Psychology to incorporate his growth-oriented perspective into the 
Adlerian emphasis of that journal, Maslow began to organize the Journal of Humanistic 
Psychology (JHP) in 1957. In July of that year, he assigned the editorship to Anthony 
Sutich, a largely self-taught psychologist who’d been corresponding with Maslow 
throughout the ’50s.35 The two originally intended to name the journal the Journal of 
Ortho-psychology, presumably in reference to the corrective or revisionary nature of its 
content, but when the Orthopsychiatric Association opposed the title, they discarded the 
idea. Maslow suggested other titles, like Psychological Growth, Being and Becoming, 
and Personality Development. And Sutich and Maslow also discussed the titles Existence, 
Third Force, and Self-Psychology. They eventually agreed to name the journal the 
Journal of Humanistic Psychology, however, upon a suggestion from Maslow’s son-in-
law, then a psychology student at Brandeis. 36 
Maslow’s decision may have been too impulsive. The name of the journal, and 
later of the association, posed problems for humanistic psychologists and detracted from 
the movement’s intent. Harvard-based personality psychologist Gordon Allport expressed 
concern over the “perils of labelism” and worried that the label “humanistic psychology” 
implied “humanism without any scientific constraints,” whereas the movement that 
Allport hoped for was one that “might be said to have the outlook of humanism, but the 
                                                                                                                                            
increasing number of important contributions have neither been published nor are they otherwise readily 
available. Journal of Humanistic Psychology,  I-VII.  
35 Anthony Sutich, a largely self-taught psychologist crippled from severe progressive arthritis since 
childhood, was wildly enthusiastic about the “new frontier” of humanistic psychology. Maslow, who had 
been introduced to Sutich in 1949 by a mutual friend, identified Sutich’s commitment to humanistic 
psychology through Sutich’s publications on values, ethics, and semantics and through their intermittent 
correspondence in the 1950s. Early on, Maslow affectionately referred to Sutich as "the boss of the new 
enterprise" and later solicited his support in the founding of the American Association of Humanistic 
Psychology. de Carvalho, Founders of Humanistic Psychology, 9. 
36 Ibid., 7-15. 
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constraints of science.”37 “Label not good,” he wrote, but it was too late. The name soon 
came to cover the coalescing movement, and the confusion that Allport had feared, 
between “humanists” and “humanistic psychologists,” plagued the movement from the 
outset.38 
The new journal, and the movement, were also hindered by a lack of funding. The 
first meager infusion came from Sutich’s personal savings and donations from friends. 
Brandeis University, whose president initially refused to offer support of any kind, 
eventually agreed to sponsor the journal, but he refused to fund it.  Supporters rallied for 
the journal’s success; even before the first issue was published in the spring of 1961, 
Sutich received numerous manuscripts and expressions of interest. A host of 
psychological luminaries agreed to serve on the journal’s board of directors, most notably 
Kurt Goldstein, Aldous Huxley—who had conceived the term “human potentialities”—
Lewis Mumford, Lonely Crowd author David Reisman, Erich Fromm and soon-to-be 
central figures in the movement like Rollo May, Abe Maslow, Carl Rogers and Charlotte 
Buhler. After the first publication, the praise from subscribers (initially the members of 
Maslow’s mailing list) and the continued submissions convinced Sutich that an 
association would be required to organize the growing list of “humanistic 
psychologists.”39 
Early issues of the Journal of Humanistic Psychology indicate the tight, insider-
oriented nature of JHP. Maslow published an article in virtually every issue (11 of the 
first 15). Charlotte Buhler’s articles were featured in 7 of the first 18 issues. Other 
frequent appearances were made by James Bugental, whose articles appeared in 5 of the 
first 13 issues and whose column “Persons behind Ideas” ran from the 4th through 6th 
volumes (the column was later written by James Fadiman); Henry Winthrop, whose 
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articles appeared in 5 of the first 7 issues and whose book reviews appeared in all but one 
of the first 13 issues; and Sidney Jourard, who published 5 articles in the first 19 issues of 
the journal. The most commonly occurring topics in the first decade of the journal 
involved the role of ideals and principles in the psychological conception of the self; 
individual striving for health and self-actualization; transcendence or peak experiences 
(spiritual or mystical experiences in which one is at one’s best); and creativity. Early 
issues of the journal also demonstrated nascent avenues of interest for humanistic 
psychology. For example, “sensitivity training,” a form of group therapy involving open 
and direct communication, first appeared in the Spring 1963 issue of the journal in two 
separate articles.40 
THE FORMATION OF AAHP 
Connections established through Maslow’s mailing list, and stirring around the 
publication of JHP, enabled Maslow to realize his ambition to form an association. In 
1962, the American Association of Humanistic Psychology (AAHP) was established at 
the first of a series of conferences sponsored by Sonoma State College, and James 
Bugental was named president pro tem. The founding meeting of the association occurred 
in the summer of 1963, in Philadelphia, and attracted 75 participants. The meeting was 
professionally significant in establishing the themes of the new organization, which were 
broadly oriented around ideas of personal growth and the infusion of values into the 
supposedly value-free realms of empirical psychology. But even more powerful was the 
meeting’s personal significance to its participants, who, according to Sutich, felt that they 
had created a new “belonging group,” delivering them from professional and intellectual 
isolation and frustration.41 
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Humanistic psychology grew quickly; the second meeting of AAHP, held in Los 
Angeles in September of 1964, boasted double the attendance of the first.42 Its continued 
success, however, depended on a clearer articulation of its goals and on dramatic cultural 
changes (already afoot) that would better align public perception with its message. 
Maslow continued to be seminal in articulating the theory of humanistic 
psychology.43 His 1962 collection of his essays and addresses, Toward a Psychology of 
Being, helped to disseminate his ideas. The book became extremely popular, selling over 
200,000 copies before the trade edition came out in 1968.44 Building on the theory of 
motivation he advanced in Motivation and Personality, Toward a Psychology of Being 
contained essays in which he reflected his existentialist bent, demarcating the highest 
level of the hierarchy of needs the “Being-realm” or “B-realm,” and speaking of the 
values that an individual possessed when in that realm as “B-values.”  
The B-values were thoroughly holistic; he enumerated them as the need for 
wholeness, perfection, completion, justice, aliveness, richness, simplicity, beauty, 
goodness, uniqueness, effortlessness, truth, honesty, reality and self-sufficiency.45 
According to Maslow, only self-actualized individuals possessed B-values, all others 
were motivated by D-values (or deficiency-values), which were oriented to basic 
necessities that they lacked.46 
Toward a Psychology of Being also brought to a much broader audience 
Maslow’s theory of peak experiences, which he had published in a professional journal in 
1959.47 Maslow defined peak experiences to participants in his research as “the most 
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wonderful experience or experiences in your life; happiest moments, ecstatic moments, 
moments of rapture.” 48 
 During a peak experience, he wrote, individuals feel more integrated “unified, 
whole, all-of a piece.” They are “more able to fuse with the world.” For example, “the 
appreciater becomes the music (and it becomes him) or the painting, or the dance.” 
Peakers feel themselves to be at the height of their powers; they experience a sense of 
“effortlessness and ease of functioning”; they feel free of blocks and inhibitions, they feel 
more spontaneous and expressive, more “freely flowering outward”; and they feel “more 
of a pure psyche and less a thing-of-the world living under the laws of the world.” 
Peakers also feel more creative, connected to the present, unique, and grateful.49 
A peak experience, he wrote, is short and fleeting.  “Certainly I know this now 
about peak, the great joys.” Maslow wrote in his journal in 1964, “They would kill us if 
they lasted too long or came too often. (Supposing a great orgasm lasted for 15 minutes 
instead of 10 or 15 seconds! The organism couldn’t stand it. Surely the heart would 
collapse. […] To have a peak means not to fear flooding. One can ‘take it,’ One can give 
up control, self-consciousness.”50 
Maslow’s notion of peak garnered widespread attention, foreshadowing the 
popular interest that the humanistic psychology movement would attract. In response to 
his professional paper alone, approximately 50 people wrote Maslow unsolicited 
accounts of their own peak experiences.51 
THE OLD SAYBROOK CONFERENCE OF 1964 
Maslow’s ideas were enough to ground a theory, but not enough to make a 
movement. He openly expressed this awareness in communications with sympathetic 
                                                
48 Abraham Maslow, “Cognition of the Peak Experiences,” in Maslow, Psychology of Being, 83. 
49 Maslow, Psychology of Being, 103-114 
50 Maslow, November 24, 1964, Journals Vol. 1, 435. 
51 Kirschenbaum, On Becoming Carl Rogers, 258. 
 107 
scholars and in the Journal.52 The momentum of his preliminary efforts, however, finally 
coalesced on November 28th, 1964, when the main players in humanistic psychology first 
convened to collectively identify the movement’s theory and goals. In the quaint 
Connecticut coastal town of Old Saybrook, the new American Association for 
Humanistic Psychology held its first invitational conference. Humanistic psychology 
lynch pins like Carl Rogers, Abe Maslow, Rollo May, Gordon Allport, Gardner Murphy, 
Henry Murray, Floyd Matson, James Bugental, Clark Moustakas, Sydney Jourard and 
Miles Vich attended. Two women participated—Charlotte Buhler (then a practicing 
psychologist in California) and Norma Rosenquist (first organizational secretary for 
AAHP). The Old Saybrook conference has been repeatedly described, by its participants 
and by scholars of the movement, as a landmark moment in humanistic psychology, 
sparking a “revolution” that “opened doors to new fields like Creativity research; others 
which had been systemically shut to psychology, such as consciousness and self-
exploration; other doors to European existential-phenomenology, and still others to 
Eastern philosophical traditions.”53 
 The conference spanned from Friday the 28th to Sunday the 30th 1964 and 
laid the intellectual foundations for humanistic psychology. The events of the weekend 
were academic in tone and nature, consisting exclusively of the civilized presentation of 
academic papers and lively discussions that bore little resemblance to the radically 
experiential gatherings that would take place under heading of Humanistic Psychology in 
the years that followed.54  
The bulk of the papers presented during the weekend respectfully (and 
strategically) placed humanistic psychology within the domain of scientific psychology, 
stressing that humanistic psychology theory would extend and enrich the findings of 
experimental psychology, rather th an negate them. The conference insisted on a firm 
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scientific grounding, and tried to pre-empt accusations that it was too strictly humanistic 
by including papers that explicitly emphasized natural rather than social science.55  
Rene Dubos represented the natural sciences with his presentation of his 
American Scientist article “Humanistic Biology.”56 Dubos urged biological sciences, 
which “have been immensely successful in describing elementary structures and 
processes of the body machine” to attend to the study of living as experience as well. He 
contended that rather than losing “contact with the humanities because it has become too 
‘scientific’ and as a consequence no longer deals with the problems peculiar to the 
humanness of man,” biology was not scientific enough. A truly scientific biology would, 
according to Dubos, consider the totality of human reality, rather than “neglecting the 
study of a large variety of man’s responses.” 57 
Edward Shoben, presenter of “Psychology: Natural science or humanistic 
discipline?” argued against the limitations of a natural science definition of psychology, 
but he also emphasized the necessity of augmenting the present empirical approach, 
rather than discarding it. “Psychology's great opportunity lies not in discarding its sturdily 
expanding methodological apparatus, but in informing it with the humanistic vision, the 
quest for an even fuller statement of the ‘law for man’ as against the ‘law for thing.’” 58 
George Kelly’s paper, “The Threat of Aggression,” further explored the idea of 
rehumanizing the scientific enterprise—not a purely academic concern at a conference 
happening only two years after the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world to the brink of 
nuclear war—arguing that the boldness of the scientifically-minded experimenter must 
not be replaced with a negative form of aggression hiding behind a mask of humanism: 
The humanistic psychologist’s dilemma—how to protect human audacity from 
human audacity without stifling human audacity—finds another kind of solution 
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when we manage to step outside the stimulus-response solipsism. It is the hostile, 
and not necessarily the aggressive enterprise, that must be guarded against. The 
aggressive effort to understand man, or to experiment with ways of accomplishing 
psychological feats never before achieved, is not intrinsically destructive. It may, 
of course, be hazardous. It does become destructive, however, when one tries to 
make it appear that disconfirming events did not actually arise, or that what failed 
to occur actually happened. And this, in turn, is generated by the notion that we 
ought always to be right before we commit ourselves, a notion that later makes it 
very hard to concede our mistakes, or to revise our construction of the world 
when our heavily invested anticipations fail to materialize.59 
At Saybrook, Carl Rogers was both sympathetic to the seductiveness of 
positivistic science and insistent on the evaluation of the values behind it. “I love the 
precision and the elegance,” he admitted. But he also advanced a new notion of scientific 
integrity that involved questioning “the presuppositions which underlie our whole field of 
work and its relation to life and living.” Opposing the notion that philosophical 
considerations were an irrelevant aspect of psychology’s past, he asked: “How do we 
know? What is ‘true’? What are the identifying characteristics of a scientist? What is 
science? What is the special nature of behavioral science?”60 
The danger of overlooking these questions, from the perspective of humanistic 
psychologists, was that psychologists would unwittingly reproduce and reinforce the 
American cultural tendency to try to fulfill human needs with impersonal technological 
invention. According to Maslow, “Our orthodox conception of science (as mechanistic 
and ahuman) seems to me one local part-manifestation or expression of the larger, more 
inclusive Weltanschauung of mechanization and dehumanization of which it is a part.”61 
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Chapter Five: Building a Movement 
Despite the conservatism of the 1950s and early 1960s, and the monopoly that 
behaviorism held over the institutions of academic psychology, participants in the Old 
Saybrook conference were optimistic about their enterprise. They knew that their 
ambitions to reform science and psychology were grand, but they shared a confidence 
that American culture was, beneath the surface, readying itself for such a shift in 
attitudes.1 Maslow spoke of the “rapidly developing” counter-philosophy emerging, in 
pockets throughout the intellectual world, in opposition to the prevalent positivism. He 
wrote: 
It might be called a rediscovery of man, of human capacities, and of needs-
aspirations. These humanly-based values are being restored to politics, to 
industry, to religion, and also to the psychological and social sciences. This is true 
also for the non-human and impersonal sciences which have been going through a 
convulsion of what might be called rehumanization. At first, they began by 
rejecting teleology (human purpose) from the physical universe, which was 
reasonable enough. But then they wound up by rejecting human purposes in 
human beings. Now this begins to change.2 
Gordon Allport, in his personal notes on the Old Saybrook conference, expressed 
his optimism for the fledgling association. He observed the “overwhelming enthusiasm” 
of his colleagues at the conference and identified humanistic psychology as “not a school, 
or a person, or a theory of Personality, but a ground swell.” More than a decade before, 
Allport had identified the existence of a “healthy and contrary trend in America.” In 
particular, Allport pointed to the liberalizing of philosophies of child-rearing; to more 
holistic, humane treatment of workers in the industrial economy; and to the popularity of 
therapy as evidence of a growing belief that a “person must settle his own destiny” and 
that life presented an endless series of opportunities for the realization of growth. 
Humanistic psychology embraced Allport’s imperative of advocating wholeness and 
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attempt to actualize his contention that “A MINORITY OF DEMOCRATIC WHOLE 
MEN can I believe, withstand a MAJORITY OF TOTALITARIAN HALF-MEN.”3 
In his 1955 introduction to Becoming, Allport identified the increasing power of 
psychological theory to address the pressing cultural questions of the time—including 
those related to race and gender relations, industry and education. He noted that everyone 
seemed to be speaking the language of psychology, from the “common man” who “now 
talks in the language of Freud and reads an ever mounting output of books in popular 
psychology,” to the leaders of industry and the scholars in adjacent disciplines, including 
anthropology, sociology and political science.4 
Allport’s own work, consistently oriented toward the uniqueness of the individual 
and her attempts at harmonious existence in the social sphere, explored a range of timely 
cultural interests, including racial prejudice and religious experience. In 1946, he 
published the book Controlling Group Prejudice, covering a topic he again took up in 
1948 in the pamphlet ABC’s of Scapegoating and in 1954 with The Nature of Prejudice. 
Exploring American prejudice against Jews, and later against blacks and Roman 
Catholics, Allport theorized the polar concepts of “the prejudiced personality,” and “the 
tolerant personality.”5 The tolerant personality, which Allport parallelled with the 
“democratic” and “productive” personality, was characterized most often by liberal 
political views, “slightly” higher intelligence, greater tolerance for amibuity and higher 
levels of empathy.6  
Allport continued to refine his notions of the “tolerant” or “mature” personality in 
his 1950 book The Individual and his Religion. Mature religious sentiment, according to 
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Allport, was characteristic of the person whose approach to religion is dynamic, open-
minded, and able to encompass contradiction.7 Reflecting his own liberal political 
philosophy and a desire to forge a psychology of “health,” Allport’s theories reflected a 
countercurrent in American culture that opposed inflexible systems of the past. 
The cultural changes of the 1950s and 1960s, and in particular the Brown v. 
Board of education decision that was issued the same year The Nature of Prejudice was 
released, suggested to Allport that America was ready to receive a theory of humanistic 
psychology. But, like his fellow participants at the Old Saybrook Conference of 1964, he 
was also realistic about the challenges that humanistic psychology would face. In his 
notes from the conference, he wrote that “all of us […] sense significant pattern, maybe 
few central qualities.”8 The loose configuration of theories comprising humanistic 
psychology would make it difficult to win adherents and to effectively oppose existing 
theories. The very intention of humanistic psychology—to capture humans in their 
complexity—further infused the movement with an intrinsic amount of unknowability 
and abstraction.  
The method that Allport identified as having led psychology to its then current, 
reductionistic state was also, he recognized, a conceptual advantage for mainstream 
psychology: he wrote that “success comes by exclusion,” by limiting the important 
questions to those that can be answered without introducing too many variables. Allport 
noted that unlike the totality of the psyche—which humanistic psychology took as its 
object of study—“fragments are manageable.”9 To illustrate this difference he listed 
examples of questions that science was able to effectively answer because of their 
simplicity: 
What’s the cause of typhoid? Find it 
What’s the cause of yellow fever? 
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What’s the cause of polio? 
What happens when you frustrate a rat? 
What happens when the eye adapts to the dark? 
What happens when conflicting images are presented to two eyes?10 
The trend toward reduction—in philosophy, literary criticism, and psychology’s 
learning theory and treatment of mental illness—was a problem for Allport. But he also 
recognized its potency, and he wondered how humanistic psychology would oppose this 
powerful tide, which had already absorbed the mainstream of psychology. “This 
approach (enormously fruitful),” he wrote, “tends to leave Nature and Human Nature as a 
pile of debris (disjecta membra).”11 Thus the mission of humanistic psychology became, 
for Allport, not one of slight modification to an otherwise functional science, but of 
resuscitation and resurrection: “Rehumanization of impersonal science” and “rediscovery 
of man.”12 
Maslow too was preoccupied by the balancing act the movement must do between 
its ambitions and its reliance on tradition, referring to humanistic psychology as a “third 
force.” In 1968, he wrote: “I interpret this third psychology to include the first and second 
psychologies […] I am Freudian and I am behavioristic and I am humanistic.”13  In the 
preface to the second edition of Motivation and Personality, he stressed “the profoundly 
holistic nature of human nature in contradiction to the analytic-dissecting-atomistic-
Newtonian approach of the behaviorisms and of Freudian psychoanalysis.”14 He claimed 
that though he accepted the “empirical and experimental spirit” of behaviorism and the 
“depth-probing” of psychoanalysis, he rejected their images of man.15  
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13 Abraham Maslow, The Farther Reaches of Human Nature (New York: Viking Press, 1971), 4. 
14 Maslow, Motivation and Personality, ix. 
15 Ibid., ix-x. 
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THE MUDDLED EXERCISE OF DEFINITION 
In order to define their movement, humanistic psychologists felt compelled to first 
define what humanistic psychology opposed, invariably incorporating a critique of the 
inadequacy of the then current academic psychology. Director of the Harvard 
Psychological Clinic Henry Murray, for example, who had vocally critiqued academic 
psychology for decades, established himself as an oppositional academician even before 
his appearance on Maslow’s original mailing list and his participation in the Old 
Saybrook conference. In 1935, he published a paper in the Archives of Neurology entitled 
“Psychology and the University,” in which he offered an extensive critique of the failings 
of academic psychology.16   
 “If psychology is defined as the science which describes people and explains why 
they perceive, feel, think and act as they do, then, properly speaking, no science of the 
kind exists.” He referred to psychologists as “encrusted specialists,” from whose “web of 
activity consideration of man as a human being has somehow escaped.” Attacking 
academic psychology specifically, he argued that researchers had contributed nothing 
more than “unusable truths.”17 
Murray’s dissatisfaction produced an inevitable antagonism between himself and 
Harvard’s psychology department.18 Of this conflict, he wrote, “Harvard as an 
environment for a social scientist is not nourishing-it is out of the main current of events, 
it is a vast impersonal factory with no sense of vocation, it is indifferent to or opposed to 
the social sciences.”19 “Psychology is young,” wrote Murray, “Harvard does not like 
                                                
16 Henry Murray, “Psychology and the University,” Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, 34, October 
(1935), 803-817. Quotations are from Murray’s archival manuscript. Henry Murray, “Psychology and the 
University” (manuscript) (Henry A. Murray Paperss, HUGFP 97.45.20 Psychology and the University, 
1930-1950 folder, Harvard University Archives). 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ian A. M. Nicholson, Inventing Personality: Gordon Allport and the Science of Selfhood (Washington, 
DC: American Psychological Association, 2003), 184. 
19 Murray, “Psychology and the University,” Murray Papers.  
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anything that is young [and] cannot prove itself to the 4th decimal place.”20 By 1936, 
statements like these, in combination with his unconventional scientific practices, earned 
Murray a good deal of departmental disapproval, spurring colleagues to advocate his 
termination.21 
Fortunately, Gordon Allport’s “scientific capital” enabled him to effectively 
protect the position of Murray, whose interests in psychoanalysis and case studies 
offended the department’s scientific sensibilities and whose forthright critique of 
experimental psychology infuriated his peers.22 Murray’s approach to directing Harvard’s 
Psychological Clinic, which he had taken over in 1927, reflected an holistic approach to 
mental health and personality that aligned with Allport’s interests. It offered, according to 
Allport. a “much needed antidote to the prevailing barbarism of mental tests and 
statistical psychology.”23  
Although Murray spent the rest of his career in the psychology department at 
Harvard, with a brief absence during World War II, Murray’s personal notes in the 1950s 
indicate a persistent, almost compulsive, engagement with weighing the pros and cons of 
psychology. The notes include the following list of “unfortunate characteristics of 
psychology/ psychoanalysis”: 
1. reductive analysis 
                                                
20 Murray, “State of American Psychology,” (Murray Papers, HUGFP 97.45.20, Psychology and the 
University, Murray Notes on Harvard’s Antipathy to the Social Sciences folder, Harvard University 
Archives).  
21 Nicholson, Inventing Personality, 184. 
22 Ibid., 184-186.; Forest G. Robinson, Love’s Story Told: A Life of Henry A. Murray (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1962), 226. In 1936, as Murray’s third 3-year contract came up for renewal, various 
members of Harvard’s psychology department, including the well-known Karl Lashley, argued to terminate 
his appointment. Lashley vehemently objected to Murray’s brand of psychology and felt that his presence 
“constituted an impediment to the ‘attempt to evolve a more exact science through an objective and 
biological approach.’ Allport, however garnered letters of support for Murray’s work from nationally 
acclaimed psychologists and, through his participation on a committee designed to evaluate Murray’s 
contribution to the University, was able to persuade Harvard President James B. Conant that dismissing 
him would destroy the humanistic traiditon in psychology at Harvard. Murray was invited to stay on with a 
5 year contract to run the clinic.22 Lashley as quoted in Nicholson, Inventing Personality, 18. 
23 Gordon Allport as quoted in Nicholson, Inventing Personality, 186. 
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2. illness-oriented, enemy-oriented, wrong-oriented, infection-oriented, distress-
oriented- not joy (hope, goodness) oriented- except to punishment, no 
disvaluation 
3. easier to see what is bad than what is good (or the absence of what is good) 
4. no synthesis, no words for synthesis 
5. abstains from evaluations of values of other modes of living 
6. accentuation of patients’ narcissism, geocentricism 
7. training has made them insensitive to values 
8. in wisdom there is sorrow. 
9. Psychoanalysts- generally speaking- are against culture (parents) most support 
patient 
10. problem of identity in consequence of narcissism- lack of sociophilia 
11. psychoanalysts- put aside religion as an illusion- have no substitute (self is 
substitute)24 
Murray’s justifications of psychology’s strengths were fewer and less passionate. 
He details the “Advantage of psychology” as follows: 
A way of looking at things- detachment, objectivity, impartiality, free from 
predispositions, fixed evaluations. Can look at repellant, criminal, delinquent, 
abnormal behavior without condemning it- also can look at other cultures, then 
own culture and own subculture and own family and own friends and self and 
finally psychology itself and its efforts25 
The consequence of psychology’s failures, for Murray, was the reduction of 
people into derogatory terms and unsynthesized aspects. He felt that the broad-scale 
intentional manipulation of individuals through psychology, as in the application of 
psychology to advertising or political action, demonstrated the potential dangers inherent 
in all forms of psychology. Murray wrote: 
We have known for several years that applications of the physical and biological 
sciences are capable of doing man the maximal amount of physical harm, capable 
                                                
24 Henry Murray, notes, (Murray Papers, HUGFP 97.41 Conference Reports and Papers, early 1960's, Box 
2, “Psychology: advantages, values, disadvantage” folder, Harvard University Archives). 
25 Ibid. 
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indeed of extinguishing all life on this planet. Now we must face one more stern 
fact, namely, that applications of the social sciences are capable of doing man the 
maximal amount of psychological harm. 26 
Even when psychology wasn’t a tool of social manipulation, argued Murrary, its 
purported “value-free” approach to individuals was actually an abdication of 
responsibility; it unwittingly advocated an acceptance of dominant American values, and 
therefore constituted an “adjustment” psychology. 27 
While mainstream psychologists had been quick to describe illness using specific 
criteria and categories, they had effectively avoided defining optimum health in a similar 
fashion. By default, health was the absence of recognized symptoms of illness. In 
negatively defining health, psychologists passively accepted dominant cultural values, 
uncritically neglecting the economic or political motivations that had contributed to them. 
“Unhealthy” people were inevitably sometimes individuals whose lack of internal 
alignment with external cultural values caused them distress. Psychology, then, became 
complicit in the pathologization of social and cultural deviance. 28 
Psychologist Sidney Jourard argued that the categorization of mental illness also 
promoted an “all or none principle (i.e., one is either healthy or pathological) rather than 
providing a continuum along which people can be ranged.” 29 This awkward perspective 
ignored “average” or “normal” experience (which encompassed an expected level of 
conflict or struggle) in favor of an ideal. The distressed—even the mildly distressed—
were swept into the category of illness, while the “healthy” comprised an imaginary ideal 
that didn’t exist.30 
                                                
26 Henry Murray, notes, Psychology and the University (Murray Papers, HUGFP 97.45.20, Psychology and 
the University, Notes folder, Harvard University Archives). 
27 Ibid. 
28  Gordon Allport, ”Psychiatry in Neurotic America,” (notes), Harvard Law Forum, December 1, 1950., 
Allport Papers. 
29 Sidney M. Jourard, “Concept of Healthy Personality” (working paper) (Gardner Murphy Papers, Box 
1076, Sidney M. Jourard folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology),1. 
30 Sidney Jourard, Personal Adjustment: An Approach through the Study of Healthy Personality (New 
York: McMillan, 1958),  vii-ix. 
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The danger of a psychology that would presume to define illness without first 
defining health was that it would advocate a set of values unintentionally, and therefore 
irresponsibly. This critique mirrored a parallel discourse in the field of psychiatry. In 
1960, Thomas Szasz had published the The Myth of Mental Illness, inspiring the anti-
psychiatry movement that formed towards the end of the decade. Although Szasz didn’t 
consider himself “anti-psychiatry,” he argued against the conception of mental distress as 
“mental disease,” proposing instead a notion of mental distress as “problems in living.”  
He also explored the ways in which diagnosis served as a tool of social power for 
psychiatrists, allowing them to perpetuate an unquestioned set of assumptions and values 
in their practice.31  
Determined not to reproduce the status quo, humanistic psychologists vowed to 
account for the subjective values and assumptions with which they would infuse their 
own work. In September of 1966, Maslow optimistically wrote: 
The new Zeitgeist is value-full (value-directed, value-vectorial), human-need & 
metaneed centered (or based), moving toward basic-need gratification & 
metaneed metagratification—that is, toward full-humanness, Self-Actualization, 
psychological health, full-functioning human fulfillment, i.e., toward human 
perfection as the limit & as the direction.32 
Humanistic psychologists understood that in order to responsibly and positively 
define mental illness and mental health, it was necessary to account for their own values, 
a practice that had been largely absent from psychological pursuits aimed at utter 
objectivity. It was also necessary to oppose earlier concepts of mental health that were 
defined primarily by a set of assumptions and the absence of symptoms.33 
HEALTH/ GROWTH AS SOMETHING OTHER THAN THE ABSENCE OF SYMPTOMS 
Although the Old Saybrook meeting represented an official collective attempt to 
articulate a theory of humanistic psychology, individual attempts to define humanistic 
                                                
31 Thomas S. Szasz, “The Myth of Mental Illness,” American Psychologist, XV, February (1960): 113-115. 
32 Maslow, September 20, 1966, Journals Vol. 1, 668.  
33 Sidney M. Jourard, “Quantification of Wellness,” October 16, 1958, (Maslow Papers, Archives of the 
History of American Psychology), 1. 
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concepts preceded the conference and continued—with a new rigor—after the conference 
ended.  In 1958, Sidney Jourard had written that “a positive applied science of 
organismic health or wellness has thus far been handicapped by absence of explicit 
criteria of optima. We have avoided stating our values and ideals for man because it 
seems like such an unscientific thing to do.” 34 Humanistic psychologists were eager to 
correct this situation. To do so, it was necessary to be recognized as legitimate scientists, 
advancing methods that were not only empirical, but more empirical than those of 
behavioral psychology (in that they considered all relevant data, rather than dismissing 
information that could potentially confound clear understanding). Rather than focusing 
too narrowly on psychological variables, humanistic psychologists wished to push 
through the murkiness and complexity of human phenomena to arrive at greater clarity. 
Identifying “true” values of human nature required forays into the gray areas of 
individual beliefs and guiding philosophies.35 
For humanistic psychologists, advancing a “value-full” approach to psychology 
meant forging a new vision of science. Of this challenge, Maslow wrote: 
Science has to be redefined & expanded to manage all human questions, 
including values = Taoistic, experiential, holistic science…. And because it is 
arrogant it (scientism) also has regarded all of this knowledge as really not 
knowledge, or not respectable, scientific knowledge, the only kind worth having. 
“It’s unscientific” = exile.36  
Each of the early humanistic psychologists had his or her own ways of describing 
his or her preferences, but they shared an approach to human values that the more 
theoretically inclined of them would identify as a hermeneutic one. By putting forth ideas 
about human values that “seemed” true, humanistic psychologists hoped to then catalyze 
a dialogue that would encompass a series of theoretical revisions, propelling the 
definition of “true” values ever closer to validity.37 
                                                
34 Ibid., 1. 
35 Maslow, December 16, 1961, Journals Vol. 1, 241. 
36 Ibid., 239. 
37 Maslow, November 5, 1961, Journals Vol 1, 130. 
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The best illustration of this hermeneutic approach to human inquiry, and the 
subject on which humanistic psychologists have been boldest, came in their assertion of 
the values of “health.” Abraham Maslow and Sidney Jourard, in particular, worked on 
elaborating and giving substance to the concept of health. Jourard, a clinical psychologist 
and a tenured professor at the University of Florida, had begun in the 1950s to articulate a 
concept of psychological health, which culminated in 1958 with his publication of 
Personal Adjustment: An Approach through the Study of Healthy Personality. In this 
book, as in subsequent work, Jourard recognized the subjective territory into which he 
needed to travel in order to quantify health, but saw it as the mirror image of the process 
that had resulted, within mainstream psychology, in ostensibly “objective” “scientific,” 
categories and definitions for understanding illness.38   
Jourard established a scale of health that considered areas like family 
relationships, eating and drinking habits, and workplace dynamics, and he evaluated 
individuals on a 5-point scale of fulfillment of each component of health. In establishing 
this scale, Jourard argued that, “we needn’t be that blind, because already we have some 
intelligent guesses about some of the determiners of optimum, ongoing, ‘wellness-
yielding’ personality.”39 Heretically, Jourard argued that his own experience as a 
thinking, feeling, observing person had qualified him to make some preliminary guesses 
about what would constitute “true” health. His survey, designed to quantify “wellness,” 
demonstrated these initial guesses: on a scale of marital health, he included the following 
spectrum from illness to health: 
                                                
38 Jourard, Personal Adjustment, 1-6. Jourard published several significant texts in humanistic psychology 
in the 1960s and 1970s. These included The Transparent Self, published in 1964, Disclosing Man to 
Himself, published in 1968, Self-disclosure, published in 1971, and Health Personality, published in the 
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Tiparat Schumrum and Lisa C. Sheehan-Hicks, “Chronological Bibliography of the Professional 
Publications of Sidney M. Jourard, http://www.jourard.com/sidbib.htm. 
39 Sidney M. Jourard, “Notes on the Quantification of Wellness,” Prepared for meeting of the Subcomittee 
on the Quantification of Wellness of the United States Department of Health and Human Services’ National 
Committee on Vital and Health Statistics, Washington, DC, November 18, 1958 (Murphy Papers, Box 
1076, Sidney Jourard folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology), 4.  
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(1) Feels a complete failure as a spouse. Gets no satisfactions out of being a 
spouse. 
(2) Can perform marital role with borderline adequacy, gets no enjoyment out of 
it. 
(3) Adequate as a spouse, gets more satisfactions than frustrations out of it. 
(4) Adequate as a spouse, gets positive satisfaction out of it. 
(5) Adequate as a spouse, the relationship is growing.40 
Jourard’s assessment of the “ideal” state of marriage portrays his implicit values 
of health: it reveals not a static state of achievement, but a dynamic state of continuous 
progress.  
Maslow’s theories of health, articulated first in his 1950 study of self-actualizers 
and revised in the remaining decades of his life, entailed a comparable amount of 
intuitive evaluation. Boldly identifying individuals whom he perceived to have achieved 
the highest degrees of health and studying the qualities they exhibited, Maslow took a 
great scientific risk. In 1965, he wrote, “We have learned much from self-actualizing, 
highly healthy people. They have higher ceilings. They can see further. And they can see 
in a more inclusive and more integrating way. They seem to find it less necessary to 
dichotomize things into either-ors.” 41 
Among the characteristics Maslow identified in the healthy personality were the 
tendency to be reality-centered, autonomous, accepting of self and others, unhostile in 
humor, humble and respectful. He also identified the higher order nature of the needs 
healthy people expressed; they demonstrated the need for a sense of truth, goodness, 
beauty, unity, aliveness, uniqueness, completion, justice and order, simplicity, 
playfulness and meaningfulness.42 
                                                
40 Ibid, 11. 
41 Maslow, “Humanistic Science and Transcendent Experiences,” 219 - 227. 
42 Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, 83. 
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Espousing Maslow’s methods, Henry Murray highlighted the necessity of 
developing a theory of health and of the values with which to evaluate health. In his 
personal notes from the 1960s, he wrote: 
In general, it might be said that there is a deficiency, if not a total absence, of 
concepts and theories representative of human beings at their best, or of the best 
human beings judged by any standards one might name. Take any concrete 
example—Gandihi, Winston Churchill, Einstein, or John F. Kennedy—and we 
must admit, I believe, that none of the concepts or theories that are current in our 
discipline would be capable of representing in what respects these men deserved 
to be admired and venerated by millions of people to the extent that they have 
been.”43  
Although Maslow and Murray agreed on the need to quantify the components of 
health, neither was willing, or able, to do the hard work of performing the scientific 
research necessary toward that goal. Maslow, as a pioneer in the field, expected others to 
scientifically test his theories, and was inevitably disappointed. He was perplexed as to 
why people didn’t replicate his self-actualization research. “They spend so much time on 
so much crap. Why not some time on something critically important?” he asked. “I just 
don’t understand it. My motivation theory was published 20 years ago, & in all that time 
nobody repeated it, or tested it, or really analyzed it or criticized. They just used it, 
swallowed it whole with only the most minor modifications.44  
REORIENTING NOTIONS OF HUMAN NATURE 
Primary to humanistic psychology’s theoretical orientation, and its articulation of 
human values, was its interpretation of human nature as something positive, a novel 
perspective in American psychology which drew on the older ideas of romanticism and 
vitalism. Implicit in this quest was their notion that human beings possessed a 
characteristic “nature” that was independent of childhood experiences (as psychoanalysts 
assumed) and environmental conditions (as behaviorists argued).45 Though humanistic 
                                                
43 Henry Murray, (personal notes), undated, (Murray Papers, HUGFP 97.45.16, Personality Papers, 
Humanistic Psychology Folder, Harvard University Archives). 
44 Maslow, August 30, 1965, Journals Vol. 1, 189-190. 
45 de Carvalho, Founders of Humanistic Psychology, 138-141. 
 123 
psychologists tended to subscribe to Freud’s concept of the unconscious, they refused to 
define id impulses as “dark” and expanded these desires to include those for creation, 
inspiration, humor and love. 46 Charlotte Buhler identified the “basic tendencies” implicit 
in human nature. Buhler, who had immigrated to the U.S. with her husband Karl Buhler 
in 1938 and become a founding member of the humanistic psychology movement at Old 
Saybrook and president of AHP from 1965-1966, cited four human tendencies: 
1. satisfying one’s needs (for love, sex, ego, and recognition) 
2. making self-limiting adaptations (by fitting in, belonging, and remaining 
secure) 
3. moving toward creative expansion (through self-expression and creative 
accomplishments) 
4. upholding and restoring the inner order (by being true to one’s conscience and 
values) 47 
Like most fundamental concepts of humanistic psychology, the movement’s 
delineation of a concept of human nature implied a direct critique of the psychological 
approaches that preceded it. Psychological science had been conceived of “in the West as 
a technique for the ransacking of nature, as applied to man.”48 For behaviorists (as 
humanistic psychologists characterized them), humans were born “blank slates,” who 
would be constituted by the results of a lifelong series of stimulus-response situations. 
For psychoanalysts, humans were born all id; their instincts for sex, food and sleep were 
closer to primordial urges than to a distinctly human form of nature. Humanistic 
psychology, in contrast, saw human nature as driven to all things good: creative 
invention, positive social interactions, love and peace. Only an obstructed or frustrated 
nature would cease to seek growth and positive self-expression.49  
                                                
46 Ibid., 54. 
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INDIVIDUALISM 
If humanistic psychology’s view of human nature was expressly positive, it was 
also extremely individually focused. Humanistic psychologists, especially in their early 
formulations of their theory, rarely spoke of altruism, environmental responsibility or 
interdependency. Instead they focused on themes like self-expression, individual growth, 
individual happiness and truth.50 
The concept of individualism was a visible theme of humanistic psychology as 
early as the Old Saybrook Conference. J. F. T Bugental wrote in his notes from the 
conference of the goal of “helping the individual person to have a greater measure of 
awareness and, therefore, control of his own experience; this is the key point; not control 
of others or by others; rather self-modulation.” 51   
As the 1960s protest movements got underway, humanistic psychology’s 
emphasis on autonomy and independence took on new dimensions.  In some cases, 
humanistic psychologists literally supplied the rhetoric used by dissidents.52  Maslow’s 
own words suggested an element of protest; he wrote that health entailed “transcendence 
of the environment, independent of it, able to stand against it, to fight it, to neglect it, or 
to turn one’s back on it, to refuse it or adapt to it.” 53 Individualism, in fact, pervaded 
Maslow’s theories. The healthy, fully grown person, “certainly is characterized by his 
transcendence of other people’s opinions,” he wrote. In his “Study of Healthy 
Personality,” he determined that healthy people were “autonomous, ruled by the laws of 
their own inner character rather than the rules of society.” 54  
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Manuscripts Folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology), 3.  
54 Ibid., 3. 
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Maslow’s words evoke the subtle alienations and discontent that were typical of 
other manifestations of the 1950s—the beat movement, the attraction of the rebels 
without a cause played in the movies by James Dean and Marlon Brando, the increasing 
self-confidence of civil rights activists—that erupted in the glorified individualism that 
characterized the 1960s and 1970s.55 George Leonard, reporter and editor for Look 
Magazine, wrote that the “60s began with all the pundits still commenting on the dullness 
of the times.” It appeared to be an “age of apathy and conformism”—an extension of the 
1950s.56 The picture quickly changed.
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Chapter Six: The Outgrowths of Humanistic Psychology: Esalen, 
Human Potential, and The Founding of Division 32 
In the first decade of the movement, humanistic psychologists produced a wealth 
of  published work, advancing and testing their fledgling theories. In addition to 
publishing three books (Toward a Psychology of Being in 1962, Religions, Values and 
Peak-Experiences in 1964 and Eupsychian Management: A Journal in 1965), Maslow 
published more than 50 articles before his death in 1970.   
Rogers was also prolific, producing 6 books between 1962 and 1972, as well as 
over 50 articles. In contrast to Maslow, however, Rogers continued to perform 
experimental research. In 1962, for example, he completed a study of psychotherapy with 
schizophrenics.1 And, after leaving the University of Wisconsin—where Rogers had 
served as a professor of psychology from 1957 to 1963—to take a position at the Western 
Behavioral Sciences Institute in La Jolla, California, he performed extensive research on 
the efficacy of his client-centered approach and on group psychotherapy.2 Even before 
the humanistic psychology movement formally began, Maslow had remarked on his 
respect for Rogers’ experimental discipline. Contrasting Rogers to Fromm, whom 
Maslow criticized for his lack of empiricism, Maslow wrote, “My respect for Rogers 
grows & grows because of his researches.”3 
However, the work of humanistic psychologists that received the most attention 
during the 1960s was not the experimental studies they published in academic journals. 
Rather it was books that popularized basic theories of humanistic psychology for the lay 
reader. Rollo May’s books, for example, including The Art of Counseling (1965), 
Psychology and the Human Dilemma (1967) and Love and Will (1969), were among the 
best-selling books in popular psychology during the time. In a 9-page article written in 
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1971, a New York Times reporter documented the sales of Love and Will, in its first year 
and half, as in excess of 135,000 copies, and wrote that it was “fast becoming the source 
book for post-Freudian man.”4 
The general trend of popular interest in the more or less ungrounded theory of 
humanistic psychologists reflected the alignment between humanistic psychology’s 
message and cultural currents of the 1960s. It also diminished the immediate necessity of 
performing experimental studies that would have effectively tested humanistic 
psychologists’ theories.5  
The humanistic psychology movement became so popular, in fact, that the 
founders had to fight against their own glorification. In 1966, Maslow wrote: “I have 
rejected all demands to be pope (e.g., for the Horneyans or the humanists, etc.) […] or to 
accept pure disciples (students, yes) & prick suckers who pledge total & exclusive 
devotion, & have always felt slightly repelled by the offer, & have tended to withdraw 
my prick from these people, get impersonal, detached, aloof—or lecture at them about 
being independent. […] But I am a leader in a higher & better sense, which allows 
autonomy for the other, if he can take it.”6  Clinging to their ideals, humanistic 
psychologists like Maslow faced the challenges and struggles associated with the 
adoption of their principles by popular culture, including the inevitable distortion of 
much of their theory.7  
The human potential movement was a cultural phenomenon, rooted in the 
humanistic psychology movement. But, no easy distinction between humanistic 
psychology and human potential exists. Humanistic psychology inspired the human 
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potential movement, was inspired by the human potential movement, and was frequently 
confused with and by developments in the human potential movement.8 But, while  
humanistic psychology was largely comprised of academic and professional 
psychologists who hoped to revolutionize the field, the human potential movement 
defined a generation of seekers, many rooted in California, who hoped to reconceptualize 
their lives and their culture in positive, secular terms, grounded in an inherently healthful 
conception of human nature.9  
CALIFORNIA 
Humanistic psychologists’ theories were applied quite literally on the California 
coast in the mid 1960s in the form of human potential. Across the state, “growth-centers” 
proliferated, drawing visitors seeking self-actualization and personal growth. Offering 
weekend or week-long programs, these retreat centers employed a variety of techniques 
ranging from encounter groups (or t-groups) to workshops on yoga and meditation. The 
success of these centers reified the popular perception of California’s experiential 
openness, which was premised, in part, on the rapid social and technological changes that 
characterized the region.10 
California’s physical environment contributed to the state’s perceived 
revolutionary potential. The sunshine suggested optimism and possibility, obscuring the 
land’s propensity for natural disaster. The dramatic coastline and alternatingly peaceful 
and forceful Pacific Ocean offered further symbolic potential. Nowhere were these 
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movement—is getting more, not less, complex,”  reflecting his assumption that the two were indivisible. 
Mike Moore, “Breaking Free from the Human Potential Movement,” Mountain Gazette, October, 1975, 17-
23. 
9 Leonard, interview, 27 April 2005. 
10 Walter Anderson, interview by author, San Francisco, 26 April 2005. 
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tensions better captured than at the nation’s premier growth center, the Esalen Institute.11 
One journalist described the intense physical beauty of Esalen’s environs, noting that, 
“the mountains along the coast could have been shot like foam from an aerosol can. They 
rush, bubbly, frothy, looping madly down the coast, lightly decked with green or frosty 
gray cover, high above the surf. Giant rocks, broken, lie scattered in the boiling white 
water. From the rocks, the ocean backs way, way out to the flat horizon in successively 
darker bands of blue. I have never seen country so strong, so broad-shouldered, and I 
whipped through it on a road hung halfway between water and sky, on perilous cliffs, 
spanning gigantic gorges, rushing through sudden strands of sweet-smelling eucalyptus 
and towering redwoods.12 
The convergence of the sublime natural environment with the social and self-
transcendence sought by human potential participants harkened back to the traditions of 
early American pioneers and transcendentalists like Thoreau. “While one may need as-
yet-undiscovered drugs to imagine how Thoreau would have reacted to the hugging, 
shouting and acid-dropping at Big Sur,” wrote a journalist, “his quest at Walden Pond is 
certainly one fountainhead of the Esalen Hot Springs experiment.”13  
Early in the 1960s, California received national attention as a site of exaggerated 
promise for American culture. George Leonard wrote, “If the United States was a 
laboratory of social and cultural change, California was that part of the lab where the 
most advanced experimentation was taking place.”14 The media latched onto California’s 
revolutionary potential. Look Magazine launched a California issue in September 25 of 
1962, and Life Magazine followed with their own California issue a month later. The 
cover of Look’s California issue proclaimed that “Tomorrow’s Hopes and Tomorrow’s 
                                                
11 Kripal, Esalen, 47.  Esalen was originally called the Big Sur Hot Springs. The institute changed its name 
in 1964 to the Esalen Institute. Ibid., 105. 
12 Richard Atcheson, “Big Sur: Coming to my Senses,” Holiday, 43, March (1968): 22. 
13 Jeffrey Klein, “Esalen Slides Off the Cliff: Encountering the Newest Wave in the Human Potential 
Movement,” Mother Jones, December (1979): 26-45, quotation from 30. 
14 George Leonard, Walking on the Edge, 80. 
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Headaches are here today in our soon-to be Largest State.” Articles referred to California 
as a “Promised Land for Millions of Migrating Americans” and as the harbinger of “The 
Way-Out Way of Life.” According to one historian, California was the answer to the 
American’s new surplus of leisure time, uniquely attuned to individual quests for 
sensation and stimulation: “Everything was bigger, newer, better, faster, shinier in 
California; it was the jewel in the technocracy's crown.”15 
California also embodied productive tensions, a simultaneous threat and a 
promise, that fueled an ethos of energy and change. Americans, still true to their sense of 
pioneerism and to their traditional Puritan roots, found the rapid change and cultural flux 
of California simultaneously exciting and frightening—“a window to the future, good and 
bad.” 16 Those who witnessed student protests in Berkeley, race riots in Watts, or drug 
culture in Haight-Ashbury would certainly attest that California was not comprised solely 
of starry-eyed youth with flowers in their hair. The Haight, for example was often a site 
more of dissolution and confusion than of harmony and goodwill. One historian wrote 
that the “madness of the place, the shouts, the chasing, the gunning bikes, the chaotic, 
occasional screams of girls running has convinced people that the Haight is a rare species 
of insane organization.”17 Joan Didion, in her 1961 essay “Slouching Towards 
Bethlehem,” described San Francisco as a site of “social hemorrhaging.”18 
In the broader cultural perception of California, however, the promise did tend to 
outweigh the threat. Early in the decade, idealistic self-seeking Americans were not the 
only ones who tried their fortunes in California: the federal government channeled forty-
two percent of all government funds for research and development into the state in the 
spring of 1962.19 California seemed to possess a surplus of great minds, capable of 
                                                
15 Jay Stevens, Storming Heaven, x. 
16 Leonard, Walking on the Edge, 80.. 
17 Stevens, Storming Heaven, xii. 
18 Joan Didion, Slouching Towards Bethlehem (New York, The Noonday Press, 1961), 85. 
19 Leonard, Walking on the Edge, 80. 
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leading America towards great things. As late as 1965, the mass media described the state 
more as a center of conformity than as a site of revolution.20 
The perceived conformity of the early sixties was a holdover from the fifties, and  
by the late 1960s, everyone from college students to women and racial minorities would 
have a dissent to offer. America was racist, sexist, imperialistic, and consumeristic. 
Particularly in Northern California, dissent took forms ranging from organized and 
peaceful protests to riots and the adoption of non-conformist lifestyles. Events of the late 
1960s, like the assassinations of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King in 1965 and 1968, 
raised the stakes and further fueled the protest that had ignited.21 
Just as growth centers were being established all along the California coast and 
the human potential movement was being named and established, humanistic 
psychologists were feeling the pull towards California. In 1967, Maslow wrote: 
It dawned on me again that I feel closer to so many of the California people than 
to my friends & acquaintances here (in the Northeast). I’d always thought this was 
the accident of nearness & distance. But now it occurs to me that these are all T-
group people, & it makes a difference. They’re more direct, honest, candid, 
undefended, open, feedbacky, etc.. And so I actually do justly & correctly feel 
more intimate with them than I do with non-T-group people here.22 
Early adherents to humanistic psychology had a California base, reflected both in the 
opening of its first office in 1965 in San Francisco and in the demographics of its 
members. The office itself came to be the site of numerous groups and early experiential 
activity for members who lived nearby. 23 
                                                
20 In fact, a reporter for Time Magazine, as late as 1965, described a generation of conformists. Stevens, 
Storming Heaven, ix. 
21 For one, of many, good cultural histories of the 1960s, see the collection of essays in: David Farber, ed. 
The 60s: From Memory to History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994). In addition, 
Todd Gitlin’s The Sixties provides a unique perspective on the decade, by blending memoir with historical 
fact. Gitlin, The Sixties. 
22 Maslow, July 9, 1967, Journals, Vol. 2, 775. 
23 The office, inhabited by director John Levy, doubled as his office for San Francisco Venture, an 
organization devoted to psycho-spiritually oriented groups and programs with and for the residents of the 
“ghetto area” in which it was located. John Levy, interview by author, phone, 30 September 2005. 
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Seminal AHP members, including Carl Rogers, Rollo May, George Leonard, 
Jackie Doyle and eventually Abe Maslow, were lured from the East towards this mecca 
of experimentation and progressive thought. Rogers moved to California in 1964, 
Maslow in 1969, and May in 1975. Eight of AHP’s first 25 conferences took place in 
California, and the Journal of Humanistic Psychology, though originally sponsored by 
Brandeis, was published out of California.24  
The west coast localization represented a literal break from the northeastern and 
Midwestern universities at which the ideals of humanistic psychology were first 
conceptualized. Figuratively, the move to California suggested a new zeitgeist; a stronger 
connection to the rebellious energy of the 1960s; and a cultural fructification of what 
began as an academically and professionally based movement.25 
While the geographic concentration of humanistic psychologists in California 
facilitated the exchange of ideas and enabled frequent contact between AHP members, it 
also blurred the boundaries of the movement and diluted the seriousness of its intentions. 
The healthy and productive components of California culture were difficult to keep 
separate from the more threatening elements. Humanistic psychology—established to 
oppose reductionistic elements of dominant psychologies and to promote health—quickly 
became identified, through the human potential movement and the activities of its 
members, with more destructive movements like LSD and anti-establishment counter-
cultures. All types of revolutionary energy tended to blend under the common aegis of 
change. Vietnam War protesters, anti-establishment youth, LSD users, and other activists 
were joined by the electric charge of reform and the idyllic vision of future possibility.26 
Not surprisingly, the realm carved out by humanistic psychology and human potential 
                                                
24 ”A Chronology of AHP’s Annual Conferences,” http://ahpweb.org/aboutahp/ahpcronology.html . 
25 Anderson, Upstart Spring, 2. 
26 Stevens, Storming Heaven, vii-xvii. For another good source on the historical significance of the 
revolutionary change of the 1960s, see: Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counterculture: Reflections on 
the Technocratic Society and its Youthful Opposition (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969). 
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lured fellow protestors against traditional mores and the perceived oppression of cultural 
conditions.27  
The prime catalyst in the initial conflation of humanistic psychology with the 
human potential movement was the Esalen Institute—originally called Big Sur Hot 
Springs. Established in 1962, the same year as AHP, Esalen founders Michael Murphy 
and Richard (Dick) Price based their practices, in part, on the theory of Maslow and 
Rogers.28 Extracting humanistic psychology’s emphases on growth, self-actualization, 
and realization of potential, Esalen began to hold a variety of workshops ranging from 
weekend retreats to corporate trainings. Throughout Esalen’s early years, humanistic 
psychology had a strong presence at Esalen.29 In addition to the lectures they gave and 
the workshops they conducted, humanistic psychologists’ ideas were circulated by 
Murphy himself, who assigned the books of humanistic psychologists to staff members.30 
Thousands seeking self-actualization and growth flocked to Esalen in an effort to find a 
“eupsychian” space—aimed at spiritual, physical and emotional renewal—apart from 
America’s ever-accelerating technological progress and material abundance.  
THE FOUNDATIONS OF ESALEN 
Esalen was created by Michael Murphy and Dick Price with two complementary 
sets of interests: those of the Esalen Center for Theory and Research (CTR), a research 
center devoted to methodical humanistic inquiry and theory production, and those of the 
Esalen “Institute,” committed to the person-centered application of the principles of 
humanistic psychology.  The earliest years of Esalen represented the period in which 
humanistic psychology and the human potential movement were most aligned. Esalen 
seminars in the early 1960s were cerebral and fairly academic. Many incorporated lists of 
                                                
27 Anderson, Upstart Spring, 145-147. 
28 Ibid., 4-5.  
29 J. F. T. Bugental, Anthony Sutich, Rollo May, Carl Rogers, Gardner Murphy, Richard Farson, Virginia 
Satir, Sidney Jourard, Clark Moustakas, and Abraham Maslow all led seminars at Esalen in the mid 1960s. 
Big Sur Hot Spring and Esalen Seminar brochures. 
30 Kripal, Esalen, 135-137.  
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requisite reading that spanned philosophy, eastern and western religion, evolutionary 
theory, and, of course, psychology. Esalen’s first public offering came in the form of a 
series of programs entitled “The Human Potentiality.” 31 
The Esalen Institute was more personally the “Frankenstein” of Dick Price, while 
the Esalen CTR better represented the style and interests of Michael Murphy. Price was 
an extroverted Stanford graduate, a recovering mental patient, and the son of wealthy 
Midwesterners whose oppressive contradictory religious interests he rejected. Michael 
Murphy was an introverted Stanford graduate, an aspiring  “mystic,” and the son of 
wealthy Californians (who actually owned the Hot Springs property). The two, who had 
been Stanford classmates, connected in San Francisco while living at the Cultural 
Integration Fellowship meditation center. In addition to their shared Stanford background 
and affluent families, they shared interests in Eastern philosophy and meditation, having 
studied under common teachers Alan Watts (for whom a building at Esalen was named in 
1968), Frederic Spiegelberg (whose Stanford class first aroused Murphy’s interest in 
Aurobindo) and Haridas Chaudhuri (the founder of the Cultural Integration center).32  
Both Price and Murphy had rejected their parents’ rigid expectations and 
developed their own personal philosophies in protest. Murphy had fled to India in search 
of mystical experience, while Price had landed in treatment at The Institute of Living in 
Hartford, Connecticut, where he received a battery of gruesome shock treatments. 
Murphy’s hopes for Esalen included a desire to extend his mystical and intellectual 
curiosity to others. Price hoped, with Esalen, to help develop an alternative to the 
mainstream psychiatric establishments where he’d received such inhumane treatment.33 
                                                
31 Kripal, Esalen, 439.; Anderson, Upstart Spring, 68-72 
32 Price’s father had abandoned his mother’s orthodox Judaism and was nonpracticing, while his mother—
somewhat late in life—decided to baptize the children and join the Episcopalian church to protect the 
family from the anti-Semitic orientation of their exclusive Chicago neighborhood. Barclay James Erickson, 
“The Only Way Out is In,” in On the Edge of the Future: Esalen and the Evolution of American Culture, 
ed. Jeffrey Kripal and Glenn W. Shuck (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 134-143. 
33Ibid., 150-152. 
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Price was interested in Esalen as a “proving ground” for applying the insights of 
humanistic psychology to diagnosibly mentally ill and severely struggling individuals.34 
Esalen, however, proved far more efficacious for those with average problems. This 
lesson played out in painful ways, including several suicides in 1968 and 1969 that were 
products, in part, of Esalen’s inability to provide comprehensive services to the severely 
disturbed.35 Group leaders tended to overlook the danger of sending psychologically 
fragile individuals home, once stripped of their familiar defenses by the intense 
confrontations that often occurred in groups.36 
Price himself experienced his second psychotic episode in 1968, while at Esalen. 
He initially sought refuge at a “blowout center,” where friends and colleagues tried to 
help him recover, but, when that didn’t work, was committed to St. Agnew’s Hospital for 
professional intervention.37 There he was able to regain his stability and return to Esalen. 
His experience suggested that the comprehensiveness and the security of a hospital were 
better suited to the seriously ill than the permissiveness of Esalen.38   
While Murphy’s aims for Esalen overlapped with Price’s in their common 
emphasis on creating an environment most hospitable to individual development and 
exploration, Murphy’s intellectualism and spiritual leanings dictated that he form a more 
personally and physically distant relationship to the Institute. Always ill at ease with the 
experiential elements of the Institute, Murphy felt a stronger affinity for the CTR.39 One 
historian noted that scholars, however, paid “little or no attention “ to CTR, nor to 
                                                
34 In his journalistic coverage of the 13th annual AHP convention for the Mountain Gazette, Mike Moore 
describes Esalen as the “proving ground for experiments in the new therapy: encounter, Gestalt, meditation, 
the healing baths, and the sensuous massage—all that we called ‘touchie-feelie’ a few years ago.” See, 
Moore, “Breaking Free,” 17-23. 
35 Anderson, Upstart Spring, 199-202. 
36  Ibid., 247. 
37 Erickson, The Only Way Out Is In,” 152. 
38 After Price’s recovery, he became an enmeshed on-site manager at Esalen, making himself ever 
available to struggling individuals and considering the Institute his home. Ibid., 154-158. 
39 Ann Taves, “Michael Murphy and the History of Supernormal Human Attributes,” in On the Edge of the 
Future: Esalen and the Evolution of American Culture, ed. Kripal and Shuck (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2005), 226. 
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“Michael Murphy as a thinker or the place of his research agenda within a larger 
intellectual frame of reference.”40 The historical fate of Murphy’s intellectual theories 
and the research they inspired has paralleled the fate of the academic underpinnings of 
humanistic psychology; they failed to capture the cultural imagination with even a 
portion of the force inspired by the sensationalist, experiential and therapeutic elements 
of the human potential movement. 
Despite his preference for the CTR, Michael Murphy was also significantly 
involved in shaping the development of the Esalen Institute. His greatest impact on the 
Institute derived from his deeply spiritual interests. At the time of Esalen’s founding, 
Murphy had recently returned from a 16 month retreat to Sri Aurobindo’s ashram in 
Pondicherry, India, where he had engaged in a “hermeneutic mysticism” with 
Aurobindo’s ideas.41 In the early Esalen years, Murphy meditated 8 hours a day and 
sought existential understanding through spiritual and mystical routes.42   
Murphy’s commitment to steering Esalen in a spiritual direction was evident in 
his choice of seminarians who used yoga and tantra and represented Eastern influences. 
These seminars were vastly popular, and their themes pervaded  Esalen so thoroughly 
that scholars like Jeffrey Kripal, author of Esalen: America and the Religion of No 
Religion, later interpreted Esalen as one of the great modern religious centers of 20th 
century America.43 
                                                
40 Ibid, 224. 
41 At the time of Murphy’s trip, Sri Aurobindo had been dead 5 years, but his spiritual partner and 
successor  the “Mother” Mirra Alfassa remained at the ashram. Murphy, however, had direct connection 
with Aurobindo’s ideas through his writing in The Life Divine. According to Kripal, Murphy experienced 
the religious dimensions of the text he studied in a “classically mystical epistemological structure.” Jeffrey 
Kripal, “Reading Aurobindo  from Stanford to Pondicherry” in On the Edge of the Future: Esalen and the 
Evolution of American Culture, ed. Jeffrey Kripal and Glenn Shuck (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2005), 108. 
42 Anderson, Upstart Spring, 119. 
43 Kripal, “Reading Aurobindo  from Stanford to Pondicherry” 2005, 99-131. For thorough history of 
Esalen, see Kripal, Esalen.  
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ESALEN’S BECOMING 
While Murphy and Price were attempting to mold Esalen in their image, the 
Institute was beginning to develop a life of its own. The two opposed hierarchical power 
relationships on principle, making it impossible for either to impose their own vision on 
the experiences of others. They were also committed to a process dialogue that 
incorporated disparate viewpoints and varied personal styles. Murphy’s interest in 
inclusiveness, in particular, made him exceptionally welcoming of anyone with an 
enthusiastic desire to lead a seminar.  Maslow reportedly quipped that, “if Satan himself 
would have showed up at Esalen, Mike would have invited him to lead a seminar.”44  
The first seminars at Esalen in 1962 failed to suggest the divergent directions the 
institute would quickly take. Instead, they represented the diverse and complementary 
interests of the founders and the strength of their initial influence. The first seminars 
were: 
September 22-23: “The Expanding Vision,” led by Willis Harman45 
October 6-7:  “Individual and Cultural definitions of Rationality,” Joe     
    K. Adams and Gregory Bateson46 
October 26:  “Art and Religion,” Special Lecture by Gerald Heard47  
November 3-4: “Drug-Induced Mysticism,” Paul Kurtz and Myron 
Stolaroff48 
                                                
44 Anderson, Upstart Spring, 4.; Kripal, Esalen, 98-102, quotation from 99. 
45 Harman was a Stanford professor of engineering who had branched out into multidisciplinary study. The 
seminar was intended to explore conceptual changes in psychology. The seminar included a complete book 
list of recommended readings in interdisciplinary psychological speculation. Anderson, Upstart Spring, 68. 
46 Joe Adams was a practicing psychologist in Palo Alto, and Gregory Bateson was an Ethnologist at the 
Veteran’s Administration Hospital in Palo Alto. ”The Human Potentiality: A Seminar Series,” (brochure), 
Big Sur Hot Springs, Fall 1962. 
47 Gerald Heard, best friend of Aldous Huxley, had immigrated with Huxley to the US in 1937. From 1942, 
he oversaw Trabucco College, a progressive/ visionary experiment in the study of comparative religion. He 
continued to write and publish extensively in both fiction and non-fiction into the 1960s. Timothy Miller, 
“Notes on the Prehistory of the Human Potential Movement: The Vedanta Society and Gerald Heard’s 
Trabuco College,” in Kripal and Shuck, On the Edge, 86-90. 
48 Kurtz was a psychologist, and Stolaroff was a Russian-born inventor and industrialist. Anderson, Upstart 
Spring, 72. 
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December 1-2:  Panel Discussion (on human potential) by Joe Adams, 
Willis W. Harmon, Paul S. Kurtz and Myron J. Stolaroff49 
The 1962 seminars were largely cerebral, thrilling for the participants because of 
the intellectual daring but conducted in the traditions of academic discussion. In the first 
seminar, participants sat in wooden chairs listening to a Stanford professor lecture on new 
possibilities for human experience. Adams and Batson offered a seminar that was 
comparably well-reasoned and intellectual, but more revolutionarily suggestive, arguing 
for the subjectivity of social belief systems and the relativity of defined reality.50 
The topic of the second-to-last seminar of 1962, “Drug-Induced Mysticism,” 
suggested the impending Dionysian turn of Esalen. Delivered about a year before LSD 
experimentation fully hit America, the seminar considered the possibilities for 
psychedelic expansion of consciousness. Kurtz and Stolaroff piqued participants’ interest 
and nudged them towards their own experimentation.51 
In 1963, the programs shifted towards various experiential practices that came to 
define Esalen. Encounter groups proved to be popular, as did “gestalt” therapy and body 
work. Seminars grew more topically diverse as well. In 1963, Alan Watts and Ansel 
Adams co-led a seminar on photography. Watts conducted “A Trip with Ken Kesey,” and 
Dick Alpert and Timothy Leary, advocates of the experimental use of LSD, led “The 
Ecstatic Experience,” based on their book Psychedelic Experience.52 Parapsychology 
aroused interest at Esalen as well, propelling the growth center in an even less academic/ 
intellectual and more mystical/ spiritual direction. 
Humanistic psychologists continued to represent themselves in the ranks of 
Esalen seminarians.  In 1963, for example, Anthony Sutich presented a seminar on 
“Humanistic Psychology.” Visits from Abraham Maslow, Rollo May, and Carl Rogers 
followed. At this point, the new focus of Esalen appeared entirely compatible with the 
                                                
49 ”The Human Potentiality: A Seminar Series,” (brochure), Big Sur Hot Springs, Fall 1962. 
50 Anderson, Upstart Spring, 70-71. 
51 Ibid., 72. 
52 ”The Human Potentiality: A Seminar Series,” (brochure), Big Sur Hot Springs, Winter-Spring, 1963. 
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goals of Humanistic Psychology. Maslow himself reportedly declared Big Sur 
“potentially the most important educational institution in the world,” and led several 
seminars during his many trips to Esalen.53 Despite his continued admiration for Murphy, 
however, Maslow’s ambivalence about the intrusion of countercultural values into the 
spirit and practice of Esalen increased in the final years of his life. In April of 1968, 
Maslow wrote: “Too many shits at Esalen, too many selfish, narcissistic, noncaring types. 
I think I’ll be detaching myself from it more & more.”54 And in August of 1968, he noted 
that his “Esalen critique file gets fatter & fatter.”55 
THE ASCENDANCE OF ENCOUNTER 
The introduction of encounter groups, a concept derived from the training groups 
(t-groups) pioneered at the National Training Laboratories (NTL) in Bethel, Maine, was a 
key development in the intensification of Esalen’s experiential elements. Bill Schutz, 
who soon emerged as a prominent figure at Esalen, brought a distilled form of NTL’s 
concept with him to Esalen in 1965, augmenting the boldly confrontational and deeply 
personal elements that had been most popular with NTL participants.56 NTL’s “training 
groups” or t-groups required small groups of participants to work together over extended 
periods of time (usually 10-40 hours total and sometimes throughout a two-week 
residential program), analyzing and discussing their experiences, feelings, perceptions, 
and behaviors.57  
                                                
53 Maslow as quoted by George Leonard, “Encounters at the Mind’s Edge,” Esquire, June, 1985, 314. 
54 Maslow, April 6, 1968, Journals, Vol. 2, 953.  
55 Ibid., August 18, 1968, 981. 
56 NTL’s mission, established in 1947, primarily concerned itself with the study and application of group 
work as a social “technology.” NTL hoped “to advance, through improved theories and practices of human 
relations education, the productivity and quality of human relations in all areas of social life.” H. A. Thalen, 
for the Committee, “Proposed Bylaws of the National Training Laboratories,” November 27, 1955 (NTL 
Papers, M226, NTL Historical Documents Folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology). 
57 NTL Institute Bulletin V2NO2, “What is Sensitivity Training?,” April 1968 (NTL Papers, M223, NTL 
Special Reports folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology); Focused on will and intention, 
the organization was premised on the idea that a sense of control over one’s destiny was integral to 
realization of one’s “human potential.” By connecting individuals more fully to the social experience of 
their work and improving their group and individual functioning, NTL intended to facilitate self-
actualization. Evelyn Hooker, “Theory Session 1: The Meaning of Laboratory Training,” June 27, 1955 
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Although the groups were explicitly concerned with individual experience and 
striving, NTL was guided by an interest in corporate leadership that used personal change 
to improve business functioning. Maslow, who spent some time at NTL in the late 60s, 
wrote that NTL, “mostly focuses on organization, group dynamics, watching form and 
process […] But this is in direct contradiction to the fact that most people are interesed in 
it as a therapeutic and a growth experience on the personal side.”58 When Schutz 
imported NTL’s t-groups to Esalen in 1965, he constructed them mainly in terms of this 
personal side, using the process of group interaction more as a tool for self-analysis and 
awareness than as a method for group change. For this reason, these revised t-groups, 
known as encounter groups, became wildly and overpoweringly popular at Esalen, 
displacing some of the more balanced elements of the Institute.59 
Popular accounts of the transformative power of Esalen’s encounter groups 
contributed to the sense of mystery and intrigue that surrounded the institute. Leo 
Litwak’s 1968 article for the New York Times Sunday Magazine, for example, was 
typical. It began with Litwak as a skeptic, armed with  “all kinds of tricks for avoiding 
encounter.” 60  It ended with his transformation: “Our group gathered in a tight circle, 
hugging and kissing, and I found myself hugging everyone, behaving like the idiots I had 
noticed on first arriving at Esalen.”61 
Litwak’s narrative, and others like it, fueled the cultural fascination with Esalen’s 
“supernatural” powers and with the charisma of gurus like Schutz, who infused the 
workshop that Litwak attended with his extremely confrontational style and his 
unorthodox emphasis on touching (in Litwak’s case, the encounter group climaxed in a 
                                                                                                                                            
(NTL Papers, M227, NTL in Group Development folder, Archives of the History of American 
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58 A. H. Maslow, “Journal Notes on The T-Groups,” June 16, 1968 Bethel, Maine (Maslow Papers, 
M449.3, T Groups Folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology). 
59 Anderson, Upstart Spring, 152-156. 
60 Leo Litwak, “"A Trip to Esalen Institute - Joy is the Prize,” in Best Magazine Articles: 1968 ed. Gerald 
Walker (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1968), 133. 
61 Ibid., 27-31, quotation from 27. 
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heated arm wrestling match between the writer and a sullen teenager to whom he’d taken 
an immediate dislike).62 
The reputation of group leaders like Schutz and Fritz Perls attracted participants 
to Esalen, detracting from the Institute’s more intellectual emphases. Esalen proved 
uniquely susceptible to the overpowering personalities of group leaders, despite the fact 
that early in the development of Esalen, Murphy and Price had attempted to lay down 
ground rules to prevent such usurpation of the tone and direction of the Institute. The 
rules stated that “No one captures the flag,” meaning that “no individual, however 
charismatic, would be allowed to dominate the culture, and, that “We hold our dogmas 
lightly,” meaning that all religious dogma would be treated as essentially psychological 
and never taken literally.63 Ironically, the anti-hierarchical power structure prevented 
enforcement of these imperatives.  
Fritz Perls, who arrived at Esalen on Christmas of 1963 and, more or less, stayed 
until 1969, was an eccentric and extravagant figure, whose personality inevitably colored 
the tone of Esalen.64 Perls’ wife Laura once described him as “a mixture of a prophet and 
a bum.”65 He embraced the role; at times wearing long white robes, at others wearing 
long, flowing multi-colored shirts and sandals.66  
Perls led his first encounter groups at Esalen in February of 1964, billing them as 
a form of “Gestalt Therapy,” and describing their goals as expanding the “scope of 
awareness,” connecting the individual to the environment, and “ending the subject object 
split.”67 Perls’ groups utilized the concept of a “hot-seat,” a position in which the seated 
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64 Kripal, Esalen, 158-159. 
65 Laura Perls as quoted in Kripal, Esalen, 161.  
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individual received his full attention, serving also as a public spectacle for the groups. 
Another empty chair was set beside the seated individual and served as an object of 
projection (it became the victim’s mother, father, spouse, etc. as needed). In the words of 
one Esalen historian, Perls then proceeded to “take the person apart by noticing and 
commenting on every defense mechanism, every body posture, every quiver of the voice 
or eyes.” Instead of allowing group members to interact with the hot-seated individual, 
Perls assumed full control while the group watched on in silence and, often, awe, as Perls 
brutally took apart his subject, measuring his success in tears. By deconstructing the 
individual, Perls hoped to reintegrate the “fractured” person in order to create an all new 
“gestalt,” or whole person. For many, the drama, humiliation, and attention were 
irresistible, inspiring many to come to Esalen just to work with Perls.68 
Perls quickly ascended as the “star” of Esalen. According to one historian, after 
the conformity and pervasive insecurity of the 1950s, Perls’ themes of “the primacy of 
emotion, the grounding of experience in embodiment, the quest for meaning, the 
centrality of relationship, the authoritativeness of self-experience, the validation of self-
expression, the key role of desire in human process, and the reclamation and celebration 
of erotic passion” held a distinct appeal to Americans.”69 At the same time, he offended 
and angered his peers at this institute and subverted the influence of the founders. Some 
of Perls’ favorite sayings directly opposed Murphy’s vision of Esalen. Perls was proudly 
anti-intellectual and claimed to hate philosophical discourse, calling it “mind-fucking” or 
“elephant shit,” “for its size and importance.” He was “equitable enough,” wrote Esalen 
chronicler Jeffrey Kripal, “to spread this kind of fecal talk around, dubbing small talk 
‘chickenshit’ and rationalizations ‘bullshit.’”70 According to humanistic psychologist 
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Maureen O’Hara, Perls felt that if it was intellectual, it was shit, hence his other mantra, 
“Lose your mind and come to your senses.”71 
Perls also ridiculed Murphy’s commitment to meditation, deeming it “neither 
shitting nor getting off the pot.” He opposed the presence of ‘mystics and occultists’ at 
Esalen, dismissing their brand of enlightenment as frivolous. However, Perls himself 
often experienced a quasi-mystical sense of illumination, both through his groups and 
through his experimentation with psychedelics.72 Perls so strongly advocated the use of 
LSD that he sometimes rejected students who had never taken the drug.73  
Perls justified his techniques as a product of “Gestalt psychology,” a perspective 
he described in Gestalt Therapy in 1951, Gestalt Therapy Verbatim in 1969, and The 
Gestalt Approach and Eye Witness to Therapy, which was published posthumously in 
1973.74 His introduction to The Gestalt Approach and Eye Witness to Therapy captures 
the vision of Gestalt psychology Perls advocated. Attempting to shrug off “professional 
jargon” and psychological complexity, Perls explained: “The basic premise of Gestalt 
psychology is that human nature is organized into patterns or wholes, that it is 
experienced by the individual in these terms, and that it can only be understood as a 
function of the patterns or wholes of which it is made.”75  Although he located the 
foundations of his practice in German Gestalt psychology, the connection was general 
rather than specific.76 
For thousands of Americans, “Gestalt psychology” was reduced to Perls’ 
interpretive techniques, to the exclusion of the more comprehensive and empirically 
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validated bases of Gestalt theory as originated in Europe during the early 20th century.77 
One critic, in attempting to distinguish Gestalt therapy from what he termed “Perls-ism,”  
noted that Perls’ Gestalt therapy was more accurately a “biological-hedonistic 
existentialism.” He specifically identified three aspects of Perls theory and practice, 
which were not a part of proper Gestalt therapy, specifically his anti-intellectual attitude, 
his view of maturity as “hedonistic isolation,” and his “unsupportive stance as a 
therapist.”78 Those versed in the Gestalt model also recognized the incompleteness of 
Perls’ brand of Gestalt, which was a “come to your senses” approach, absent of the 
political and philosophical components that defined the approaches of Gestalt 
psychologists like Paul Goodman.79 Perls’ most purely, and perhaps only truly, Gestalt 
principles were his focus on the “here and now,” present needs and beliefs as syntheses of 
past experiences, the immediacy of self-expression, and the contention that all perception 
was interpretation.80   
Perls’ Gestalt was a psychology of rebellion, a somewhat chaotic rejection of 
dominant interpretations of reality, including behaviorist and psychoanalytic conceptions, 
and a constructivist liberation of perception. If all reality was filtered and spontaneously 
constructed “on the fly,” individuals needed to learn to attend to the present and to throw 
off the past-oriented techniques of psychoanalysis, which privileged childhood 
experience in self-understanding. Perls’ Gestalt deviated from psychoanalysis in its 
rejection of the idea of an inherent conflict between individual nature and human society 
and its reclamation of the value of expressing aggression and experiencing desire.81 Yet, 
for all of its departures from Freudianism, Perls repeatedly evoked psychoanalytic 
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principles in both his writing and his groups, reflective of the residue of Freudianism that 
circulated through Esalen.82 
Even as Perls’ groups became extraordinarily popular, his personality, and sense 
of entitlement, became problematic to those trying to run Esalen. Perls acted the role of a 
guru, “an institution within the institute.”83 His programs were listed separately, and he 
lived in a private residence at Esalen, an odd round house with a grass-covered roof that 
he had extracted from Murphy by promising to pay for it (a promise he didn’t keep).84 In 
the vein of what many of his colleagues at Esalen identified as one of the most toxic 
themes of American culture, Fritz cared only about himself and urged others to do the 
same. This attitude was evident in his Gestalt “prayer,”: 
I do my thing and you do your thing. 
I am not in this world to live up to your expectations, 
And you are not in this world to live up to mine. 
You are you, and I am I, and if by chance we find each other, it's beautiful. 
If not, it can't be helped.85  
Perls was also infamous for his sexual seduction of female participants and his 
proselytization of sexual promiscuity. One of his female patients recalled, “He told me I 
should fuck around. It was really a crazy thing to tell me. He created problems I didn’t 
really want. I’m ‘supposed’ to fuck around because my therapist tells me that.”86 Perls’ 
philosophy of the “here and now” at times detracted from consideration of the inevitable 
social consequences of individual action. In his notes on this type of encounter, Maslow 
wrote that there is more to learn than “to give honest feedback and expect honest 
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feedback, to be authentic and candid and the like. With the wrong sort of people, this 
automatically leads to getting clobbered or to getting defeated rather than achieving 
anything.”87 Perls thought Maslow, in turn, was a “a sugar-coated Nazi … [who] 
pandered to a happy world of optimism that did not in fact exist.” 88  
More threatening to Perls than Maslow, who was only an occasional presence at 
Esalen, was Bill Schutz. Schutz came to Esalen in 1965 and inherited the supervision of 
Esalen’s 9-month residential program from psychologist Virginia Satir. Schutz 
encouraged the group to do all kinds of things that “the culture would not approve of,” 
which typically involved getting nude as quickly as possible.89 Perls referred to Schutz’s 
team of encounter group leaders as his “circus”; Schutz called Perls’ workshops “the 
Flying Circus.”90 
According to George Leonard, Bill Schutz was “the great conquistador,” a 
physically dominating presence. With an ego comparable to Perls’, he would challenge 
others to “break him,” expose his vulnerability and bring him to tears. As far as Leonard 
knew, this was never accomplished. His model for encounter was the “more openness, 
the better,”, and his success was judged by his ability to bring his residents to tears that 
would quickly produce a feeling of transcendence.91  
Schutz’s method of compelling catharsis provided an appealing form of instant 
gratification and release, and his groups became nationally acclaimed. His book Joy: 
Expanding Human Awareness went through five printings, and his unorthodox 
techniques, his frankness with talk show hosts, and his encouragement of the audience to 
emulate his candor earned him many television appearances in 1968—as a guest for 
Johnny Carson, Phil Donahue, David Suskind, Dick Cavett, and Merv Griffin.92 
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Unsurprisingly, Schutz and Perls ran groups that were more alike than they were 
different.  George Leonard, who had attended one of Schutz’s early groups, found it 
“wonderful” but “destructive.” The group began with each participant screaming and 
pounding the floor. The participants, all couples in this case, were then asked to tell three 
secrets to their spouses that would threaten their relationships. Leonard recalls that a war 
bride from England confessed that she had never wanted to get married, and had hated 
every minute of it. A husband confessed that he had been sleeping with his wife’s best 
friend; she responded by hitting him violently and repeatedly, then crying and claiming 
that he was a “shit” but that she loved him anyway. Other tactics Schutz employed to 
encourage the experience of strong emotion included making faces, Indian hand 
wrestling, and growling. According to Leonard, these were all “quick fixes” that wore off 
soon after the retreats ended. The woman who had hit her husband, for example, divorced 
him 6 months later.93 
Instead of pretending problems and emotions didn’t exist, Schutz advocated 
exaggerating them. Participants were driven to extremes and sometimes pushed beyond 
their limits. Those who weren’t blinded by the sheer ecstasy of the process were apt to 
feel angry and used, upon returning to a life full of problems that hadn’t been solved. 
“Many of our programs,” said Murphy, “were kind of the sledgehammer approach to 
human growth. […]. There were encounter groups there where the darkest and the dirtiest 
things you could dig up from your own psyche or accuse someone else of was being 
tossed around. People were saying things to one another that thirty years later they 
haven't forgiven one another for.”94  
The founders of Humanistic Psychology, like the founders of Esalen, frequently 
expressed frustration with the excesses of the encounter group movement. In 1969, 
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Maslow wrote, “Too many shits at Esalen, too many selfish, narcissistic, noncaring types. 
I think I’ll be detaching myself from it more & more.”95 May expressed a similar 
dissatisfaction, describing, in 1971, his avoidance of encounter groups and his temporary 
resignation from AHP as protest.96 But, in spite of their criticisms, humanistic 
psychologists didn’t give up on the potential value of encounter groups.97 
Nor did the founders perceive the divergent directions of Esalen as indicative of 
failure. They were committed to a democratic ideal, which would reliably promote the 
interests of the majority. Murphy eventually “came to see Esalen’s growth away from his 
original vision as something organic, natural and necessary.”98  
Leaders like Murphy, Leonard and Price were at least as excited by the dramatic 
turns Esalen took as they were dismayed.  Humanistic psychologists, who watched AHP 
move in the same direction as the human potential movement, tended to agree. “You had 
to be present at the time to understand the tremendous [though chaotic] energy of the 
movement,” explained former AHP director John Levy. Levy, nostalgic for the 
excitement of the times, didn’t regret the strongly experiential turn in the least. “It was 
what people wanted.”99  
AHP’s mid-sixties turn towards the experiential mirrored the early transformation 
of Esalen. AAHP conventions began to include Esalen-type encounters and often 
included the Esalen gurus. As AHP membership rose, new members were drawn to the 
organization not with the intention of revising psychoanalysis and behaviorism, opposing 
the reductivist empiricism of academic psychology, or resurrecting psychology’s 
philosophical ancestry, but with the objective of becoming involved in the process of 
experiential transformation. Most new members, in fact, were not academic 
psychologists, and some, as in the case of George Leonard and John Vasconcelles (later a 
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California State assemblyman), were not psychologists. They were drawn to AHP 
because it seemed to be on the cusp of the countercultural revolution; it seemed a site of 
novel psychological freedom and emotional expression, and also offered a new vision of 
society.100  
The extent of AHP’s turn to the experiential could easily be overstated.  Founding 
theorists like Maslow, Rogers and Allport stuck with the movement and continued to 
infuse it with their new ideas. Those who disavowed it for its experiential turn (May and 
Murray in particular) ultimately returned, unable to find a parallel to the movement’s 
good intentions elsewhere.  
THE FOUNDING OF DIVISION 32 AND CONTINUED PROGRESS IN HUMANISTIC 
PSYCHOLOGY 
While the founders of AHP continued to generate theory, members of AHP, 
perhaps distracted by the experiential emphases, were hard-pressed to test it. In May of 
1966, Maslow rued the lack of scientific progress in humanistic psychology. In a journal 
entry, he wrote: 
There are so very few people doing humanistic work (defined as for the benefit of 
mankind & its improvement) that this partially explains the lack of research. Not 
enough time. Not enough people. […]The positivists have so much taken over 
APA & the elementary texts & graduate education that AAHP is not even known 
to most, & my kind of work is shoved into a corner where I’m a hero to a few & 
unknown, neglected, despised by most, or simply not defined as a “scientific 
psychologist.”101 
Feeling alienated from mainstream psychology, Maslow was being overly cynical 
about his lack of esteem in the field. As a testimony to the professional interest that his 
work had generated, he was elected to the presidency of the APA in 1967. He was 
shocked, having felt thoroughly rejected by the association to the point of fantasizing 
about being thrown out. He described his self-doubt in his journal: “As I felt the research 
impulse drain out of me, I guess I must have felt that the right to call myself a 
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psychologist was also draining out of me, & in several kinds of situations I’ve felt 
inadequate, not sufficiently trained, etc.”102 
The recognition was a boon to humanistic psychology.  Maslow noted the 
advantages for AAHP, “for adding weight & prestige to my causes, for having a 
guaranteed hearing for anything I want to say.”103 It also supplied humanistic 
psychologists with the momentum they needed to carve out their own territory in APA.104 
In 1971 Don Gibbons, an Association of Humanistic Psychology (AHP) member 
and psychology professor at West Georgia College, gathered enough signatures (the 
required 1% of APA members) to found a division of humanistic psychology within 
APA. His intention was for the new division to serve as a bridge between AHP and APA, 
representing the interests of many individuals who had membership in both 
organizations. Belief in the wisdom of this union, however, was not uniform; certain 
members, including Mike Aarons, argued that the creation of another organization of 
humanistic psychology would “dilute” the movement.105 
The first organizational meeting of the new division was held on September 4, 
1971, and was attended by 57 individuals and chaired by psychologist Albert Ellis. 
Membership of the division soared in the first few years, reaching a peak of 1,150 
members in 1977, and increasingly including an international contingent. This early 
success earned the division two seats on APA’s Council of Representatives.106 
In 1974, the division formed an affiliation with JHP and a journal called 
Interpersonal Development, ensuring that its members would have a forum for their 
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theory and researches.107 But cultural and professional interest in humanistic psychology 
was already reaching its peak. And humanistic psychologists were spread increasingly 
thin, divided between academics and practice, cultural movements and individual 
concerns, and theory and science. By the end of the decade, humanistic psychologists 
would witness a new cultural conservatism that would further impede many of their 
hopes for the movement.108 
 
 
                                                
107 Ibid., 21. 
108 Ibid., 22. 
 152 
Chapter Seven: Racial Confrontation 
In spite of its liberal emphases and utopian aspirations, humanistic psychology 
demonstrated a blindness to certain pressing social concerns. In the case of civil rights, 
for example, the humanistic psychology movement mimicked the short-sightedness of 
larger organizations, like the American Psychological Association (APA), which attended 
the needs of black members, and the larger cultural crises they represented, only when 
forced to do so. 
 In 1969, at the annual convention of the APA, 24 black graduate student 
members of the newly formed Black Students Psychological Association (BSPA), fed up 
with the organization’s inattentiveness to the concerns of black students and 
psychologists, demanded that the APA council respond to their requests. Standing 
shoulder-to-shoulder in front of the council, the students asked that more black students 
be recruited to undergraduate and graduate programs in psychology, that blacks receive 
better representation in the APA, that black students be offered socially relevant 
experience in programs designed to benefit the black community, and that the credibility 
of the black power movement be recognized.1  
This organized protest of black students was typical of the increased pressure 
facing professional organizations in the late 1960s. The American Sociological 
Association, for example, faced a comparable “disruption” at their own annual 
convention, also in 1969.2 In these organizations, as in most professional and academic 
organizations of the 1960s, blacks were grossly underrepresented and generally 
                                                
1 Bryce Nelson, “Psychologists: Searching for Social Relevance at APA Meeting,” Science, New Series, 
Vol. 165, No. 3898 (Sep. 12, 1969), 1101-1104; David B. Baker, “The Challenge of Change: Formation of 
the Association of Black Psychologists,” in Handbook of Psychology, ed. Irving B. Weiner (Hoboken, NJ: 
John Wiley, 2003), 492-494. 
2 Nelson, “Psychologists,” 1101; Ida Harper Simpson and Richard L. Simpson, “The Transformation of the 
American Sociological Association,” Sociological Forum, Vol. 9, No. 2, Special Issue: “What's Wrong 
with Sociology?” (June, 1994): 259-278. 
 153 
unrecognized.3 But, with a virulent drive for organized protest in the air, even 
associations with few black members began to feel internal pressure towards the 
inevitable confrontation of racial issues.  
Though few in number, black students had grown, over the course of the 1960s, 
increasingly organized and self-assured in their sense of mission.4 The cataclysmic civil 
rights activities of the 1950s, including the Brown v. Board of Education decision of 
1954, the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955, and the University of Alabama riots in 
1956, erupted in the form of further protests and riots in the 1960s, infusing racial issues 
with a sense of undeniable urgency. 5 Beginning with the freedom rides of 1960, the 
establishment of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) the same 
year, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) in 1961, the passage of the Civil Rights 
Act in 1964 and the subsequent formation of the Equal Employment Opportunities 
Commission (EEOC) designed to enforce it, Civil Rights swept through the decade on a 
swift tide of activity and change.6 In 1964, even the House Un-American Activities 
Committee (HUAAC) was preparing to investigate the Ku Klux Klan.7  
The response of the APA to the challenge from black graduate students was 
decidedly mixed. Milton J. Rosenberg, University of Chicago professor and council 
member, told the students that “the council was ‘beyond racism’ and was tired of the 
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‘make it hot for whitey routine.’”8 In frustration, APA president George Miller asked, 
“How can we keep [psychology] a science if we try to solve everybody’s goddamn 
problems?”9 Other psychologists were more sympathetic to the demands of the black 
students, but doubtful about their relevance to the mission of the APA. University of 
Texas professor Sigmund Koch expressed his remorse that, “psychology has no answers 
in respect of the problems [black students] are concerned about.”10 
These sentiments were typical of psychologists in response to the clash between 
disciplinary interests and social concerns. They were also common to liberals in other 
professions, who felt that, though they naturally supported equal rights, racial equality 
was irrelevant to their professional priorities. Many blacks judged the compromised 
efforts of predominantly liberal professional organizations towards racial integration to 
be insufficient and even insulting.11  
The evolution of the sentiments of eminent black psychologist Kenneth Clark, 
from hope and faith in integration to cynicism and anger, paralleled the trajectory of the 
civil rights movement as a whole. In 1952, Clark had testified in Briggs v. Elliott, one of 
the four cases which—in combination—formed Brown v. Board of Education.12 Drawing 
on the doll studies that he and his wife Mamie Clark had performed on racial prejudice in 
children in segregated and unsegregated schools, Clark’s testimony spoke to the necessity 
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of desegregating schools to eliminate racism.13 By the mid-1960s, however, his patience 
had waned as he looked in vain for progress on integration. In 1965 he wrote: “I am tired 
of civil rights. Maybe I should develop some ideas concerning the enormous waste of 
human intelligence sacrificed to the struggle for racial justice in America at this period of 
the 20th century. How long can our nation continue the tremendous wastage of human 
intellectual resources demanded by racism?”14 
By the late 1960s, many blacks, disappointed with the slow pace of cultural 
change, had abandoned the goal of total racial integration. Sociologist Lewis Killian 
wrote in 1968 that, “in practice integration had turned out to mean the token integration 
of a minority of qualified blacks into what remained a white man’s society.”15 As one 
scholar wrote, many blacks were characterized by, “the experience of bitter 
disappointment, disgust, and despair over the pace, scope and quality of social change 
[and] the prolonged and direct encounter of certain civil rights workers—especially those 
connected with SNCC and CORE—with the grim and aching realities, the dark and brute 
actions and deceptions of certain sections of the deep South.16  
Some blacks openly abandoned integrationist efforts, arguing that all black 
coalitions would be better able to fully devote themselves to the expedient amelioration 
of racial inequality.17 Frustrated with the limited impact of the organization and seeking a 
novel strategy, SNCC expelled its white members in 1966 and supplanted its 
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integrationist platform with a black power agenda. SNCC’s position paper on this 
decision defends the action by arguing that the intimidating influence of whites had 
created an “unrealistic” racial atmosphere. SNCC enjoined whites to form their own 
coalitions in support of racial equality, but justified their exclusive policies as necessary 
to force social change.18   
APPLYING HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY’S THEORY TO RACE 
Throughout the 1960s, humanistic psychologists’ support for civil rights had been 
largely ideological. As a politically liberal movement, humanistic psychologists were in 
favor of equal rights and sympathetic to the plight of blacks in America.19 But, like the 
frustrated council members of the 1969 APA meeting, many humanistic psychologists 
felt that meaningfully addressing racial, or even political, concerns was beyond their 
capabilities.20  
Humanistic psychologists who prioritized racial action, locating the psychological 
within the realm of the cultural and political, were the rare exceptions. George Leonard, 
senior editor of Look magazine from 1953 to 1970 and AHP president from 1979 to 1980, 
was one such exception—a follower of humanistic psychology who firmly believed in the 
relevance of human potential to the plight of blacks and in the necessity for the 
movement to act on it.21 Born in Atlanta in 1923, Leonard had firsthand exposure to the 
racism of the deep South. He had seen the horrors of black tenant farming during his 
summers in Monroe, Georgia, and considered the practice to be “probably worse than 
                                                
18 SNCC Position Paper (1966), “Who is the Real Villain—Uncle Tom or Simon Legree?” in Black Power: 
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19 George Leonard, interview by author, phone, 18 April 2006. 
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slavery.” 22  His discomfort with the elusive presence of “a shadowy population of 
blacks” in the small town, who “moved apologetically through the streets on their way to 
work” incited in Leonard a commitment to racial reform that shaped his journalistic 
career.23 By 1953, when he moved to California, Leonard was “one of those fervent 
rarities, a white Southern integrationist.”24 As a senior editor for a major national 
magazine, he created special issues on Civil Rights, reporting the confrontation over 
integration at the University of Mississippi himself.25  
Leonard had been drawn into the orbit of humanistic psychology through his 
introduction to Esalen co-founder Michael Murphy on February 2, 1965.26 The two, 
introduced by a mutual friend, instantly connected, partially on the basis of their concern 
for the systematic denial of the ability of oppressed Americans to reach their highest 
potential. Two weeks later, they spent three nights at George Leonard’s house 
brainstorming ways to extend civil rights and to aid individuals, in general, in achieving 
self-realization. Inspired by the ideas of humanistic psychologists like Abraham Maslow, 
they articulated a vision for a cultural movement, which they named “human potential.”27 
Although neither Leonard nor Murphy were humanistic psychologists, they acted 
as messengers for the transmission of the theories of humanistic psychology to the wider 
culture. The Esalen Institute, which had become a site of intense cultural interest, served 
as their stage for attempts to directly apply humanistic psychology to the daily lives of 
individuals. Leonard immediately began to envision ways to get blacks to Esalen, where 
they could experience the personal transformation he felt they so deeply needed. This 
transformation, he hoped, would be a crucial step in the eradication of racial inequality in 
America. Murphy and co-founder Dick Price agreed that greater racial diversity and the 
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24 Leonard, interview, 5 April 2006. 
25 Look was a weekly national magazine, published in Des Moines, Iowa from 1937 to 1971.  
26 Michael Murphy and George Leonard were introduced by brain researcher Lois Delattre at her home in 
Telegraph Hill. Leonard, interview, 18 April 2006. 
27 Ibid. 
 158 
consequent inclusion of varied perspectives would enrich the experience of all 
participants. The consistent lack of diversity at seminars had  perplexed and sometimes 
disturbed them. Still, neither had taken action to target seminars and workshops 
specifically to blacks.28  
In 1967, Leonard proposed to Dr. Price Cobbs, his friend and neighbor, that they 
create a series of black-white encounter groups, which he intended to operate in the 
manner of a traditional group, but with mixed race participants and pointed honesty about 
concerns, emotions, and beliefs related to race. Cobbs, a black psychiatrist whom 
Leonard had interviewed for a Look piece on the experience of moving into an all-white 
San Francisco neighborhood, was reluctant to join in Leonard’s grandiose attempts to 
achieve interracial harmony, and he secretly feared that Leonard’s interest was driven by 
textbook white liberal guilt. He was compelled, however, by what he perceived as 
Leonard’s genuine commitment to racial issues.29 
Cobbs was also reluctant to get involved specifically in Esalen.30 Unlike many 
blacks, Cobbs had actually heard of Esalen but “identified it as a playground of middle-
class white dilettantes.”31 Yet, as anyone who has spoken to Leonard even briefly knows, 
Leonard was persuasive, and his enthusiasm infectious. Leonard explained to him that the 
traditional ways weren’t working. Explaining his motivation for bringing interracial 
encounter to Esalen, he later wrote that, “black-power militants screamed their hurt, 
anger, and hatred. By revealing themselves and voicing the truth, they begged for 
encounter. White leaders responded with conventional language, cautious words. How 
could there be understanding without self-revelation? Didn’t the whites feel outrage, fear, 
repressed prejudice? The measured, judicious response seemed a lie.”32 
                                                
28 Ibid.; Leonard, interview, 5 April 2006. 
29 Price Cobbs, interview by author, San Francisco, 23 June 2005.  
30 Leonard, Walking on the Edge, 266.  
31 Anderson, Upstart Spring, 162. 
32 Leonard, Walking on the Edge, 265. 
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Cobbs “shared this sentiment” and agreed to work with Leonard. Even after 
committing to run the group, however, he considered canceling it in favor of attending a 
black power workshop on the East Coast. His wife urged him to honor his commitment.33 
 The first black-white encounter group, co-led by Leonard and Cobbs, was titled 
“Racial Confrontation as a Transcendental Experience” and was held at Esalen from July 
21-23 of 1967. It was advertised in the Esalen brochure with the following description: 
Racial segregation exists among people with divided selves. A person who is 
alien to some part of himself is invariably separated from anyone who represents 
that alien part. The historic effort to integrate black man and white has involved 
us all in a vast working out of our divided human nature. 
Racial confrontation can be an example for all kinds of human encounter. When it 
goes deep enough—past superficial niceties and role-playing—it can be a vehicle 
for transcendental experience. Price Cobbs, a Negro psychiatrist from San 
Francisco, and George Leonard, a white journalist and author born and raised in 
Georgia, will conduct a marathon group encounter between races. The group will 
try to get past the roles and attitudes that divide its participants, so that they may 
encounter at a level beyond race.34 
While the group was large (35 participants) and racially mixed, it replicated the 
class composition of previous groups, largely drawing from the upper-middle class. It 
was also unbalanced in its ratio of whites to blacks and of black men to black women 
(more whites and black men). Most participants were California psychologists and 
educators.35 The only anomalous participant was a young black man who worked for the 
highway department and had been repairing roads at Esalen. The man had noticed a flyer 
posted about the workshop and was struck by its inclusion of race and by the novelty of 
this as compared to the many flyers he’d seen posted that had never mentioned race. 36 
Structured in the traditional Esalen manner, the black-white encounter group was 
a full weekend marathon event, meaning neither the participants nor the leaders could 
sleep. Unlike other sessions, it took a while to break the ice. Price Cobbs remembers that 
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36 Cobbs, interview, 23 June 2005.  
 160 
during the first overnight marathon session, exhaustion set in before fruitful discussion.37 
According to Cobbs, the black participants began by challenging each other. There was a 
lot of name calling, of “Uncle Tom” accusations, and implications that certain blacks 
were either not black enough or not appropriately black. One light-skinned black woman 
called a darker skinned black man “a dirty little nigger” when he described his interest in 
sleeping with a white woman in the group.38 
Black participants’ anger towards each other soon turned to expressions of anger 
towards the white members of the group. “What do you know about having your kids 
called ‘nigger’ and there’s nothing you can do about it?” shouted the group’s one black 
woman to a white woman. “When’s your kid ever been spit on because he was black?”39 
Black participants exposed what they perceived to be the archetype of the “white good-
guy liberal,” an individual who defined himself against racism but replicated the subtle 
dynamics of racism with his ignorance of black reality.40 In accessing this resentment, 
black participants tapped into a seemingly limitless font of anger and frustration, the 
“black rage,” about which Cobbs would later write.41  
In the early hours of the morning, Cobbs and Leonard began to give up hope. The 
anger continued, now mixed with bitterness and desolation. “Everything, it seemed, had 
failed,” wrote Esalen chronicler Walter Anderson, “the weekend was a failure, the people 
themselves were failures, and the prospects for tearing down the barriers between races 
were nil.”42 Sometime after the sun rose, a transformation occurred. Emotionally 
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overwrought, a white woman began to cry, claiming that she only dated black men 
because she had given up on white men. Her despair and desolation were powerful 
enough to invoke the sympathy of both the white and black participants, leading them to 
tearful hugging and emotional reconciliation.43  
To Leonard, the moment of tearful recognition testified that the group had worked 
its magic, unleashing an emotional catharsis that represented a new level of emotional 
understanding between individual participants and suggesting the possibilities for broader 
interracial understanding in the culture. Leonard was euphoric; the group had been saved.  
Cobbs also left the group optimistic, but without dreams of reconciliation or even 
resolution. Cobbs wrote in his 2006 memoir, “The participants at this first black/white 
confrontation group learned so much about one another that weekend that few, if any of 
them, went home unaffected. Many friendships were formed. Some of the participants 
came away offended and upset. A few seemed shell-shocked.”44  
Cobbs’ primary impression was of the common black experience of anger and 
frustration and the common white experience of prejudice and ignorance, and 
encouraging others to see “the truth of black rage” became his primary interest. For this 
reason, he immediately heightened his commitment to encounter groups, deciding to 
venture to Big Sur on weekends for modified versions of the same experience.45 
In the flush of preliminary success, Leonard saw the black-white encounter group 
as a model for how broad social change would occur.46 To heal a culture that harbored 
deep racial tensions, it was necessary first to recognize them and then to exorcise them 
through mutual understanding. But like Murphy, who was always skeptical of encounter, 
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Cobbs had practical concerns about the ability of encounter groups to elicit enduring and 
pervasive change in cultural attitudes.  
Whatever potential encounter groups may have held for ameliorating race 
relations, he felt, was compromised by conducting them at Esalen.47 Esalen’s reputation 
as an “upper middle-class utopia” was likely off-putting to most blacks.48 The 
breathtaking location alone—the cliffside views, the sulphur infused hot springs, and the 
rolling hills of organic gardens—suggested a level of luxury and self-indulgence that was 
estranged from the daily experience of prejudice and struggle familiar even to middle 
class blacks, and was unimaginable to the majority of blacks who lived in the thrall of 
rural or urban poverty..49 
 The sexual ethos of Esalen, too, smacked of the white leisure classes.50 
Esalen’s baths were clothing-optional during the day and entirely nude at night, and 
sexual promiscuity (sex between visitors or between visitors and staff) was rampant. 
These facts were widely publicized by the media. To many, nudity as a form of protest 
was a bit frivolous, particularly in comparison to civil rights, the war in Vietnam so 
costly to minority communities, and women’s liberation. It also ran counter to the strong 
influence of the black church.51   
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When confronted with open nudity at Esalen, black men must have been at least a 
little wary.52 Several historians have documented the care with which certain black men 
held themselves to standards of sexual morality, in the face of entrenched cultural myths 
that had constructed them as hypersexual predators.53 Cobbs initial reaction to Esalen 
reflected his perception of the threatening nature of sexual impropriety at Esalen.  “Oh 
God,” Cobbs thought, “what have I gotten myself into? Me, a conventional young black 
professional, raised to be respectable. The visions of long-haired hippies swimming nude 
made me wonder what my mother would have thought about us being there.”54  
Cobbs was also particularly concerned about the geographic limitations of hosting 
black-white encounter in Big Sur, viewing the inaccessibility as an obstacle to the 
realization of meaningful social change from the groups.55 Big Sur was a 150 mile trip 
from San Francisco on the Pacific Coast Highway, a narrow and serpentine roadway 
comprised of treacherous hairpin curves and uniquely susceptible to adverse weather 
conditions, flooding, and falling rocks (like the one that would eventually kill founder 
Dick Price).56  
When Murphy proposed opening a city location to attract wider community 
attention and enable urban individuals to attend the groups, both Cobbs and Leonard were 
in full agreement. Murphy imagined that, “if George Leonard and Price Cobbs could pull 
off a marathon racial encounter workshop at Esalen advertised as ‘Racial Confrontation 
as Transcendental Experience’ (a title which ‘came more from my reckless enthusiasm 
than from [Cobb's] considered judgment,’ […] then the San Francisco Center could think 
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bigger and sponsor four consecutive racial encounter workshops in the summer of 
1968.”57 
Esalen officially opened a San Francisco extension in 1967. The new location, 
modeled closely on the original in terms of workshops and seminars, was initially a great 
success, attracting attendance in excess of ten thousand in the first two months of 
operation.58 The inaugural event for the center was held on February 6, 1966 at San 
Francisco’s Grace Cathedral. George Leonard offered a grandiose introduction to 
Abraham Maslow’s lecture “The Farther Reaches of Human Nature.” With little 
advertising, the event managed to attract 2,000 people.59  
Murphy, who became primarily responsible for the San Francisco extension while 
Price stayed on at Big Sur, brought to the project the same serious intentions that he had 
infused into the original Institute. Among the list of speakers invited to open the institute 
was B. F. Skinner, a behaviorist whose theory posed significant challenges to humanistic 
psychology. 60 The new center also honored its intentions to address race issues 
meaningfully, offering four racial confrontation workshops in the summer encounter 
series of 1968. The registration form explained that: 
Open racial confrontation is at last a reality, but it has brought bloodshed and 
death, terror and polarization. Rather than fear a confrontation, we must welcome 
and embrace it. For only in direct and honest encounter can white racism and 
black self-hatred be discarded. This series of Racial Confrontations is to allow for 
bloodless riots where the most dreaded thoughts and emotions may be expressed, 
where self-delusions that limit can be stripped away. Only when such 
confrontation has occurred can man expand his blackness and whiteness into 
creative humanness.61 
 
Unfortunately, attendance began to drop off after the initial surge of interest. The 
racial encounter groups were poorly attended by blacks, and reflected the same middle-
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class bias of the initial Big Sur Group.62 Viewing the San Francisco extension as 
secondary to that of the Big Sur branch, Esalen leaders seem to have failed to devote the 
necessary resources to outreach for the center.  
The San Francisco office was plagued by internal tensions as well. Faced with 
staff whose commitment to racial issues differed dramatically from one person to the 
next, the extension proved as vulnerable to the dividing potential of racial conflict as any 
other organization. These tensions were most aptly demonstrated in 1969, when an 
argument erupted between Ron Brown, a black graduate student at the San Francisco 
wing, and Bill Smith, an administrator. The argument quickly devolved into shouting and 
several things Smith said, including his threat to call the police, struck Brown as being 
racially loaded. Michael Murphy, George Leonard and Price Cobbs met with the two to 
try to ease the conflict, but to no avail. As was typical, Murphy backed away from the 
confrontation, angering Leonard and Cobbs. Brown later said of Murphy that he “just 
never understood the racial part of it.”63 This insensitivity drove Cobbs away from 
Esalen; he never again ran a group there. Leonard, too, kept his distance from Murphy for 
a while and Murphy himself lost some of his evangelical zeal for Esalen’s mission.64 
The San Francisco extension, which had lost money from the start, soon began to 
tax the Big Sur facility.65 In the 1972 catalogue, Esalen reported in the news section that 
the San Francisco extension lost $125,822 in 1971. In the same catalogue, the San 
Francisco facility began to co-sponsor their programs with the Gestalt Institute of San 
Francisco.66 Eventually, around 1973, the facility’s treasurer recommended to Murphy 
that the extension close. Whether this financial necessity stemmed from a lack of public 
interest or organizational mismanagement is a matter of some contention, but the 
outcome validated the idea that the San Francisco Esalen never experienced the wild 
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popularity of the Big Sur Esalen. “Perhaps Esalen needed that deep black Big Sur soil to 
thrive,” remarked George Leonard, in retrospect.67 Leonard’s statement suggests the 
otherworldly quality of the Big Sur Esalen; it was hospitable to the lofty goals of spiritual 
seekers, but ill-suited to the weighty, urban social issues of the time. 68 
BEYOND ESALEN: HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGISTS RESPOND TO RACE  
Despite his limited first-hand involvement with racial action, Carl Rogers 
harbored high hopes for the integrationist potential of black-white encounter groups. He 
facilitated a few groups and celebrated the results: “the outcomes are a gut-level 
experiential learning [about] racist attitudes on the part of whites, and a rare opportunity 
on the part of blacks.”69 For blacks, he felt that the “bitterness and rage which exists” 
could be expressed productively, easing the burden of misunderstanding and isolation. 
Rogers touted the outcome of racial encounter as, “[t]he surprising result […that blacks 
and whites] tend to become persons to each other and can talk openly and freely with-out 
reference to stereotypes or color.70 Rogers never immersed himself in race-based 
encounter groups, viewing them more as a side project that intermittently might receive 
attention.  
Rogers’ perspective was not atypical of members of humanistic psychology, who 
tended to express initial excitement about the potential of encounter groups, but later to 
become distracted by the numerous aspects of humanistic psychology that competed for 
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their attention.71 He was concerned about social injustice but not willing to subordinate 
other concerns in favor of activism. More extreme reactions came from humanistic 
psychologists, like Virginia Satir, who failed to recognize any obligation that humanistic 
psychologists might have to pressing political issues of the time. Satir, when confronted 
about her lack of political consciousness replied, “I want to change the family and their 
interactions. I want to change the communications and I even want to change the way 
therapists see dynamics and interactions. But I like the world as it is otherwise.”72 The 
brand of humanistic psychology that Satir practiced implied an extreme personal focus 
that would ultimately make humanistic psychology vulnerable to attack. 
By contrast, Maslow was particularly sensitive to the natural affinity between the 
goals of humanistic psychology and black liberation movements, but he tended to blame 
blacks for their lack of attention to the relevance of humanistic psychology. Maslow 
wrote: 
One sad thing about the whole business is that you can interpret one aspect […] of 
the Negro rebellion as reaching out for this very humanistic entranced personal 
ethic and philosophy. They reach out for it as if it didn’t exist. And yet it does 
exist. They just don’t know about it. You could call it in a way an answer to their 
prayers, to their demands. In principle it is something which should satisfy them, 
because it’s a system of values which involves a reconstruction of science as a 
means of discovering and uncovering values (rather than it being value-free). Not 
only that, but it includes the beginnings of a strategy in tactics of reaching there. 
That is, a theory of education, including a philosophy of education including both 
means and ends of education.73 
Implicit in Maslow’s statement was an awareness that the goals of humanistic 
psychology, which prioritized the capacity for choice, for freedom, and for self-
development, were inherently complementary to the objectives of civil rights. Absent, 
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however, is an admission of humanistic psychology’s responsibility in the failure to 
connect with blacks.  
Though most humanistic psychologists professed their unrestrained support for 
improving race relations, the reality was that few were willing to or interested in taking 
race relations to the forefront of their professional lives. Not one article in the first 2 
decades of the Journal of Humanistic Psychology (JHP) explored racial issues.74  
This combination of personal interest and lack of professional attention tended to 
come across as racial tokenism; humanistic psychologists were willing to espouse racial 
equality but not work for it. The critique blacks lodged against whites in humanistic 
psychology paralleled the critique of white liberals in civil rights coalitions. As 
sociologist Lewis Killian wrote in 1968, “Much of white support for black rights appears 
to be lip-service, an approval of rights without a corresponding commitment to do 
anything to grant them. 75  
In his relatively brief interaction with humanistic psychology, Price Cobbs had 
identified this racial tokenism. When he would raise issues regarding racial dynamics and 
concerns, other members would often respond by saying, “let’s just be human.” Cobbs 
felt deeply that just saying “I’m liberal and I’m for you wasn’t enough,” but that was all 
that many humanistic psychologists were willing to offer.76 
Stanley Krippner corroborates this view of humanistic psychology's limitations in 
terms of exploring race. Because they felt that race was a social construct, humanistic 
psychologists believed that a revisionist perspective based on common humanity would 
erase the societal distinctions between blacks and whites.77 Krippner felt that whether 
dangerously naïve or just overly idealistic, humanistic psychologists tended to minimize 
and even ignore the pervasive nature of the racial prejudice with which the culture was 
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saturated. Further, they tended to alienate racial minorities by homogenizing human 
experience, ignoring the individual struggles and psychological scars characteristic of 
minorities living in a racially divided culture.78 
Those who stuck with human potential and humanistic psychology and 
maintained a commitment to racial issues faced ongoing disappointment. Esalen never 
attracted the racial diversity that Murphy aspired to, nor did AHP produce a very racially 
diverse membership. As Natalie Rogers, daughter of Carl Rogers, asserted of AHP, 
“Race issues just never made it.”79 At best, humanistic psychology offered blacks a 
viable ideological frame for the improvement of their cultural condition. But as a 
movement, it failed to adequately distinguish itself from psychology as a whole. For 
blacks, this was an enormous liability. 
BLACK RESISTANCE TO THE BROADER FIELD OF PSYCHOLOGY 
Any notion humanistic psychologists had of appealing to blacks was also 
frustrated by the historical relationship between blacks and psychology. While 
humanistic psychology diverged dramatically from psychological schools that had relied 
on medical and scientific power to control and manipulate individuals, it also possessed 
similarities to the movements that preceded it. For one, it was a largely white movement, 
led by scholars who had very little first-hand knowledge of black experience. Also, it was 
largely inaccessible. Seeking therapy from humanistic psychologists required money and 
knowledge about where to seek treatment. While its theories had begun to seep into the 
broader culture, as a therapeutic tool it remained the province of an overwhelmingly 
white cultural elite. 
Many blacks undoubtedly also associated humanistic psychology with the larger 
field of psychology. Blacks’ historical distrust of psychiatry and psychology derived from 
their association with the American medical establishment’s history of racism. In the 
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past, doctors had hypothesized that the black brain was “smaller and less developed” than 
the white brain, thus explaining why blacks were “not capable of managing a high degree 
of civilization.”80 They had also targeted genetic predisposition in some racial stocks as 
an explanation for mental inferiority in blacks.81 
The medical establishment’s racism had been demonstrated in practice as well as 
in theory. The Tuskegee Syphilis study was the final straw for many blacks who had 
come to perceive American medical institutions as threatening and authoritarian. 
Beginning in 1932, government researchers conducted a long-term study (initially 
intended to extend for 6 months) of the effects of syphilis on a group of black men in 
Alabama. The study continued for 40 years, during which time participants were not 
informed of their diagnosis, but were told they had “bad blood,” a vernacular term used 
to describe a variety of ailments.82 Participants were also denied penicillin, which had 
become an acceptable and effective form of treatment as early as 1945. In July of 1972, 
the Associated Press broke the story, making it public knowledge that 399 syphilitic 
black men had gone untreated, and many had died, for the purposes of an ad hoc 
government study that lacked a documented protocol.83  
Though the field of psychology mostly hadn’t demonstrated such overtly racist 
practices, psychologists may have inadvertently perpetuated racial injustices by 
reinforcing cultural beliefs that had proved detrimental to blacks.  Psychoanalysis and 
broader drive theories, for example, constructed pathological behavior as a product of a 
flawed psyche, locating the source of pathology within the individual and, in effect, 
blaming the victim. In all likelihood, accepting the psychotherapeutic paradigm would 
have exacerbated the “sense [in blacks] that something inside themselves prevented them 
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from struggling effectively to realize their full psychosocial potential.”84 Drive-theory 
also helped to “reinforce what can be referred to as nativist themes by declaring that 
human differences resulted from causes within people rather than environmental forces in 
society. Therefore the ‘plight’ of blackness, including the so-called culture and cycle of 
poverty, were blamed on inherent inadequacies of blacks themselves.”85 
The theory of environmental conditioning, dominant in the behaviorist climate of 
1940s and ’50s psychology, further reinforced psychology’s inclination to “blame the 
victim” by locating the sources of emotional and behavioral problems within individuals. 
Environmental conditioning explained mental distress and pathological behavior as direct 
products of an unhealthy environment, which may have included the family atmosphere 
or the social situation. Such behavioral theories had the potential to blame black families 
for the distress of black children, rather than evaluating the broader culture that had 
produced the inequality. 
Even as drive-theory tended toward psychological determinism, environmental 
conditioning theory suggested environmental determinism. In both cases, the individual 
will was denied, leaving the “subject” passive at best and inherently psychologically 
pathological at worst.86 Humanistic psychology, of course, hoped to correct the errors of 
both psychoanalysis and behaviorism in denying individual subjectivity and 
disempowering will, offering a theory that, it was believed, would inherently align better 
with black interests. In many cases, however, blacks had no interest in looking to 
psychology, even in alternative formulation, for answers. 
For many blacks, seeking assistance from psychological institutions (which were 
often associated with the larger evils of medicine and government) was a practice 
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incompatible with their cultural and religious beliefs.87 The horrific experience of 
surviving slavery had instilled in many blacks a sense that they were capable of and 
expected to endure “superhuman” levels of psychological and physical suffering. 
Problems in daily life or relationships, including the experience of anxiety or depression, 
appeared nominal in comparison to the obstacles which their ancestors had overcome. As 
Alvin Poussaint, Harvard Medical school professor of psychiatry and eminent writer on 
black psychology wrote (with co-author Amy Alexander), “[the] overarching message 
found in much of the spiritual and secular music-and even some poetry and literature 
created by blacks over the century placed an emphasis on a need for ‘keeping on’ despite 
incredible psychic and physical difficulties.”88   
Poussaint and Alexander argued that the cultural mentality of “staying strong” 
may have prevented blacks from admitting mental distress.  This idea was perpetuated in 
church, where ministers delivered a “host of messages designed to shore [blacks] up 
under difficult circumstances.”89  Among these were values of chastity and sexual 
inhibition that would prove incompatible with the liberal sexual ethos of a liberationist 
movement like humanistic psychology. Self-denial and self-sacrifice had become central 
to a respectable black identity. “The Christian faith claimed by most African-Americans,” 
wrote psychologist Alvin Poussaint and scholar Amy Alexander, “has historically upheld 
the philosophy of ‘bearing up’ at any cost under the pain of slavery and the long-lasting 
effects of discrimination.” Further, Christianity offered the concept of a healing God to 
which believers could pray for the abatement of mental distress. Trust in religious 
solutions often precluded the possibility for reliance on a psychological “expert” whose 
motives were invariably less trust-inspiring than those of God, religious figures, and 
fellow church members. 90 
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Unfortunately, with whites as the cause of much their distress, blacks hesitated to 
turn to predominantly white institutions for help. Poussaint and Alexander argued that the 
indoctrination of the idea of blacks’ superhuman strength has been a, “a potent mixture of 
fatalism and stoicism.”91 Black men have suffered the highest levels of suicide of any 
American demographic and “however much blacks avoid the mental health care 
community, they are more likely than whites to be diagnosed with serious illnesses 
should they be evaluated by clinicians.”92  
Black psychologist and University of Michigan professor Adelbert Jenkins felt 
that humanistic psychology could help. He argued that humanistic psychology 
reformulated notions of mental distress and of human nature in ways that would address 
blacks’ resistance to psychotherapy. Mental distress was, according to humanistic 
psychologists, not internally derived but a product of an environmental resistance to 
human potential through the frustration of healthy individual strivings. Individuals, 
however, were not powerless to rise above environmental oppression. On the contrary, 
they were inherently healthy, growth-oriented individuals who, given the opportunity, 
would maximize their potential. This formulation implied that American society was still 
on the hook for the hindering obstacles they had heaped on blacks (in the form of 
discrimination and oppression), but that blacks had not been irreparably damaged and 
would continue to seek greater heights of self-realization.93   
In theory, humanistic psychology espoused a more balanced perspective on the 
location of mental distress, implicating the individuals’ broader environment and social 
relationships in individual struggle. In practice, though, humanistic psychologists relied 
on an individual-centered agenda, treating the self as referential rather than sociocentric 
and treating group goals as subordinate to individual goals. For blacks, argued Jenkins, 
the problem may not have been that they did not know how to grow as individuals, but 
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that these opportunities may have been blocked.94 Humanistic psychology failed to 
consider the kind of group organization necessary to elicit broad-scale cultural change; 
without this level of action, efforts at individual self-actualization seemed futile and 
ineffectual.95 
The timing for humanistic psychology’s connection with blacks, also, seemed to 
be all wrong. Until the early 60s, around the time of the release of the Moynihan Report, 
liberal social scientists’ reliance on damage imagery was strong. In spite of their positive 
intentions to eliminate racism by eliciting white sympathy, blacks often felt acutely 
suspicious of attempts to address their “pathology,” which tended to be overemphasized. 
It wasn’t until the mid 1970s, when humanistic psychology’s cultural power had already 
begun to decline, that the social sciences began to represent the black psyche in non-
pathological ways.96 
In addition to being hesitant to look to psychology for any form of support, blacks 
in the late 1960s were reluctant to unite with a predominantly white movement. Though 
some clinicians attempted, in the 1960s, to “re-examine the language of mental health 
and redefine what constituted normal black behavior, marking the onset of a 
politicization of black health issues,” these efforts received little attention from blacks at 
the time. Not only were blacks estranged from the American mental health profession, 
but they were, at the time, alienated from white coalitions in general, favoring black-
centered movements in which they could exercise more control. 97 
Leonard recalls that it became more and more difficult to recruit blacks for 
participation in encounter groups, as they came to represent assimilation into a white 
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power structure.98 While humanistic psychology sought to negate racial differences with 
humanistic understanding, black power offered both recognition of the unique 
experiences of racial minorities and compensation for previous wrongs they had endured. 
Prioritizing black equality and citizenship, blacks refused to enter into a paternalistic 
relationship with humanistic psychology, just as they increasingly refused to accept direct 
help from white-centered institutions and movements broadly.99 
In spite of the paucity of black interest, Esalen’s black-white encounter groups 
continued for several years, both in Big Sur and at Esalen’s San Francisco extension. But 
by the early 1970s, the human potential movement and humanistic psychology were even 
less ambitious on the racial front. At AHP’s 1979 convention, a mere 6 of the 
approximately 1,500 participants at the convention were blacks.. Carl Rogers was quoted 
as saying, “It’s unfortunate, and we hope to change that,” in response.100  The time for 
humanistic psychology to truly embrace racial concerns had, of course, passed.  
Even if blacks didn’t venture to Esalen, however, they couldn’t avoid the impact 
of humanistic psychology entirely. The language of self-actualization and self-awareness 
became a major theme in popular culture, appearing in films, television, and self-help 
literature. Humanistic psychologists’ ideas were further transmitted through universities, 
which blacks attended in greater numbers after the introduction of affirmative action.101 
Many universities offered classes in humanistic psychology, and some even offered 
encounter groups.  
Humanistic psychology also entered workplaces, through sensitivity training and 
seminars on group dynamics. The increase, following the 1964 Civil Rights Act, of black 
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representation in the work force, and in management positions specifically, made blacks 
much more likely to encounter directly humanistic psychology’s theory in the form of 
NTL-type groups.102 Through this exposure, certain blacks did identify the compatibility 
of their liberationist perspective with that of humanistic psychology. Many others 
remained cynical about a movement that was unable to prioritize racial concerns. 
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Chapter Eight: The Psychedelic Experience 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, humanistic psychologists were drawn to the 
psychological potential of psychedelic drugs. Touted for their supposed spiritual 
properties, drugs like LSD produced in users everything from a feeling of temporary 
transcendence to the (at least temporary) experience of a complete reorganization of 
perception and meaning.1  Many humanistic psychologists identified the consonance 
between their own goals—of self-actualization, expanded self and transpersonal 
awareness, and intensified experience—and the qualities of psychedelic experience.2  
Reports of psychedelic experience evoked, in particular, Maslow’s notion of peak 
experiences. In The Varieties of Psychedelic Experience, a thirty-six year old assistant 
professor of English was quoted describing his experience with psychedelics. “What I 
experienced was essentially, and with few exceptions, the usual content of experience but 
that, of everything there was MORE.”  
Writing under the influence of the drug, he noted that he was able to sense, think, 
and feel MORE. Of objects, he saw more color, detail and form. Of his own emotions, he 
felt more intensity, more depth, more comprehensiveness. He felt that his mind was able 
to contain more. “Awareness has MORE levels, is many-dimensioned.” He also felt a 
sense of MORE time, MORE unity with people and things, more self-knowledge, and 
more alternatives.3 
Maslow himself noted a similar sense of amplification when describing peaks. 
During a peak experience, he wrote, individuals feel more integrated “unified, whole, all-
of a piece.” They are “more able to fuse with the world.” For example, “the appreciater 
becomes the music (and it becomes him) or the painting, or the dance.” Peakers, he wrote, 
                                                
1 Robert Masters and Jean Huston, The Varieties of Psychedelic Experience: The Classic Guide to the 
Effects of LSD on the Human Psyche, (Rochester, Vermont: Park Street Press, 1966), 7-12. 
2 Stanley Krippner, interview. 
3 Masters and Huston, Psycheldelic Experience, 7-12. 
 178 
feel themselves to be at the height of their powers; they experience a sense of 
“effortlessness and ease of functioning”; they feel free of blocks and inhibitions, they feel 
more spontaneous and expressive, more “freely flowering outward”; and they feel “more 
of a pure psyche and less a thing-of-the world living under the laws of the world.” 
Peakers also feel more creative, connected to the present, unique, and grateful.4 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURAL INTEREST IN PSYCHEDELICS 
Psychedelics began to receive mainstream interest when, in 1943, Swiss chemist 
Albert Hoffman discovered the hallucinogenic effects of a compound he had discovered 5 
years earlier. Upon accidentally ingesting Lycergic acid diethylamide (LSD), Hoffman 
achieved a “remarkable experience,” in which he perceived an “uninterrupted stream of 
fantastic pictures, extraordinary shapes with intense kaleidoscopic play of colors.”5 
Compelled by the experience and enthusiastic about its therapeutic potential, as 
“medicine for the soul,” Hoffman continued experimental research on the drug 
throughout the 1950s.6  
In America, first-hand information about other kinds of psychedelic experiences 
came primarily from those who traveled to locations like Southern Mexico, where 
psychedelic mushrooms were used in tribal rituals.7 R. Gordon Wasson, for example, was 
a New York banker who traveled to Southern Mexico in 1955 to sample psilocybin 
mushrooms with the Mixeteco Indians of the region. He published an account of his 
experience in Life Magazine in June of 1957, describing his own hallucinogenic 
experience, as well as the native perception of the shamanistic properties of the 
mushrooms. He wrote, “The Indians believe that the mushrooms hold the key to what we 
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call extrasensory perception.” At the conclusion of the article, Wasson expressed both an 
anthropological and scientific interest in properties of mushrooms.8  
In 1960, psychologist Timothy Leary traveled to Mexico, for his first experience 
with psychedelic mushroom inebriation. Of the experience, Leary later wrote, “ I was 
first drugged out of my mind in Cuernavaca, August 1960. I ate seven of the Sacred 
Mushrooms of Mexico and discovered that beauty, revelation, sensuality, the cellular 
history of the past, God, the Devil—all lie inside my body, outside my mind.”9  
Despite the largely sensationalistic attention that LSD research received in the 
1950s, medical researchers, like those at Sandoz Pharmaceuticals, studied the 
compound’s potential as a serotonin blocker, to treat migraines and prevent allergic-
inflammatory processes.10 The earliest psychiatric research on LSD, performed in Europe 
and the US, used the compound for mental relaxation in the recovery of repressed 
memories and to achieve a better understanding of psychosis.11 Other experimental uses 
included the treatment of schizophrenia and alcoholism.12 Significant research on the 
treatment of alcoholics occurred between 1954 and 1960, when Humphrey Osmond and 
Abram Hoffer treated approximately 2000 alcoholics under carefully controlled 
conditions, reporting that 40% to 45% of the alcoholics who were treated with LSD had 
not returned to drinking after a year.13 
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Meanwhile, the concept of LSD inebriation and the benefits of recreational drugs  
were transmitted to the public through popular reports in magazines and literature.14 
Reporters published first-person accounts of LSD experimentation in popular magazines, 
as in the case of Sidney Katz who published “My Twelve Hours as a Madman” in 
MacLean’s in 1953.15 Also, fictional authors like Aldous Huxley romanticized LSD use, 
constructing it as a tool for consciousness-expansion, pleasure, and religious 
awakening.16  
In 1962, Huxley published an account of what he perceived to be the transcendent 
elements of psychedelic experience in his novel Island. He wrote: 
 
Even if it doesn’t refer to anything outside itself, it’s still the most important thing 
that ever happened to you. Like music, only incomparably more so. And if you 
give the experience a chance, if you’re prepared to go along with it, the results are 
incomparably more therapeutic and transforming. So maybe the whole thing does 
happen inside one’s skull. Maybe it is private and there’s no unitive knowledge of 
anything but one’s own physiology. Who cares? The fact remains that the 
experience can open one’s eyes and make one blessed and transform one’s whole 
life.17 
 
Huxley’s accounts suggested the enormous potential of psychedelic drugs, and laid the 
foundations for a popular movement of LSD use.18 
In the fall of 1960, Timothy Leary, a lecturer in Psychology at Harvard, founded 
the first psilocybin laboratory in the United States, with the support and participation of 
psychologist Henry Murray and assistant professor of education and psychology Richard 
Alpert. The explicit goal of the laboratory was to explore the potential psychological 
                                                                                                                                            
Hallucinogenic Drugs, ed. Bernard Aaronson & Humphrey Osmond (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 
1970), 357-366.   
14 Hofmann, LSD, 11-12. 
15 Sidney Katz, “My Twelve Hours as a Madman,” MacLean’s Oct. 1, 1953, 9-11, 46-55. 
16 Huxley published two books in the mid-fifties that explored psychedelic use: Aldous Huxley, Doors of 
Perception (New York: Harper, 1964). and Aldous Huxley,  Heaven and Hell (New York: Harper, 1956). 
17 Ibid., 141. 
18 Anderson, Upstart Spring, 141-144. 
 181 
benefits of psychedelics, particularly in the realms of emotional and creative expression, 
and to pursue the effects of psychedelic inebriation.19 
The early results of Leary’s research were promising. In his first study, in which 
175 participants from all walks of life ingested psilocybin, Leary reported that more than 
half had reached new heights of self-understanding, an equally high percentage felt the 
experience had permanently improved their lives, and 90 percent wanted to repeat the 
experience.20 Subsequently, Leary conducted the Concord Prison Experiment, in which 
psilocybin therapy was administered to prisoners. Improvements in the mental health and 
morale of participants were so marked that Leary was invited to Washington to explore 
the possibility of a national psilocybin program that would extend throughout the penal 
system.21 
HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY’S INTEREST IN PSYCHEDELICS 
Many of humanistic psychology’s leaders favored and even participated in 
psychedelic experimentation. Stanley Krippner, then an assistant professor of clinical 
psychology at Kent State, was enthusiastic about the possibilities of LSD and was eager 
to try it himself. 22 Gratefully accepting an invitation from Leary to participate in LSD 
experimentation at Harvard in April of 1962, Krippner traveled to Cambridge for the 
experience. He was so motivated to take the drug that he appeared for the session despite 
the fact that he had been violently ill from food poisoning the night before and had to be 
assisted to Leary’s lab by a friend.23  His nausea abated the moment the drug took effect.  
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Krippner was not disappointed by the new heights of consciousness he soared to 
in the course of the trip. Describing his kaleidoscopic visions, Krippner wrote: 
A spiral of numbers, letters, and words blew away in a cyclone, stripping me of 
the verbal and numerical symbols by which I had constructed my world.[…] The 
recordings of Beethoven and Mussorgsky had never sounded better, and I seemed 
to be surrounded by chords and tones. The clock on the mantel seemed to be a 
work from a Cellini studio. I visualized delicate Persian miniatures and 
arabesques.  I was in the court of Kublai Khan; inside a Buckminster Fuller 
geodesic dome; at Versailles with Benjamin Franklin; and danced flamenco with 
gypsies in Spain, one of whom threw roses into the air which exploded like 
firecrackers. I was with Thomas Jefferson at Monticello; I watched Edgar Allen 
Poe write poetry in Baltimore.24 
Feeling that he had encountered the “ground of being,” Krippner described the 
experience as both religious and transpersonal, concluding that LSD had a useful function 
in giving individuals a “road map” to expanded consciousness and self-exploration.25 
Other humanistic psychologists, including Rollo May, expressed a more 
intellectual interest in LSD experimentation. On September 18, 1965, May congratulated 
colleague Charles Dahlberg for getting a grant to study LSD with psychotherapy patients. 
May wrote: “I am interested, beyond the clinical phenomena as such, in the underlying 
meaning of the changes of consciousness that take place. I would like very much to 
observe what light LSD throws on the nature and function of consciousness.”26 
Abraham Maslow was more conflicted about psychedelic experimentation. He 
believed that psychedelics offered an experimental opportunity to study higher realms of 
human consciousness.27 But, he also perceived that they held destructive potential—
particularly when used recreationally.28 
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Maslow was concerned that peak experiences achieved exclusively through 
psychedelic use were less meaningful than those that occurred spontaneously, but not 
arbitrarily, after an individual had done the long, hard work of self-exploration. He 
formulated his critique of psychedelic peaks in much the same way that Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer—the German Lutheran theologian—described the idea of “cheap grace”; it 
was unearned and undeserved. “Cheap grace,” wrote Bonhoeffer in 1937, “means grace 
sold on the market like cheapjacks’ wares […] Cheap grace is the grace we bestow on 
ourselves.”29 Psychedelic experiences could, of course, be literally purchased. And, 
unlike the peaks achieved from the arduous activities that Maslow describes (childbirth, 
for instance), drug-induced peaks were not the product of striving, process, or work of 
any kind. 30 
In an unpublished paper entitled “Drugs—Critique,” Maslow described the ideal 
peak experience as akin to “costly grace,” one that, because it was “earned,” would 
promote self-confidence, pride in one’s powers, and a sense of achievement. He drew a 
parallel to the way that earning money would be “health-fostering,” whereas receiving 
unearned money would be “sickness-fostering.”31  
“Even if the drugs were not harmful psychologically,” Maslow wrote, “I think 
they can be harmful spiritually, characterologically, etc. I think it’s clearly better to work 
for your blessings, instead of to buy them. I think an unearned Paradise becomes 
worthless.”32 Maslow’s strongest objections to the LSD culture stemmed from 
“essentially moral reasons—something like should we build an escalator to the top of Mt. 
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Everest or should we put more automobile roads through the wilderness or should we 
make life easier in general…”33 
A BURGEONING CRITIQUE OF PSYCHEDELIC USE 
Beginning with modest claims about the clinical efficacy of psychedelic use, 
Timothy Leary grew increasingly convinced of the power of LSD to catalyze a mystical 
or religious experience.34 He reported in 1963 that in his research at Harvard, 40-90 
percent of people taking psilocybin and LSD reported a religious experience. He claimed 
that the experience could produce a “changed man and a changed life.”35  
Leary’s ideas were ideally situated to appeal to the emerging human potential 
movement, which had been interested in psychedelics from its inception. The first round 
of Esalen seminars, held in 1962, included a seminar on drug-induced mysticism, led by 
Myron Stolaroff and Paul Kurtz. In early 1963, another version of the seminar, then titled 
“Religion and Drug-induced Mysticism” was held. And, in the summer of 1963, Paul 
Kurtz led a “post-psychedelic seminar” for those who had experimented with LSD and 
wanted to discuss their experiences. Leary himself finally ventured to lead a seminar at 
Esalen in 1964 with his former Harvard colleague Richard Alpert. The seminar, led first 
as a weekend seminar from October 30 to November 1 and then as a 5-day seminar from 
November 1-6, received the following description in Esalen’s catalogue: 
A weekend discussion of the ecstatic experience, with and without psychedelic 
drugs, the role of the intentional community and various meditation techniques in 
fostering it, and its relation to the conceptualizing function. The workshop will 
extend these discussions and invite direct experience through non-chemical 
means. No Drugs will be used.36 
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The intellectual discussions of the potential of psychedelics fueled enthusiasm for 
actual use at Esalen. Murphy and Price attempted to prevent uncontrolled drug 
experimentation at Esalen, but residents and visitors largely disregarded their opposition. 
37 The most they were able to accomplish in terms of control was the elimination of drug 
use from meetings and the limitation of experimentation to the rented rooms of 
participants (a domain protected under state law).38 “We put a bulletin up on the board 
that anybody found dealing drugs or having drug trips was going to be evicted instantly 
since it was against the law,” said Murphy. “But, we knew, of course, that these people 
with that particular look on their face, some of whom couldn’t walk very well, were 
under the influence of something other than beer or wine.”39 
The rampant drug use at Esalen was unsettling to figures like Maslow, who 
questioned the wisdom of rampant LSD inebriation. Maslow also took issue with Leary’s 
claims about the potential of LSD. He acknowledged the potential of psychedelics to 
yield insights which remained as truths after the immediate experience had ended (he 
judged a ‘truth’ by its “remaining stable, permanent & nonvanishing”), but he doubted 
the transformative power of the average experience of psychedelic use.40  
Even supporters and users of LSD expressed doubts about the enduring value of 
psychedelic trips. The day after an LSD trip, writer Arthur Koestler told Leary, “This is 
wonderful, no doubt… But it is fake, ersatz. Instant mysticism… there’s no wisdom 
there. I solved the secret of the universe last night, but this morning I forgot what it 
was.”41  
Alan Ginsberg, the famous beat poet, fueled public interest in LSD by writing 
several poems, including “Lysergic Acid,” and “Mescaline,” which extolled the drug’s 
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virtues and romanticized the trips. His 1969 poem, “Graffiti 12th Cubicle Men’s Room 
Syracuse Airport” contained the following lines:  
Man, I’m really stoned out of my skull really O-Zoned-good old LSD the colors 
in here are so nice really fine colors and the floor tile is really outasight if you 
haven’t tried it you ought to since it is the only way to really get your head 
together by first getting it apart LSD Forever.42 
Even Ginsberg, however, later said that in retrospect, “we were probably too 
proselytizing.”43 
Others were less generous than Ginsberg in their analysis of Leary’s aims. Even 
fellow LSD researchers, like Humphrey Osmond and Albert Hoffman, opposed Leary’s 
contention that the mass distribution of LSD would save the human race and bring global 
peace and criticized his simplistic political vision.44 Those who weren’t transformed by 
LSD to the point of prosyletization grew disenchanted with Leary’s aims. His laboratory, 
which had once attempted to perform scientific experiments, had become a supplier, 
critics said, for a “semipermanent cocktail party” full of entranced intellectuals who 
thought they had discovered the panacea for a sick society.45  
Maslow, who had been a colleague and friend of both Leary and Alpert, was 
deeply ambivalent about Leary’s work, defending his unorthodox experimental methods 
but criticizing what he deemed “the Leary technique.46“ The “Leary technique,” Maslow 
wrote in his journal in 1964, “is a denial of the very principle itself of stages of 
knowledge for which appropriate stages of personality development are necessary.”47  
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Partially as a response to his grandiose declamations about LSD and the negative 
publicity they provoked, Harvard dismissed Leary in 1963, shortly after the FDA’s 
pronouncement that LSD had become too powerful and its results too chaotic, and that 
the agency would seek to legislate non-controlled uses.48 At this point the FDA didn’t 
want to end scientific experimentation, but wanted to prevent abuse.49 The same was true 
of Harvard, which continued to support controlled experimentation with LSD. As late as 
1966, research came out of Harvard supporting the idea that mystical experiences from 
LSD could be therapeutically useful in treating personality and behavioral disorders.50 
THE MEDIA’S NEGATIVE ATTENTION 
Media attention to psychedelic experience starting in 1962 was consistently 
sensational, and reflected the fear that drug use corrupted youth and undermined 
American establishments.51 One typical article, published in the New York Times in 1964, 
described psychedelic drug use with a barely veiled anxiety and contempt: 
Students feel that these drugs increase their perceptiveness and sensitivity, bring 
out latent talents and inspire a feeling of extraordinary togetherness among the 
group which is enjoying the “drug experience.” Of course, the drug generally 
provides only the briefest of delusional respites. But some of it leads to hopeless 
addiction or months of insanity.52 
After his dismissal from Harvard, Leary’s own actions and statements provided 
additional fodder for reporters. In 1966, he founded his own religion, the League of 
Spiritual Discovery, which was oriented around the sacramental use of LSD, peyote, and 
marijuana. In one of many public appearances (at a press conference in the New York 
Advertising Club), Leary announced, “We have a blueprint and we’re going to change 
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society in the next 10 years.”53 Leary planned to test in the courts the constitutional rights 
of members of the new religion “to use the drugs in their ‘shrines’ at home.” He also 
grandly asserted that, “Like every great religion of the past […] we seek to find the 
divinity within and to express this revelation in a life of glorification and worship of God. 
These ancient goals we define in the metaphor of the present—turn-on, tune-in and drop-
out.”54 
Leary’s non-conformist rhetoric aligned, at least superficially, with Maslow’s 
understanding of the place in society of self-actualized individuals, who display a 
“resistance to acculturation” and a “certain inner detachment from the culture” coupled 
with an extreme sense of autonomy.55 In Maslow’s studies of self-actualizers in the early 
1950s, he had observed among them a general lack of conformity to cultural norms.56 He 
concluded that “lack of conformity may not signify emotional immaturity, but rather truly 
superior social functioning.”57 
But Maslow drew a sharp distinction between nonconformist self-actualizers and 
most other kinds of non-conformists (like psychedelic users or participants in various 
1960s’ countercultures). He described self-actualizers as able to function effectively 
within the wider culture, notwithstanding their criticisms of it. He found that they have 
generally “settled down to…an accepting, calm, good-humored, everyday effort to 
improve the culture, usually from within, rather than to reject it and fight it from 
without.”58  
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In stark contrast was Leary‘s notion of “dropping out.” In 1965, in The Politics of 
Ecstasy, Leary wrote: “Quit school. Quit your job. Don’t vote. Do not waste conscious 
thinking on TV-studio games. Political choices are meaningless.”59 In addition to 
encouraging frequent use of psychedelics, he suggested that drop-outs should form their 
own “cults.”60  
In the mid-1960s, Leary’s irreverent attitude toward American institutions 
generated continued media interest. The media often focused on the questionable legality 
of his activities, portraying him as threatening to the moral order of the nation.61 Of the 
Dutchess County trial of Leary in 1966, a New York Times reporter wrote, “The jurors are 
trying to determine whether the Foundation [Leary’s communal living experiment] has 
been promoting LSD experimentation through the country, impairing the morality of 
children and running a disorderly house.”62 Critics sensed but couldn’t always articulate 
the threat that Leary posed, and often pathologized even the slightest aberrations from 
“normal” behavior. Media depictions latched onto the metaphor, and the actuality, of filth 
as a way to convey the moral disorder and taint that drug users embodied. Look magazine 
described the archetypal hippie pad as “a filthy litter strewn swarming dope fortress that 
was a great deal less savory and sanitary than a sewer.”63  
Media attention to LSD only escalated over the course of the decade. Historian 
Jay Stevens wrote that, “scarcely a week went by that this curious creature [LSD]  wasn’t 
in the news columns, either raping or murdering or committing suicide in stories that 
were usually anonymous, uncheckable, and bizarre.”64 Local papers transmitted the 
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mistaken idea that so many people were driven psychotic from LSD local emergency 
rooms were being overwhelmed. The media descriptions grossly distorted the reality of 
LSD-related problems; LSD-related narcotic arrests actually represented a minor 
percentage of national narcotics arrests in the 1960s, and LSD-related accidents were far 
more rare than accidents related to the abuse of other narcotics (alcohol in particular).65  
By mid-1966, governors were competing to enact anti-LSD legislation, and 
Congress soon passed federal legislation banning the drug. In October, possession was 
deemed illegal in every state. With the enactment of such laws, open-ended research 
came to an end, and researchers encountered obstacles to completing even the funded 
projects that were underway. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals even recalled all the LSD it had 
distributed.66 
 The black market that resulted from the change in legal status ensured a steady 
supply of LSD, and the now illegal status of the drug, combined with its continued use 
and availability, resulted in an even greater public anxiety about the danger that LSD use 
posed to American institutions.67 Government figures construed drug use as an act of 
political rebellion that undermined the protective structures of government. President 
Lyndon Johnson, in his 1968 State of the Union address, highlighted his concern over the 
advancing cultural interest in drug use, promising to put measures in place to stop it.68 In 
July of 1969, President Nixon asked congress for more money for enforcement, heavier 
penalties for violations involving LSD, and the federal authority to break into residences 
unannounced to seize drug evidence quickly. Nixon also reported that juvenile arrests 
involving use of drugs rose almost 800% between 1960 and 1967. 69 
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THE THREAT TO THE HUMAN POTENTIAL MOVEMENT 
Esalen, as a concrete outpost of the human potential movement, was particularly 
vulnerable both to the excessive scrutiny of the media and to the real excesses of 
psychedelic users. During the summer of 1967, stoned and tripped-out hippies descended 
upon the grounds of Esalen, camping out just to be near the already mythologized retreat. 
These squatters damaged Esalen’s standing in the community, inspiring one local 
restaurant owner to refuse to serve “hippies” and “beatniks,” and obscured the 
respectability of its goals.70 According to Murphy, the squatters infused the air with a 
“drunken mysticism that undermined every discipline we set for the place.”71 
The intrusion of psychedelic users, who tended to lack commitment to the goals 
of human potential and who sought little more than a safe haven where they could “drop 
out” of American culture, deeply troubled Esalen leaders, who found themselves trapped 
in their own anti-hierarchical and thoroughly democratic philosophies.72 In 1968, 
Leonard and Murphy experienced a profound dismay with some outgrowths of human 
potential, even expressing urges to disown the whole movement.  They “quickly learned 
that just as it was much easier to change the world than to change it the way [they] 
planned, it was much easier to name a movement than to unname it.”73 
The problems at Esalen were emblematic of what was happening at other growth 
centers across the country. In the late 1960s, an often destructive permissiveness seemed 
to be the rule at many of these retreats. Maslow wrote: 
At times it seems as though the Growth Centers and revolutionary youth both 
agree on discarding the worth and value of rationality. They seem to 
overemphasize the senses and emotions, and they exaggerate the number of 
people who are ‘up tight’ in the United Sates and who need release from 
inhibitions without considering that many people need more inhibitions rather 
than less (impulse disorders, psychopaths, immature, feebleminded, and so forth). 
They often tend to be too exclusively Dionysian, regarding logic, science, 
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education, and the like as imprisonment, with feeling and sensory experience, 
rather than knowledge, as the well-spring of their motivations. They stress 
impulsive expressiveness, mistaking it for healthy spontaneity. They agree in 
mistrusting power and authority, defining them both in an extremely low way 
(i.e., as dominating, and not recognizing that authority and power can be 
humanistic and transcendent). They believe that if one lifts the restraints and 
allows absolute freedom that only good will result, which means (implies) an 
unfounded faith in basic human goodness and an implied belief that evil comes 
only from social restraints and inhibitions. They do not have enough respect for 
the profound instinctive needs of safety, security, law, order, keeping the peace; 
and they do not realize that without these needs, freedom is impossible. They 
think of power as evil, not realizing that they must temper, restrain, and control 
the forces of inhumanity and chaos within the human soul.74 
Maslow’s criticism of psychedelic extremists stemmed, in part, from the distance 
between his personal experience and the experiences of the rebellious human 
potentialists. Maslow—like Rogers—was, above all, an academic psychologist and a 
staid husband and father: his interest in experiential rebellion was largely intellectual.75 
But his aversion was not just temperamental; it reflected a thoughtful assessment of the 
pitfalls of psychedelic use. In 1965, he expressed concern over what Mike Murphy and 
LSD researcher Sidney Cohen reported as the outcome of excessive psychedelic use. 
According to Murphy, Maslow wrote, “the beatniks dry up & atrophy intellectually after 
a few years of “seeking experiences” (i.e., not thinking or working) & become sad & 
disconnected.”76 He feared that their unprogrammatic approach to revolution was 
inevitably self-defeating; “these idiots,” he wrote, “have defined radicalism as fighting 
against.”77 
PARALLELS WITH OPEN SEXUAL EXPRESSION 
In accounts of the humanistic psychology and human potential movements, the 
media often integrated inflated accounts of nudity, sexual experimentation and rampant 
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drug experimentation. Leary himself linked LSD use to sexuality in a 1966 interview 
with Playboy, in which he claimed that a woman could have several hundred orgasms 
during a properly administered LSD trip.78 
Because nudity and open sexuality were only minor components in the human 
potential movement, any media attention inherently exaggerated its significance. Carl 
Rogers stated, “I don’t suppose that 1/100th of one percent of groups in practice place 
any emphasis on nudity.”79 This reality seemed inconsequential to reporters. In 1968, for 
instance, Life magazine illustrated Jane Howard’s 18-page article on the human potential 
movement with photographs of a nude marathon in Los Angeles that was neither led by 
core members of the movement nor connected to Esalen in any way.80  
Whether or not they approved of open nudity, most leaders of HP were dismayed 
by the disproportionate emphasis the media had placed on it. George Leonard writes that 
“the original idea of a human potential movement had nothing whatever to do with 
nudity. Mike Murphy, in fact, had always been opposed to mixed nude bathing, which 
had been initiated by early guests of Esalen […]”81 Murphy and Dick Price fought for a 
year before determining that nude bathing at Esalen was beyond their control.82   
Film representations of the human potential movement mocked the liberal 
extremes found at Esalen. In Paul Mazursky’s film Bob & Carol & Ted & Alice, a 
couple’s relationship and friendships quickly fall prey to the destructive consequences of 
“open marriage” after they learned and adopted the concept at a weekend retreat at 
Esalen.83 Director Bill Persky’s film “Serial” also parodied the human potential 
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movement by portraying couples who treated sex like a commodity, engaging in it 
compulsively to fill their inner voids.84  
As with the media representations of psychedelic use, the problem with the 
dominant portrayals of the sexual behavior associated with the human potential 
movement was not that it was fabricated, but that it was reductionistic. Humanistic 
psychologists rarely systematically opposed experimentations with either drugs or sex, 
but often opposed the abuses and the reduction of a complex theoretical and experiential 
movement to these types of behaviors.  
Maslow, in fact, ideologically supported nudist experimentation. In his 
correspondence with Paul Bindrim (a California psychologist who had been sanctioned 
by the APA for his nude marathon groups), Maslow expressed his support for 
experimental and exploratory nudity. “I must say that I consider the taboos on nudity to 
be entirely a matter of folkways and customs rather than a matter of ethical or moral 
principle in any cross-cultural sense,” he wrote.85 Yet Maslow also recommended 
discretion, sensitivity, and appropriate conservativeness in the execution of such nudist 
experimentation, perhaps to guard against reactions like the one articulated in a letter sent 
to Maslow, in February of 1968, from a veteran of one of Bindrim’s nude groups, who 
“came away from Bindrim’s nude group feeling dirty and sick at heart.”86 Aware of the 
complexity of the issues, Maslow viewed this renunciation as a singular case and 
continued to support Bindrim’s work, evaluating him to have been “properly conservative 
in [all] respects.”87  
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Maslow was also concerned with the danger of people mistaking the thrill of 
socially forbidden nudity, sexual exploration, and drug use for vital self-transformation. 
According to Maslow, the danger of extreme behavior was that impulsivity was allowed 
to masquerade  as spontaneity,  and onanistic or egocentric love was able to pose as deep 
“I-thou” love.88 Rather than indicating transcendence of social mores and achievement of 
new heights of human experience, such dramatic behavior suggested an interpersonal and 
spiritual desperation and bankruptcy. “When all hope has been lost for attaining relation 
by an imaginative grasp of the other, then all that is left is touching, feeling, being 
cradled, rocked, being in the nude together, and ultimately intercourse.”89  
THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES 
The cautious line that Maslow and others advocated, between open exploration 
and thoughtful moderation, was often too difficult for Esalen participants to tread. And 
the thrill of sexual and drug-induced stimulation seduced many participants into singular 
pursuits of these ends. As a direct effect of the rampant drug use, Esalen suffered a series 
of misfortunes. In 1968, Lois Delattre, a graduate of Esalen’s first residential program 
and an administrative employee of the San Francisco office, experimented with MDA, a 
psychedelic drug of the amphetamine group. She died within hours.90 Delattre’s death 
was devastating to the Esalen staff, who had known her well. Many blamed Esalen for 
her misfortune.91 
This event began to chip away at Esalen’s sense of security and utopian 
invulnerability. Closely following Delattre’s accidental death were the suicides of Marcia 
Price and Judith Gold (a shooting and a drowning in the baths respectively). The deaths 
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shook the Esalen community, causing them to seriously question what Esalen had 
become. Most critics targeted reckless encounter groups, like those led by Fritz Perls. In 
fact, a tape was released after Marcia Price’s death that showed Perls mocking her suicide 
threats.92  
Leaders like Perls, whom Murphy had trouble controlling (in part because 
Murphy was opposed to the idea of controlling), were capable of extreme harm to 
individual participants and to the larger mission of the human potential movement. In 
addition to displaying questionable therapeutic ethics, Perls perpetuated the negative 
reputation of Esalen by forcing all the raciest elements of the movement to the forefront. 
Perls was also somewhat of a sexual predator, infamous for making sexual advances on 
vulnerable group members and for goading individuals into behavioral extremes.93 
Although the AHP wasn’t as concretely vulnerable to the behavior of its 
members, it suffered by association with the Human Potential movement and from the 
sensationalistic media attention it received. It also, like the founders of Esalen, opposed 
the type of power relationships that could have enforced discipline over its identity, and 
therefore prevented members from taking the movement in directions which were in 
opposition to its founding principles.94 Such a nebulous foundation wasn’t sufficient to 
establish boundaries between self-development and self-indulgence. 95  
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Humanistic psychology’s ethic of toleration led to internal division within the 
movement.96 More significantly, however, it diminished the potential of the movement to 
produce direct and systematic social and ideological change. Instead, humanistic 
psychologists would have to settle for the more subtle and pervasive cultural change that 
the compromised movement would produce.  
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Chapter Nine: Encountering Women’s Liberation 
In 1984, Natalie Rogers, who was Carl Rogers’ daughter and a humanistic 
psychologist in her own right, chaired a panel on Women in AHP at the annual 
convention. She expressed her ongoing anger with AHP. “I feel like a child who is angry 
with her parents,” she said.1 For Rogers, as for most women engaged in feminist 
struggles, this statement had a literal and figurative meaning. She was angry with her 
father, a founder of AHP, who in the midst of his theorizing about the importance of 
facilitating individual strivings toward self-actualization had neglected to recognize the 
severely obstructed nature of his own daughter’s potential (whose identity, she felt, had 
been entirely subordinated to those of her husband and children). She was also angry with 
AHP, an organization whose goals appeared so harmonious with those of feminism but 
whose practices had fallen so short in supporting women. At the 1984 conference, Rogers 
observed that 90 percent of the speakers at the convention were men, though participation 
figures favored women. According to Rogers, the convention included 6 all-male panels 
and 10 panels in which there was 1 woman and 2-5 men. She found it ironic that a panel 
entitled “Designing the AHP Future” was an all-male panel. These figures were a scant 
improvement on the AHP conferences of the 1960s and 1970s.2   
For many humanistic psychologists, feminism was a family issue, rooted in their 
own domestic struggles. Like Rogers, who was forced to grapple with the criticism of his 
daughter, Rollo May was confronted by several influential woman in his life (most 
notably his second wife Ingrid) about the necessity of increasing his sensitivity to gender 
issues. According to Stanley Krippner, May had always written exclusively for men, and 
had failed to consider the unique circumstances and psychological reality of women.3 By 
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the time Krippner saw May speak at Sonoma State College in 1966, he was struggling to 
incorporate women in his analyses. At this point he was even trying to employ non-
gendered pronouns. The 1967 publication of May’s Psychology and the Human Dilemma 
also testifies to May’s newfound sensitivity to gender issues: his introduction bears the 
footnote “Some of these essays were written before the time when we began to realize 
that ‘man’ did not embrace ‘woman’ …”4 
CULTURAL CHANGES AND THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 
Feminist concerns crept into the purview of humanistic psychologists in much the 
same way that they had entered the wider cultural consciousness. In the 1950s, with the 
post-war U.S. focused on a domestic ideal of femininity (reflected in advertising rhetoric 
and in women’s declining professional employment), feminist concerns manifested 
themselves as an inchoate sense of dissatisfaction. 5 In 1956, a writer for Time Magazine 
observed: 
 
If there is such a thing as a ‘suburban syndrome,’ it might take this form: the wife, 
having worked before marriage or at least having been educated and socially 
conditioned toward the idea that work (preferably some kind of intellectual work 
in an office, among men) carries prestige, may get depressed being ‘just a 
housewife.’ Even if she avoids that her humiliation still seeks an outlet. This may 
take various forms: in destructive gossip about other women, in raising hell at the 
PTA, in becoming a dominating mother […]  In her disgruntlement, she can work 
as much damage to the lives of her husband and children (and her own life) as if 
she were a career woman, and indeed sometimes more.6  
Early forms of protest were subtle: beginning in 1957, women began having 
fewer children and marrying later, and more women in the middle classes were attending 
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college.7  Meanwhile, cultural conditions were ripening for a feminist resurgence.  In the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, the sexual liberation movement gave women new freedoms. 8 
As early as 1953, scientists began to study and publish on women’s sexuality: in 1953, 
Alfred Kinsey published Sexual Behavior and the Human Female (a bestseller), and in 
1966 William Masters and Virginia Johnson published their laboratory studies of human 
sexual response, debunking myths about female sexuality and facilitating open 
conversation about female sexual concerns.9 By 1962, the birth control pill became 
widely accessible: a reported 1,187,000 American women were using it for family 
planning.10 Literary censorship began to lift as well. Books like Helen Gurley Brown Sex 
and the Single Girl (an instant bestseller) helped to normalize a more open, less inhibited 
idea of female sexuality.11  
In 1963, Betty Friedan offered American women a lens through which to identify 
their latent dissatisfaction with their roles as housewives. In her bestselling book The 
Feminine Mystique, Friedan argued: “the core of the problem for women today is not 
sexual but a problem of identity—a stunting or evasion of growth that is permitted by the 
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feminine mystique.”12  For Friedan, the “feminine mystique” was the damaging myth that 
the only path to fulfillment for an American woman was through the role of housewife-
mother.13  
Friedan drew heavily on psychological theory to inform her conception of 
women’s problems.14 In fact, she credited humanistic psychology, at least in part, with 
her reconsideration of the female role. Specifically citing Maslow’s work, Friedan 
attempted to demonstrate the humanistic, unselfish nature of women’s strivings. She 
described Maslow’s finding that the higher the dominance or strength of self in a woman, 
the less she was self-centered and the more her concern was directed outward to other 
people and to worldly concerns. In contrast, Maslow argued that women who were more 
conventionally feminine were more focused on themselves and their own inferiorities.15 
Focused on self-actualization, potentiality, and self-awareness, Friedan’s language 
throughout the book evokes Maslow’s theories. 
Friedan, who had been trained as a Freudian at the University of California-
Berkeley, came to oppose both Freudianism and behaviorism, considering both of them 
to be an impediment to self-actualization.16 Friedan wrote that “for years, psychiatrists 
have tried to ‘cure’ their patients’ conflicts by fitting them into the culture. But 
adjustment to a culture that does not permit the realization of one’s entire being is not a 
cure at all, according to the new psychological thinkers.”17 What Friedan desired was a 
theory which, in the image of her memoir-style book, would advance a vision of an 
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improved culture and society through its analysis of highly personal and individual 
experiences.18 
The Feminine Mystique, while hardly responsible for the events of the 1960s that 
ensued, gave voice to a set of concerns and anxieties that had been building for years and 
that would, over the next few decades, change the shape of gender relations in America. 
Friedan received a flood of responses to the book—some from barely literate women and 
some written in crayon, that demonstrated the personal resonance of Friedan’s argument 
with American women.19  
CONSCIOUSNESS RAISING 
In the mid 1960s, increased legislative attention to women’s issues combined with 
persistant inequality to heighten the urgency of feminist concerns. Despite the passage of 
Title VII in 1965, which made it illegal to discriminate against women in hiring and 
promotions, the creation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
(also in 1965), and the founding of the National Organization for Women (NOW) in 
1966, women remained politically and culturally subordinate to men. President 
Kennedy’s record on female appointments was worse than those of his four immediate 
predecessors and dramatic pay differentials persisted between men and women, 
suggesting the ineffectuality of the EEOC.20 Women were also poorly represented in the 
House and Senate: in 1966, 10 of 435 members of the House of Representatives and 2 of 
100 U.S. senators were women.21  
                                                
18 Ironically, Friedan’s representation of her own experience in The Feminine Mystique was somewhat 
inauthentic and contrived, in that she had not been the naïve housewife whose visions were clouded by the 
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19 Ruth Rosen, The World Split Open: How the Modern Women's Movement changed America (New York: 
Viking, 2000), 6 
20 Kathleen C. Berkeley, The Women’s Liberation Movement in America (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1999), 19-20. 
21 “Women in Congress,” Society and Culture Almanac, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0801429.html. 
 203 
The inadequate government support signaled the need for individual action on the 
part of women. Organization began from the classes where it had resided throughout 
feminism’s dormancy in the 1930s through 1960s in secular groups of elite, mainly 
educated, primarily white women. In 1966 the National Organization for Women was 
formed by twenty-eight women and men who attended the Third National Conference of 
the Commission on the Status of Women. The founders included Betty Friedan, the 
organization’s first president, and the Reverend Pauli Murray (the first African-American 
woman Episcopal priest), who jointly drafted the organization’s statement of purpose, 
establishing NOW’s commitment to gaining equal participation for women in all domains 
of society.22 
The rise of consciousness raising (CR) groups, which bore a striking resemblance 
to encounter groups, marked the convergence of women’s domestic and political 
discontent. CR groups, fueled in part by the framing ideology of humanistic psychology, 
as advocated by Friedan in The Feminine Mystique, began at the grass-roots level, 
lacking formal structure and organization. Feminist Anita Shreve explained that CR was 
the “political reinterpretation of one’s personal life.” Its purpose was to “awaken the 
latent consciousness […] that all women have about [their] oppression.”23 The 
embodiment of the renowned motto, “the personal is political,” CR groups sought to 
convince women that what they had previously perceived as personal problems were 
actually social problems that required social rather than personal solutions.  
CR groups originated somewhat organically, as groups of radical women began to 
form “rap sessions” or “bitch sessions” in which they vented their frustrations about their 
personal struggles. These radical left groups resembled the Maoist Chinese practice that 
had been utilized in the Chinese revolution (“speak pains to recall pains”) and was later 
                                                
22 Barbara Sinclair Deckard, The Women's Movement: Political, Socioeconomic, and Psychological Issues 
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used in the Civil Rights movement in America (within SNCC, for instance, under the 
slogan “tell it like it is”).24 Concerned with matters of growth, fulfillment and striving, 
women gathered in a politicized encounter group style to discuss issues that had formerly 
been silenced by a culture whose dominant ideology rejected them.25  
CR groups consisted of the collective sharing of private experiences of oppression 
by men, ranging from marital struggles to incidences of sexual violence.26  “The process 
is simple,” wrote one feminist, “Women come together in small groups to share personal 
experiences, problems and feelings. From this public sharing comes the realization that 
what was thought to be individual is in fact common; that what was thought to be a 
personal problem has a social cause and political solution.”27 
Although CR groups originated with leftist activists, they spread more broadly 
through word of mouth to middle class women with divergent political interests.28 By 
1970, CR groups were active in every American city, uniting women over discussions of 
their cultural victimization, sexual experiences, and innermost desires. 29  In 1973 alone, 
over 100,000 people nationwide reported membership in a consciousness raising group.30 
Typical groups remained, for the most part, limited to white women of the middle class, 
who were more likely to have leisure time to devote to the groups, the suburban lifestyles 
that fueled their discontent, and the college experiences that gave some intellectual form 
to their feminist inclinations. 31  
Consciousness-raising relied on the same epiphanic experience that encounter 
groups so esteemed. Anita Shreve wrote, “The heart of the matter, say the women, was 
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‘the click’—the light bulb going off, the eye-popping realization, the knockout punch. It 
was the sudden comprehension, in one powerful instant, of what sexism exactly meant, 
how it had colored one’s own life, the way all women were in this together.”32 But while 
encounter groups viewed the epiphany as the goal, CR conceived the revelatory moment 
as an invaluable tool which would facilitate personal and political action. Feminist Kathie 
Sarachild argued that the purpose of CR had always been “social transformation as 
opposed to self-transformation.”33 Proponents of CR made every effort to differentiate it 
from therapy, maintaining that CR groups analyzed male supremacy and conceptualized 
ways to defeat it. 
Not everyone bought this explanation. Like encounter groups, CR groups were 
mocked as being “trivial,” “nonpolitical,” and were deemed “hen parties,” even by other 
members of the radical left. Betty Friedan referred to CR groups as “navel-gazing.”34 
Some perceived the self-absorption that they associated with CR to be extremely 
threatening. Like drug experimentation, which caused people to “tune out,” and 
encounter groups, which obscured social and political concerns with personal catharsis, it 
was feared that CR participants might “retreat from action into self-indulgent 
personalism.”35 Proponents of CR argued that the effect would render contrary results; 
that women would become more committed to resisting the system. But the debate 
persisted, creating fissures within feminist organizations.36 
                                                
32 Ibid., 53. 
33 Kathie Sarachild as quoted in Alice Echols, Daring to Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America 1967-1975 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 87. 
34 Echols, Daring to be Bad, 87. 
35 Shreve, Women Together, 86. 
36 Eventually, the controversy was enough to split the New York Radical Women, an early feminist group 
which began in 1967, into those in favor and those against CR groups. In 1969, the feminist group 
Redstockings became the new home for CR group advocates and actively promoted and advocated the use 
of CR. Those who opposed CR mostly did so on the basis of their personal, rather than overtly political, 
emphases. CR opponents, who frequently defined themselves as socialist feminists, formed the Women’s 
International Terrorist Conspiracy from Hell (WITCH), when the New York Radical Women dissolved. 
Echols, Daring to be Bad, 86. 
 206 
CR advocates viewed groups as a “valuable tool, indeed, essential tool, that 
would, in turn, give individual women tools with which to go forward in their own 
lives.”37 This instrumental view contrasted with the increasingly popular practice of 
encounter groups, whose intensity of expression became a desired end in itself.  
In contrast to encounter groups, CR groups implicitly accounted for group-level 
forces, wove the political into the personal, and offered a sustaining form of intimacy and 
support which guided women through significant changes. Also, unlike encounter groups, 
CR groups remained responsive to changes in the culture, changing as the political 
climate changed, as career opportunities expanded, and as the priorities of the women’s 
movement shifted.38  In retrospect, CR groups may have unknowingly drawn on the more 
moderate and salubrious tenets of humanistic psychology, while many encounter groups 
exacerbated the excesses and oversights. 
THE 1970S: WOMEN’S LIBERATION SEEPS IN 
For the relatively conservative founders of humanistic psychology (all middle 
class, white males in fairly traditional marriages), the goals of women’s liberation in the 
1970s were more palatable than those of the related sexual revolution, which was more 
sensationally in evidence at growth centers like Esalen. While sexual revolution in the 
1960s had manifested in the general relaxation of sexual taboos among the mainstream 
culture, sexual revolution in the 1970s was characterized more by countercultural 
experimentation with these relaxed standards. No longer focused on the inadequacies and 
hypocrisies of the more traditional conceptions of female sexuality, the sexual revolution 
of the 1970s demonstrated a more libertine, radical emphasis on sexual experimentation, 
represented in things like pornography, private clubs for group sex, aggressive 
promiscuity, and open marriage.39 Concerned with such behavioral excesses, Maslow 
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seized on a friend’s explanation. He wrote, “Remember, not only are they children at 
Esalen, but they’re in a permanent state of childhood.” 
Entangled in the frenetic changes of the 1960s, it took humanistic psychologists a 
while to separate the legitimate critiques of traditional practices from the more eccentric 
displays of protest. As such, they were slow to recognize the ways in which specific 
attention to women’s concerns was relevant and significant to AHP. “All of psychology 
was dragged kicking and screaming through every liberation movement,” said humanistic 
psychologist Richard Farson, “It was embarrassing how far behind the curve we were.”40 
Farson recalls sitting on a stage at a conference, in 1966, when the meaning of the 
feminist movement first overtook him. The conference, entitled “Quo Vadis, Today’s 
Woman?”, was led by four men, including John Mack Carter, editor-in-chief  and 
publisher of the Ladies Home Journal, who preached to a crowd of approximately 2,000 
women about their position in American culture.41 The irony of the fact that four men 
would purport to know more about women’s experience than the 2,000 women who were 
listening to them overcame Farson. From then on, he began to talk and write about 
women’s liberation.42 His first article on the subject, “The Rage of Women,” was 
published in 1969 in Look Magazine.43 This publication was one of several articulated 
statements of the significance of women’s liberation that finally penetrated the 
consciousness of humanistic psychology in the last few years of the 1960s. “That’s how 
slow it was to emerge,” claimed Farson, “unbelievably slow.”44 
By the 1970s, the women’s liberation movement was so widespread that scarcely 
a man, particularly a white, middle class man, existed who didn’t have a wife, daughter 
or friend committed to the cause. In 1971, NOW had over 150 chapters and from 5,000 to 
10,000 members. By 1972, it had grown to about 30,000 members. Even outside of 
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activist organizations, women’s liberation had gained widespread ideological support. A 
1972 poll, commissioned by Virginia Slims cigarettes (a company that sought to exploit 
feminist inclinations to sell cigarettes), showed that 48 percent of women supported 
efforts to strengthen and alter women’s status in America, while 36 percent opposed it. 
These figures had increased from 40 percent and 42 percent respectively in the year prior. 
Evaluations of the effectiveness of women’s organizations had also risen from 34 percent 
in 1971 to 43 percent in 1972. Political opposition to the women’s movement grew 
increasingly hesitant. Sensitive to this new political imperative, Congress passed a series 
of women’s rights legislation from 1972-1974.45 
Despite the advancing general support that the Virginia Slims poll suggested, it 
also found that support had dipped among black women, who were still embroiled in the 
struggle for civil rights and perhaps, like members of SNCC, found women’s issues 
“bourgeois,” diverting attention from primary problems like race.46 Barbara Emerson 
wrote “I’m an African-American woman in that order […] Now I realize full well that 
lots of women see their gender, or see, feel, think their gender first and then their race. It 
doesn’t happen to come to me that way.”47 Emerson spoke for many black women, whose 
oppression as blacks was generally more tangible than their oppression as women. 
Women were, after all, loved and respected (within limits) by men. 
It was through this love and respect for the women in their lives that the founders 
of humanistic psychology began to prioritize women’s issues. Carl Rogers’ increasing 
sensitivity to gender issues was hastened by personal experience. In 1968, his daughter, 
who had been a “feisty” child and adolescent but who had “disappeared” into herself 
during her twenty year marriage, announced that she was divorcing a man whom both her 
parents strongly favored. Motivated by his strong desire for growth and understanding, 
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Rogers struggled to understand his daughter’s perspective, and he listened to her openly. 
Her experience was certainly one that a humanistic psychologist could appreciate; she felt 
that her intellect and the wholeness of her being were suppressed by the marriage. The 
validity of her experience was undeniable to her father, and it began to inform his clinical 
interactions with women.48 
Once feminism was in full force, Carl Rogers and other AHP leaders found its 
critiques increasingly unavoidable. Natalie Rogers remembers an invited lecture that her 
father gave at Harvard in the early 1970s, where a woman spoke up at the end to criticize 
his gendered use of pronouns throughout his speech. In Natalie Rogers’s opinion, her 
father gave a “wrong answer” and she and her colleagues from Greenhouse, a growth 
center in Cambridge, Massachusetts, confronted him about it later.  
Once he was attuned to these dynamics, Carl Rogers himself began to “get it.”49  
His 1977 publication of Carl Rogers on Personal Power begins with “a special note.” “I 
have been greatly perplexed by the pronoun problem, or, more exactly, the ‘he-she’ 
issue,” he writes. “I am totally in sympathy with the view that women are subtly 
demeaned by the use of the masculine pronoun when speaking in general of a member of 
the human species.”50 He resolves this problem in the book by alternating between 
chapters in his use of masculine and feminine pronouns.  
The changes in Carl Rogers went beyond his written and spoken words. He 
assimilated more gendered notions into his clinical practice and group work as well. He 
began in simple ways, like noticing that four or five men had spoken in a row and 
encouraging a woman to speak. He recognized the ways that groups served as a 
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microcosm of the culture, and he began to tackle group forces that influenced the 
behavior of individual women in his sessions.51  
The transformation even penetrated his fairly traditional marriage to Helen 
Rogers, a woman who had been an ideal faculty wife, furthering her husband’s career 
with her competence and interpersonal ease and often subordinating her own passions for 
painting, reading, and traveling to her husband’s needs. As Helen lay on her death bed, 
nearly paralyzed by arthritis, Rogers wrote,”[…] she is giving up the old model of being 
the supportive wife. This change brings her in touch with her anger at me and at society 
for giving her that socially approved role.”52 Fortunately, Helen’s daughter Natalie and 
granddaughter Frances would not wait so long to embrace this anger. In fact, they later 
co-led feminist workshops for mothers and daughters.53  
Maslow, like Carl Rogers, was married to a woman who never challenged his 
more traditional notions of women. Bertha Maslow raised their two daughters, fostered 
her husband’s career, and never worked outside the home. Unsurprisingly, Maslow 
believed that women were more suited to growing relationally, through their experiences 
with husbands and children,54 But, he also recognized the costs of forcing women into a 
role that was purely relational, with no room for self-development, writing that “self-
actualization was hardly possible at all for women in our society.”55 His journals suggest 
his persistent interest in, and conflicts with, the women’s liberation movement. On 
January 8, 1963, Maslow wrote in his journal, ”Read Betty Friedan’s Feminine Mystique 
right thru, finished at 5 A.M. A passionate book,--I was swept along unintentionally […] 
It’s very impressive & I’m glad I helped her. […] One thing I’m sure of: she tends to 
dichotomize being a female only from being a general human being. Often she disavows 
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this & criticizes others for doing it, & yet she falls into it herself. Or, better said, she 
doesn’t really think hierarchically. […] Humanness is postpotent to femaleness (I think! 
Now, after reading her book, I’m less sure of this.[…])”56 
Maslow had been interested in women’s psychology, and sexuality, since his 
work with Harlow in the 1930s. In his 1939 paper, “Dominance, Personality and Social 
Behavior in Women,” Maslow anticipated 1960s feminists, highlighting common desires 
for work, assertiveness and growth.57 The significant number of well-marked and 
highlighted magazine and newspaper articles in his collected papers of the 1950s and 
1960s also suggests the persistence of his interest in the changing roles of women. 58  
AHP ADDRESSES WOMEN 
Despite their traditional backgrounds, and to their credit, the founders were more 
open-minded than most, consistently listening attentively, if not always 
comprehendingly, to the concerns of their female patients, colleagues, family members, 
friends, and intellectuals and activists like Friedan. They supported the inclusion of 
women in AHP and in positions of leadership, but were often predictably insensitive to 
the unique issues which accompanied these transitions.59 
Feminist considerations were often perceived as irrelevant to the goals of 
humanistic psychology. At worst, they were perceived as antipathetic to the ideals of 
group unity and universal understanding, and feminists themselves were often perceived 
by male humanistic psychologists as threatening. Maureen O’Hara claims, “Many of the 
men at [Center for Studies of the Person] could not understand why there was any 
necessity for a women’s gorup. They saw it as hostile, and I suppose it was. I mean there 
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were times when it was really bitter, and part of the bitterness had to do with the absolute 
denial on the part of men of the fact that women’s situation was any different from 
theirs.”60 Natalie Rogers remembers that “you really had to get in their faces to get them 
to listen.”61 This resistance only exacerbated the animosity many women felt towards the 
men who, at least in their minds, represented the male power structure of the country. 
Rogers remembers herself as “very confrontative, outspoken, and angry.” In her intensity 
and vociferousness about women’s concerns, she claims, “I scared the shit out of you.”62 
The building frustration of women within and without AHP arose, in part, from 
the failure of humanistic psychology to adequately consider anything beyond the distinct 
individual. In this, the leaders of humanistic psychology demonstrated a blind spot to 
forces that existed at the group level. Rogers, for instance, genuinely believed that if you 
properly nurtured the subjectivity of an individual, gender was irrelevant, and only slowly 
began to recognize that something was missing from his Person-Centered Approach 
(PCA) writings.63 White males, feminist critics felt, could afford to focus solely on 
individuals, being free of cultural oppression and discrimination. Women, however, had 
to attend to more pressing material and political deficits before they could have the 
luxury of self-focus.64 They would have to fulfill their more basic needs before 
examining, in the Maslovian sense, their “being” needs.  
The loudest feminist-oriented voices in the ears of the founders undoubtedly came 
from the women in AHP, who expressed a natural allegiance to feminist principles. No 
longer the male-dominated movement that it was in the 1950s, women seeped into the 
power structures slowly, then quickly. At the inaugural meeting of the Association of 
Humanistic Psychology in Old Saybrook in 1964, Charlotte Buhler was the only female 
psychologist, and Norma Rosenquist (later Lyman), the first organizational secretary of 
                                                
60 O’Hara and Proctor,“Interview,” 60. 
61 Natalie Rogers, interview. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Natalie Rogers, interview. 
64 O’Hara, interview by author. 
 213 
AHP, was the only other female participant. Shifts in AHP leadership reflected the 
organizations responsiveness to the increasing status of women. Prior to 1976, 3 of 14 
AHP presidents—Charlotte Buhler, Norma Lyman, and Eleanor Criswell—were women. 
Yet from 1976 to 2005, AHP had 13 female presidents and 16 male presidents.65   
In contrast, the leadership of APA’s division 32 (Humanistic Psychology) 
remained male-dominated. Considered the more intellectual of the organizations, 
Division 32 was created to transmit principles of humanistic psychology to professional 
and academic psychology. Meanwhile, AHP was viewed as the more experiential 
organization, and perhaps, because of assumptions about women’s nature, a more 
appropriate site for female leadership.  As of 2001, women comprised only 16.6 percent 
of officer positions in Division 32, though 30.1 percent of the members were women.66 
Female membership consistently increased in the early years of AHP. Ilene 
Serlin, former president of AHP, wrote that “The world of humanistic psychology was a 
favorable environment for women.”67 Arising in the same era and under the same cultural 
circumstances as women’s liberation, humanistic psychology demonstrated many 
parallels. “Much of humanistic thought,” claimed Serlin, “especially in regard to the 
centrality of personal experience and holistic and tacit ways of knowing, has much in 
common with feminist theories of intersubjectivity, personal knowledge, and the 
importance of finding one’s own voice.”68 Many female members recognized the 
complementary nature of feminism and humanistic psychology and participated in both 
movements. 
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AHP members represented the varying levels of commitment to the women’s 
liberation movement.69 Jackie Doyle, for example, was a resident at Esalen who went on 
to co-found Greenhouse, a growth center in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in the hopes of 
incorporating feminist ideas into groups. Greenhouse held some of the first women’s 
groups in humanistic psychology, dedicated to the goals of overthrowing sexist 
stereotypes and incorporating the precepts of liberation into women’s lives. Doyle, 
however, felt most comfortable with a mainstream notion of feminism and resisted more 
radical expressions. When Gloria Steinem and others invited her to a summer gathering 
in New Hampshire, Doyle was put off by the militancy of the women’s ideas, which 
displayed a “lesbian flare.” She never integrated their ideas or connected with these 
women. Doyle, however, continued to encourage students and group participants to 
consider their attitudes about gender and to re-envision their roles as women. 70  
Female group leaders, like Natalie Rogers and Maria Bowen tended to be more 
intuitive in their inclusion of a feminist perspective in groups. They often made 
observational comments about visibly gendered group dynamics; for example, pointing 
out when a woman had been interrupted or men were dominating the conversation.71 
Maureen O’Hara, a relative latecomer to humanistic psychology in 1970, initially 
rejected a feminist analysis, feeling that the common humanistic psychology 
perspective—characteristic of Carl Rogers, with whom she worked closely—“was 
already big enough to allow space for a subjectivity that was both essentially human and 
gendered.”72 She soon realized that the conversations that were occurring were absent a 
recognition of female subjectivity. Without a level playing field, she realized, treating 
everyone the same way meant privileging the white male. In order to recognize women’s 
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70 Jackie Doyle, interview by author, Tiberon, 28 April 2005. 
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distinctiveness, it was important to acknowledge the gendered world in which their 
subjectivity had developed, “against a historical context which has denied their 
subjectivity.”73  
In the wake of her efflorescent feminism, O’Hara began to believe that several 
essential characteristics of women were ignored by the humanistic psychology. O’Hara 
came to believe that women were more relationally oriented and that viewing the life 
course as a journey from dependence to independence could prove inhibitory to women’s 
potential. She noticed that in groups, women were more inclined to make statements like 
“we’ve been thinking,” which would often be admonished by group leaders with the 
imperative to “think for yourself.” The expectation that health was equated with 
independence and autonomy ignored the reality of women’s relational concept of self. In 
order to foster women’s self-actualization, it was necessary for facilitators to recognize 
the range of possibilities for the experience of self and relationships.74 O’Hara’s 
essentialist perspective likely would have been ill-received by feminists who argued that, 
given the present differentials in social expectations and societal respect for men and 
women, our perception of immutable differences between genders could only “reflect our 
prejudices.”75 In the meantime though, feminists like O’Hara and Rogers addressed 
women’s needs in the context of the culture in which they generated and experienced 
them.  
Second wave feminists diverged on the question of whether or not to attend to 
gender differences, like those described by O’Hara, or to promote a policy of total 
equality, which disregarded any notion of essential difference, perceiving difference as 
socially constructed and thus remediable. Essentialists either would have found (if they 
had gained exposure to it) or did find (in the case of those with psychological interests) 
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humanistic psychology to be more synonymous with stereotypically female ways of 
knowing than male ways of knowing.76 
Although humanistic psychology earned itself feminist supporters, who were 
willing to address their critiques from within the movement, it also provoked outside 
feminist critiques, which were reliably the harshest. A paper by Carolyn Morell, for 
example, targeted Rollo May’s bestselling Love and Will as being “unintentionally 
sexist,” with implications that justified the existing power relationship between men and 
women and contributed to women’s dissatisfaction and dehumanization.  The paper 
further argued that May’s book reinforced the patriarchy by being written for a male 
reader, making statements—like “If you called a lady ‘sexy,’”— in which the you could 
only sensically be male, or lesbian. Morell also accuses the sexual enlightenment May 
advocates as being superficial, invoking changes in expression but not in power.77 
May’s response, which was published as an article in the Journal of Humanistic 
Psychology, was typical of the ambivalent way in which the movement grappled with 
feminism. Initially, May grudgingly conceded that his analysis “does suffer from 
unintentional sex prejudices. So does practically every other book written by a man (and 
most of them by women) […] whether the author is Abraham Maslow, Carl Rogers or 
anyone else.” He also noted that he (and Maslow and Rogers) are “emphatic” supporters 
of the feminist movement. A paragraph later, May expressed his intention to rewrite 
certain sections and to continue to struggle with the “man-woman issue.” In the spirit of 
humanistic psychologists, May wrote, “One can learn,” and thanks Morell for her “help” 
in the revision of his book.78 
Implicit in Morell’s critique of May was the argument that the white male 
perspective wouldn’t intuitively account for the unique position of women. She 
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repeatedly described May’s errors as “unintentional” and “unconscious,” suggesting that 
the white male paradigm is itself the problem. Morell’s allegations were representative of 
the bulk of feminist critique of humanistic psychology, which revolved around the 
contention that humanistic theory arose from the experience of alienated, urban, white 
men of European descent who, according to one scholar, privileged “the sole self-
evolving individual on a solitary and heroic journey of self-discovery […]characterized 
by subduing nature, overcoming matter, transcending the body, promoting individuation, 
differentiation, and abstraction.”79 While the claim that humanistic psychology had 
“forgotten the body” was arguable, the emphasis on traditional masculine ideals of 
autonomy, agency, and self-sufficiency were inescapable.  
Certainly, the relationship between feminists and humanistic psychology was 
complex. At the same time that humanistic psychology (or more accurately, certain 
representatives of it) offended female sensibilities, it also advanced a theory that was in 
line with women’s liberation. Cultural historian Joyce Milton credits Maslow, through his 
influence on Friedan, with shaping the entire women’s liberation movement. Maslow’s 
model of self-actualization, she argues, became the dominant view in female psychology 
(a role that endures to the present).80 Likewise, The Feminine Mystique impressed 
humanistic psychologists by highlighting the parallels between feminist liberation and 
self-actualization and striving. Stanley Krippner, for example, reports that the book 
“changed his life” and his entire outlook on women.81 
For the most part, women were able to accept the imperfect recognition that 
humanistic psychology was able to offer and to appropriate as their own the empowering 
philosophy of humanistic psychology. In 1975, a writer for the Mountain Gazette 
reported that “the Women were probably the most important thing going on at the AHP 
conference. They seemed to be a step away from power there; or maybe they already 
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have it. I had a murky view of strong, attractive and self-possessed women and meek, 
powerless men.”82 
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Chapter Ten: Fragmentation of the Movement 
In The New York Times’ coverage of AHP’s 1970 annual convention, journalist 
Robert Reinhold described the scene of the Miami Beach’s Orante Deauville Hotel, 
where the conference was held. He wrote, “800 people sprawled out on the floor of the 
main ballroom […] silently touching each other with their eyes closed.”1  
A few months later, another reporter described the same convention in an article 
on Rollo May. He wrote: “May seldom participates in encounter sessions, and at the 
Miami Beach convention, when he was caught in a group that celebrated its ecstasy by 
jumping up and down, he simply jumped his way to the door and out of the room.” He 
went on to describe the ultimate inescapability of AHP’s “acting-out techniques,” 
explaining that May was later forced to participate in a “toe-touching orgy” and a “trust 
march through the hotel.”2 
Both journalists were fascinated by the sensational qualities of the conventions, 
and by the tension with the intellectual ideas that lay behind them. Probing the 
conference leaders for their opinions on the hedonistic overtones of commonly practiced 
experiential techniques, Reinhold exposed the growing internal critique of the 
movement’s anti-intellectualism.  He described conference chairmen Lawrence 
Solomon’s concern over the “increasing slippage” between humanistic psychology’s 
ideals and the intrusion of anarchic and “anti-intellectual” tendencies into the movement. 
Also, quoting humanistic psychologist and UCLA business school professor Fred 
Massarik, Reinhold wrote: “There is much concern with turn-on [...] But it should not 
interfere with the think-on.”3 
More fair than most, however, Reinhold also conceded that AHP’s “leadership 
remains solidly academic and many do not even take part in encounter groups. Having 
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respectability as a protest movement, the group seems now to be groping for a positive 
program.”4  
Even in the 1960s, establishing this positive program had been difficult for the 
founders to achieve.  Constrained by the narrow definition of science at the mainstream 
universities at which they were employed, they tended to feel unsupported intellectually 
and financially. As early as 1959, Maslow wrote, “Very pleasant to be a big shot but 
doesn’t do my Brandeis salary much good. Nor can I get my papers published. Nor do 
grad students do my work for me.”5 In 1962, he wrote, in a tirade against the rigid 
expectations of mainstream psychology departments and of the APA, “In a way, ‘science’ 
is anticreative. It is an organization, with division of labor, with fixed rules, a body of 
knowledge. But the creative person is on the fringes, where ignorance is, not where 
knowledge is.”6  
Maslow felt most appreciated outside of psychology departments. In 1961, he 
spent a sabbatical semester at a privately-funded institute, the Western Behavioral 
Sciences Institute (WBSI) in La Jolla, California, where engineer-entrepreneur Andy Kay 
funded his fellowship.7 The following year, he accepted another invitation from Kay to 
spend the summer consulting for his corporation, Non-Linear Systems, a plant at which 
workers assembled digital voltmeters  (instruments for measuring the electric potential 
difference between two points in an electric circuit).  Maslow was paid handsomely to 
visit the plant once a week, collecting his perceptions of management techniques and 
employee satisfaction and applying his theory of motivation in recommendations for 
increasing employee satisfaction.8 Despite the benefits of the job, however, Maslow 
returned to his position at Brandeis in the fall of 1962. In 1969, Maslow finally left 
Brandeis, accepting an offer from an administrative corporation called Saga that was too 
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good to refuse. The corporation offered him a 2-4 year commitment, a new car, a 
generous salary, and a private office with a secretary. In exchange, Maslow was only 
expected to work on his own writing and scholarly work; he had no duties at the 
company.9 
Rogers had been comparably motivated to leave academia. Having accepted a 
research position at the University of Wisconsin in 1957, he spent the next several years 
in increasing conflict with his colleagues. In January of 1963, Rogers sent a 
memorandum to the faculty, indicating his inclination to leave the university and 
describing his dissatisfaction with the department’s “fixed policies and philosophy.” 
Chief among his concerns was the extent to which graduate students were mistreated;  he 
argued that the faculty created a threatening environment for them, often focused on their 
potential failure and rarely attentive to their creative and original ideas.”10  
The same year, Rogers received an offer from WBSI. Though he had turned down 
offers like this before, Rogers began to rethink his position. He wrote, “What was a 
university, at this stage in my career, offering me? I realized in my research it offered no 
particular help; in anything educational, I was forced to fit my beliefs into a totally alien 
mold; in stimulation, there was little from my colleagues because we were so far apart in 
thinking and in goals.”11  
Compelled by the absence of “bureaucratic entanglements,” the “stimulation of a 
thoroughly congenial interdisciplinary group,” and the superiority of the group’s 
educational model, Rogers left Wisconsin for WBSI in 1964.12 Among his senior 
colleagues would be Lawrence Solomon, a humanistic psychologist who insisted on the 
necessity of upholding the intellectual standards of humanistic psychology, and Sigmund 
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Koch, who had developed his famous critique of mainstream psychology while executing 
the US government’s assessment of psychology’s first fifty years.13 
In addition to offering exceptional peer support, WBSI provided a hospitable 
environment for innovation and creativity in research, and thus for the execution of truly 
humanistic science. In a letter to his friends in 1963, Rogers wrote of WBSI, “It offers the 
complete and untrammeled freedom for creative thought of which every scholar dreams. I 
will have no obligation except to be a creative contributor to a new, congenial, pioneering 
organization.”14 WBSI director Richard Farson wrote that WBSI’s “independence 
enabled it to avoid the limiting effects of the politics of knowledge that dominate 
establishment institutions, often closing down the investigation of unconventional 
thinking.”15 Independent research institutes also freed researchers from rigid expectations 
about consistent and measured contributions to their fields. Farson wrote that even 
beyond the impossibility of exercising “groundbreaking creativity” within universities, 
the sheer size of universities was a major impediment to the production of novel theory, 
as “scale is the enemy of innovation.”16 Rogers agreed and explained to his friends that 
“this new emphasis in psychology—a humanistic, person-centered trend—has not had a 
chance to flower in University departments.”17 
In spite of the significant advantages of affiliation with independent research 
institutes like WBSI, however, the disadvantages were also numerous. The biggest 
problem was that they further estranged innovative thought from mainstream academia, 
thus reducing its ability to affect meaningful change in the field. The maintenance of 
university affiliation at least kept humanistic psychologists balanced, requiring that they 
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attempt to affect change from within the system (the key to the influence of scholars like 
William James and Gordon Allport).18  
Private research institutes also gave license to researchers to disregard even the 
more valid constraints of academic psychology. Without institutionally imposed 
standards for the content and methodology of scientific experimentation, researchers took 
more liberties. Some went to extremes in this regard. Stanley Krippner, for example, was 
compelled by the powerful pull of the experiential, transcendental and transpersonal. 
Krippner, who had earned his PhD from Northwestern in 1961 and taught and directed a 
child study center at Kent State for several years, transferred to the Maimonides Medical 
Center Dream Laboratory in 1964.19  He soon located himself on the outskirts even of 
humanistic psychology, pursuing investigations of parapsychology and telepathy.20 
ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM 
The rise of private institutions willing to fund humanistic psychologists was, in 
large part, evidence of the widespread cultural interest in the theory of humanistic 
psychology and in experiential applications of the theory. But, the movement’s popularity 
tended to gloss over the complexity of its flaws. The shrewdest and most piercing 
criticisms of humanistic psychology came, not from academic psychologists or media 
representatives, but from humanistic psychologists themselves. Keenly aware of the 
contradictions within the movement and of the ways in which it had strayed from the 
original goals of its founders, many humanistic psychologists waged an ideological battle 
to remain loyal to the movement that, even in diminished form, best aligned with their 
intellectual and personal interests.21 
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Although most dissatisfaction with humanistic psychology developed after the 
human potential movement obscured its more intellectual emphases, several scholars 
harbored reservations about humanistic psychology from the movement’s inception. 
Henry Murray shared ideological ground with humanistic psychology, but also 
experienced marked disappointment with its early development.22 He was particularly 
disturbed by the proceedings of the 1964 AHP conference at Wesleyan University. 
Murray certainly respected figures like Maslow, May and Rogers, but found the self-
proclaimed ‘third force’ in psychology “at once strident and confused.” Murray’s concern 
over the movement’s ambiguity reflected his own questions as to humanistic 
psychology’s potential to affect meaningful change within mainstream psychology, and 
as to his own ability to contribute meaningfully to the movement. For one, he found its 
guiding vision and dimensions difficult to articulate. For this reason, he determined his 
own contributions to the 1964 conference unworthy of publication.23 
Murray’s early conflicts about the viability of humanistic psychology were the 
exception, and most humanistic psychologists displayed an unqualified enthusiasm 
during the early phases of the movement’s development.24 By the early 1970s, however, 
many humanistic psychologists agreed with Murray. At the height of the human potential 
movement, with which humanistic psychologists were intimately entwined, few could 
disagree that humanistic psychology lacked pragmatic, scholarly bases. Whether this 
foundation had always been tenuous, as Murray suggests, or whether it had eroded in the 
strong current of enthusiasm for experiential exploration, the association’s annual 
meetings and journal publications reflected the emphasis they had come to place on 
experiential technique. Representative article titles, for example, in the early 1970s 
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included Identity Formation within Groups, The Image of Man Implicit in Encounter 
Group Theory, and Encountering Encounter Groups.25 
 In his remarks to the Association of Humanistic Psychology in 1981, Rollo May 
rued the fact that the organization was “formed by scholars,” but “taken over by 
hippies.”26 Like California, he suggested, the land where humanistic psychology had 
come of age and the font of endless idealistic revolutionary energy, humanistic 
psychology was “full of illusions” and in flight from reality.27  
Many humanistic psychology scholars, including some who saw significant value 
in encounter, had tried to prevent the subversion of the scholarly work of humanistic 
psychology by the experiential work of encounter. Maslow, for example, who died 
suddenly of a heart attack on June 8, 1970, had often reflected on the necessity of 
balancing experiential elements with good theory and experimental researches.28 But, 
fifteen years into the movement, scholars still pleaded for attention to the movement’s 
serious goals. “So far,” wrote Richard Farson in 1978, “most of us simply haven’t done 
the hard work of making a humanistic psychology.”29 With regret, he asserted that, 
“Humanism as a psychology does not compare to behaviorism in scale, scholarship, or 
scientific discipline.”30  
Farson, in a letter to fellow members of AHP, also asked whether AHP wanted to 
be a “cult” or an association (of shared interests, values and beliefs). Humanistic 
psychology’s “bad science,” Farson argued, had made it cultish, as had its “tendency to 
reduce concepts to jargon,” its lack of intellectual dialogue, its “smugness about the 
superiority of [its] group beliefs,” and its unwillingness to consider conflicting 
                                                
25 Cumulative Contents, 1961-1990, Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 70-112; titles from  79-81. 
Encounter groups were by no means the sole, or even dominant, focus of JHP articles in the early 1970s. I 
emphasize them only to convey JHP’s increasing interest in the topic.  
26 Rollo May, “Remarks to AHP,” January 29, 1981 (May Papers, HPA Mss 46, Box 155: 8, Speeches for 
H. Psych-My Speeches to AHP, Humanistic Psychology Archives).  
27 Ibid. 
28 Maslow, August 30, 1962, Journals Vol. 1, 189-190. 
29 Farson, “Technology of Humanism,” 6. 
30 Ibid., 5. 
226 
evidence.31 Rollo May corroborated this criticism, noting that “an aura of self-
righteousness hangs over our movement.” Its very language, he observed, was replete 
with words that, in compensation for the movement’s relative powerlessness, projected 
an overly strong sense of personal power (he took, for example, the basic term “self-
actualization”).32 The pervasive adoption of the group language fueled the cultish 
tendencies of the movement, producing a chorus of agreement, in which members 
uncritically touted the humanistic message. Conflict was construed as “unproductive” and 
“un-humanistic.”33  
The Journal of Humanistic Psychology, intended to be the intellectual bedrock of 
the movement, was perceived by many to reflect the same shortcomings as the larger 
movement–an inattentiveness to science, an uncritical air of self-promotion, and an 
espousal of overly simplistic solutions. AHP member and Harvard business school 
professor Tony Athos, in conversation with Rollo May, described the Journal of 
Humanistic Psychology as “intellectually fly weight,” and identified the “tendency in our 
group not to want to think too hard.”34  
In 1971, Rollo May had articulated his sense that AHP seemed to be turning into a 
“circus.” May cited the sensationalist bent of the meeting titles at the AHP convention as 
evidence of the trivialization of the movement’s larger concerns. May argued that the title 
“Childbirth for the Joy of It” reflected a “general aura of irresponsibility that ran through 
the whole program,” and ignored the pressing issue of overpopulation while carelessly 
treating babies as “playthings.” The title “Should a Therapist Go to Bed with His 
Patient?” which was predictably picked up by The New York Times, engendered 
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impressions of the movement that had “practically nothing to do with humanistic 
psychology.” He invoked the phrase Erik Erikson had used in reference to hippies: “They 
play with symbols that people die for.”35 
In addition to condemning the “huckster” titles, May feared that humanistic 
psychologists had gone too far in opposing the nature of academic psychology. May 
argued that humanistic psychology’s antagonism toward APA had endangered the 
“humanistic” basis of humanistic psychology. “Our tendency in our reaction against APA 
has been an anti-intellectual one and we have tended to leave out the thinking, reflecting, 
historical man and put in only the feeling, touching man in the ‘now’.”36 
LACK OF BALANCE 
The valorization of experience at the expense of intellect resulted from the 
unchecked enthusiasm and passionate protest spirit of most humanistic psychologists. 
Charged by the 1960s ethos of rebellion and intoxicated by the freedom they gained by 
departing from mainstream psychology, humanistic psychologists disavowed pragmatic 
methodology.37 One historian referred to the massive “inductive leaps” of associated 
theorists as partially responsible for the movement’s shortcomings. Too often, he argued, 
humanistic psychologists began with a theoretical premise and jumped to an application 
of it, without being able to answer for the steps in between.38 George Leonard offered a 
prime example of this type of leap. After the first successful black-white encounter 
group, he moved facilely to the notion that bringing the groups to the White House would 
revolutionize America.39  
Many humanistic psychologists ended up looking more like unthinking zealots 
than like intellectuals. Their evangelistic promotion of encounter groups was responsible 
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for much of this sense of zealotry. “Like the behaviorists of the sixties,” wrote Farson, 
“we have become obsessed with our new technology, which, to my mind, fragments 
people as much as do the approaches of those whom we criticized.”40 Although encounter 
groups could be a beneficial component of individual experience and the process of 
change, promoters treated them like a panacea. Sole emphasis on encounter was 
reductionistic, not holistic, betraying the purposes that humanistic psychologists had 
theoretically articulated. Farson wrote: “In the final analysis, we humanists and 
behaviorists seem to have the same enemies: Utopian zealotry, obsession with 
technology, the need to reform people, ideologically bound narrowness, feelings of self-
importance, the arrogance of insecurity, linearity of thought, a tendency toward 
reductionism, desperate responses to impotence, and fundamentally, the self-deception 
made necessary by the discrepancy between our theories and our lives.”41 
Encounter groups had other liabilities, as well. The emotional drama that the 
groups contained tended to be addictive, further perpetuating participants’ lack of 
balance. “There were a bunch of people at Esalen and other places who really thought if 
we turned the screw a little more, if tears really showed that we were experiencing 
something deep, then vomiting or screaming would be even better.”42 Even participants 
who were by nature pragmatic and intelligent willingly scrapped their logic in favor of 
the powerful subjective experience of epiphany.  
Identifying the one-sidedness of the encounter group movement’s emphasis on 
“sensationalism and excitements,” one critic expressed concern that the movement was 
unwittingly opiating the masses and maintaining the status quo. The escapist nature of 
episodic seminars lacked both an integrative quality that would carry over to real life, he 
argued, and a value orientation that included a sense of social purpose and context.43  
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By exalting all forms of experience and “revelation” equally, humanistic 
psychologists were unable to differentiate and evaluate types of sensations, feelings and 
interpersonal practices. “It is here the encounter movement reveals its affective 
promiscuity and valuative limbo-or possibly nihilism,” wrote humanistic psychologist 
Bernard Rosenthal, who was then a professor at the Illinois Institute of Technology, “For 
it is ready for all experience, all states of being, and all explorations of sensation.”44  
Where founding humanistic psychologists had envisioned growth, expanding 
awareness and self-actualization as life-long processes, encounter groups implicitly 
endorsed a briefer, cheaper, and more revelatory type of enlightenment.45 Rosenthal 
identified the “brief diet of uninhibitedness” that encounter groups provided and the 
paradigm of epiphany that was unlikely to result in enduring change. In much the same 
way that drugs offered a transitory sense of enlightenment and transcendence, encounter 
groups offered an unintegrated intensity that was largely incapable of impacting an 
individual’s daily sense of health.46 
SELF-ABSORPTION 
At their worst, encounter groups tapped into the more poisonous strains of 
American individualism, encouraging a narcissistic self-focus to the exclusion of social 
and political concerns. Unfortunately, humanistic psychologists did little to push back 
against this tendency. Often they were complicit in perpetuating it. “Early in the euphoric 
year of 1966, at my first Esalen seminar,” wrote George Leonard, “I had made a 
statement that now haunted me, ‘Fuck history’.” The audience “exploded with approving 
laughter” and the sound bite was repeatedly played on public radio. “If that cry was taken 
as simply a warning against inertia in the face of precedent, it might have had some merit. 
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But to the extent that it would be taken as permission to ignore the lessons of the past, it 
had to rank among the dumbest things I had ever said.”47  
The media’s obsession with Leonard’s comment spoke to the allegation that the 
movement lacked political awareness. According to Rosenthal, “The concern with feeling 
for itself without reference to purpose, direction, values enhanced, public policy 
sustained, social organizations supported, way of life abetted, and image of man 
subserved is one of the characteristics of this movement.”48 
Worse than the contention that humanistic psychologists failed to prioritize social 
issues, however, was the charge that the theory of humanistic psychology actually fueled 
political inaction. Specifically targeting the human potential movement, critics argued 
that the personal epiphanies attained through encounter groups placated individuals and 
allowed them to maintain the status quo.49 “By diverting the desperation and resentment 
engendered by the prevailing socio-cultural system to innocuous transient satisfactions,” 
wrote one critic, the human potential movement “has prevented the confrontation and 
attack on the very issues that have spurred dehumanization [...] By encouraging 
temporary self-actualization at episodic seminars and on weekends, it has artificially and 
falsely transformed the humanistic impulse and value-orientation into a non-authentic 
process in a closed-chamber environment and thus given a rather illusory view of its 
nature and power.50  
ATTEMPTS TO REVITALIZE HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY 
Faced with an expanding sense of dissatisfaction and disorder, humanistic 
psychologists increasingly felt the need to get their own house in order before they could 
consider the larger problems facing American psychology or American culture. 
Movement leaders, like Rollo May, had at various points indulged their frustration with 
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AHP’s “anti-intellectualism,” resigning from the movement “in protest.”51 Even Maslow, 
who didn’t live to witness the increasingly experiential focus of AHP in the 1970s, had 
foreseen the potentially destructive direction of the movement. In 1969 he wrote, “This is 
starting to get all confused. Just the way I am these days about 3rd Force psychology, 
Esalen, et. al.—conflicted.”52  
Unfortunately, advocates for the maintenance, or re-invigoration, of 
intellectualism in AHP were underwhelmed by the response to their pleas. In an undated 
letter from Richard Farson to members of AHP, Farson warned that the issues that caused 
many members of AHP to leave still had not been “sufficiently aired.” Like May, Farson 
pointed to the anti-humanistic practice of evading complexity, arguing that conflict and 
self-criticism and self-examination were critical to the productive and healthy evolution 
of an organization. In the spirit of the interdisciplinary views that had produced 
humanistic psychology, he advocated broadening the AHP to encompass questions of 
political action and social change.53 
Farson contended that the most pressing problem facing AHP was its association 
with counter-cultural revolution. “Is AHP to be, as its name implies,” he asked, “an 
Association for Humanistic psychology, devoted to the open-minded yet clear-thinking 
exploration of the nature of human existence and the possibilities of human growth, or is 
it to be an association dedicated to promulgating the faith that a certain kind of large-
scale change is now taking place (or is about to take place) in American society and/or 
the world?” For Farson, answering in favor of the former was the only way to distinguish 
AHP from a “cult.”54 
Farson further argued for the necessity and productive potential of internal 
conflict. He implied that the association should be conceived in much the same way that 
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humanistic psychology conceived of individuals. In order to reinvigorate the movement, 
it was necessary for humanistic psychology members to openly voice and debate their 
concerns about AHP, seeking new directions and heightening understanding.55  
Other members of AHP acknowledged the validity of May and Farson’s criticism 
and, in response, organized a theory conference designed to return humanistic 
psychology to its intellectual roots and to promulgate theory that would propel the 
organization in healthy directions. The conference had the additional conciliatory effect 
of reuniting estranged humanistic psychology drop-outs, like Rollo May and Henry 
Murray, whose membership was contingent upon a more serious consideration of the 
association’s theoretical underpinnings.56 
THE AHP THEORY CONFERENCE OF 1975 
On April 4th to 6th, 1975, twenty-four AHP members assembled in Tucson, 
Arizona for the AHP theory conference.57 Each participant submitted a position paper in 
which they focused on their specific concerns about AHP. Position paper titles included 
UC Santa Cruz social psychologist Brewster Smith’s “Prefaces to a Discussion of 
Humanism and Science in Humanistic Psychology” and humanistic psychology textbook 
author Melanie Allen’s “Keeping the System Open.”58 Most participants echoed Farson’s 
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concern about the necessity of reinvigorating humanistic psychology’s investment in 
scientific exploration and voiced their dismay over the current state of imbalance between 
experiential and theoretical emphases. 59  
Brewster Smith’s comments represented a common sentiment. He wrote, “I feel 
close affinity with some of the founders of AHP. But I am also put off by much, both 
theoretical and practical, that goes on in the name of humanistic psychology. As a 
psychologist, I continue to identify with the goals of scientific psychology that ask for 
evidence, and I hope to contribute toward a cumulative, self-corrective discipline that, 
insofar as it participates in the social process of science, also has reason to believe that it 
can take advantage of the last legitimate refuge of Progress.”60  
Charles Hampden-Turner, who had been the president of AHP in 1974 and who 
was then engaged in research on the application of social science to human rights as a 
fellow at the Wright Institute in Berkeley, likened the negotiation of the scientific and the 
experiential to “Sailing Between Scylla and Charybdis.” “In the strenuousness of our 
objections,” he wrote, “we have rushed pell mell to the opposite ends of each polarity to 
try and build a systematic theory out of feelings, ambiguity, openness, softness, depth and 
involvement, etc.”61  
The humanistic psychology that participants reenvisioned included a 
“systematization of subjective experience,” an “open, participating inquiry,” a moral, 
value-directed inquiry, and a unified view of human experience that would balance 
subjective and objective inquiry.62 “I prefer not to call what we seek a new subjectivity,” 
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May explained, “for that puts us in the same old dilemma. We make the same mistake 
then that the people who are devoted to objectivity make, except we use the opposite 
word. We need to find a dimension in the human being below pure subjectivity and pure 
objectivity.63  
For May, the need to address the theoretical shortcomings of the movement 
preceded the need to strengthen the movement’s scientific bases. He opened the 
conference with some remarks on AHP’s history and the origins of the gathering, 
highlighting the fact that humanistic psychology had begun as a protest against 
behaviorism and psychoanalysis. Even in the face of rapid growth, however, humanistic 
psychology persisted almost singularly as a protest movement, making its lack of 
substance increasingly evident. “But if humanistic psychology is only a protest,” said 
May,  “we can be sure that its demise will be assured.” In order to redeem its value, May 
felt, humanistic psychology needed to stand on its own, advancing valuable theory and 
research that was sensitive to the complexity and holism of human experience. 64 
May had become so dismayed by humanistic psychology’s inadequacies that he 
had left the organization for several years. He justified this break from AHP in terms of 
his discomfort with the “predominantly emotional and body therapy,” which he found 
essentially anti-intellectual. He also likened himself to Henry Murray, who had dropped 
out of the movement due to its characteristic anti-intellectualism. Yet May’s time away 
from the movement convinced him of the necessity of humanistic psychology’s 
existence: “if we didn’t have such an organization called humanistic psychology, it would 
be necessary that we found one and call it the same name.” Thus May excused 
humanistic psychology for the awkwardness of its infancy and adolescence, and returned 
determined to work toward an “adequate theory.”65  
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May maintained that there were invaluable components of humanistic psychology 
that needed to be preserved and fostered. Humanistic psychology was, he felt, in tune 
with what people valued: how to live, how to make love, how to get along with people—
concepts that were “simply thrown to the wolves by modern, academic psychology.”66 
An appropriate theory would, he believed, represent a balance between the principles of 
science and the human problems of living. He criticized humanistic psychologists who 
privileged subjectivity over scientific principles, arguing that they were no better than 
modern academic psychologists who were singularly devoted to objectivity.67  
Others expressed their concern over what Floyd Matson, professor of American 
Studies at the University of Hawaii and author of several books relating American culture 
and politics to humanistic psychology, identified as the perception of  humanistic 
psychology’s “social irrelevance” and sought to distance the movement from the human 
potential movement, recognizing the threatening elements of the conflation. “Humanistic 
psychology has long been afflicted with the stigma of hedonistic self-indulgence, the 
image of social irrelevance,” argued Matson. “No doubt this labeling has been grossly 
unfair—a plain case of mistaken identity resulting from the popular equation of 
humanistic psychology with the amorphous ‘human potential movement’.”68 
The conference itself suffered from the weaknesses it was convened to address. “I 
don’t like psychoanalysis any better than this gathering does, but it does have some blood 
in it,” said Gregory Bateson, “and I feel that this gathering is losing blood.”69 Concerns 
about increasing the depth and complexity of humanistic inquiry were repeatedly met 
with the question, “but how do you feel?” 70 
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Tony Athos observed that too often the “beautiful questions,” those that required 
deeper probing, were responded to with a “crummy useful answer.” By responding too 
quickly and using the language of humanistic psychology formulaically, “you lose 
something marvelous in the question, so that you just leap from insight to action and 
technique, and we don’t accumulate anything, refine our actions, or improve our 
techniques. We skip what reason can give us because of what it appears to take away 
from our vision and insights.” May whole-heartedly agreed, recapitulating Athos’ 
question as “Why does the answer impoverish the problem? And I think it is because we 
never push our answer deep enough.”71 
Certain members did take the opportunity afforded by the theory conference to 
wrangle over the deeper questions of humanistic psychology that had grown increasingly 
pale.  May and Rogers took up the issue that had long bifurcated them: the question of 
whether it was reasonable to assume that individuals were inherently good and inherently 
motivated toward positive growth. “This is why I’m very concerned about our tendency 
to break our arms patting ourselves on the back, saying we are self-actualized, we are 
happy, we are people of peak experiences,” said May. “With all due respect to a man I 
love very much, namely Maslow, I don’t think self-actualization is in our bones[…] We 
will come out of our fox holes shooting. All of these aspects of life which are horrifying 
we cannot put aside.”72 
Others recognized the arbitrary nature of presuming man’s inherent goodness, 
advocating the assumption nonetheless. Brewster Smith defended humanistic 
psychology’s assumption of man’s goodness, “Well, my starting point would really be 
with Nietzsche,” he explained, “who said, ‘Man is not either good nor evil, but we will 
make man good.’ He is expressing a positive commitment to make man good.”73 Carl 
Rogers corroborated this view, “when Rollo thinks I have held ‘man is by nature good,’” 
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he said, “I don’t think I have ever said that; I certainly haven’t said it in the last 10 or 15 
years. What I’ve tried to say is that when a certain definable psychological climate is 
provided, the person tends to move in the direction of becoming a socially constructive 
organism.”74  
Reactions to the success of the theory conference were mixed. Carl Rogers 
expressed his regrets about the theory conference to the attendees in a memo entitled 
“RE: A Disappointment.” “In the wholly intellectual directions we took,” he wrote, “we 
could not have been sharply distinguished from traditional psychologists. So we made 
‘progress,’ instead of making progress.”75 He regretted perpetuating the intellectual focus 
and wished they had devoted more time to the feelings of the participants.   
Most participants either disagreed with Rogers’ comments or qualifiedly 
acknowledged them, still recognizing the necessity of what had transpired at the 
conference. Tony Athos disagreed outright with Rogers’ criticism, while Fred Massarik 
agreed that “there was no time for the wide range of experiencing which goes beyond 
intellect,” while arguing that there had been an inevitable need for choice and focus in the 
face of limited time. 76 
Richard Farson, who had played the roles of Rogers’ student, research assistant, 
and boss, regarded the anti-intellectual comments of Rogers, in retrospect, with 
perplexity and frustration. “I don’t know why he did that,” Farson claimed, “He was very 
interested in systematic personality theory.” Farson remembers a discussion he had 
moderated between Gregory Bateson, well-known anthropologist and committed 
humanistic psychologist, and Rogers. Bateson, who was a “real intellectual 
heavyweight,” participated in what became a theoretical debate, until Rogers cut it off at 
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the pass, suggesting that Bateson talk about his feelings. Farson remembers the 
embarrassment he felt over Rogers’ comment, ashamed that he would bow out of the real 
intellectual course that the discussion was taking. For Farson, the event represented a 
latent anti-intellectual streak in Rogers, as well as Rogers’ relative inability to learn from 
his colleagues, including Rollo May, who was also an “intellectual heavyweight,” and 
whom Farson perceived to be ahead of Rogers in many respects. “Rogers always learned 
a lot from his students,” explains Farson, but often struggled with his colleagues.77   
Farson’s awareness of Rogers’ weaknesses existed beside his enormous amount 
of respect for him. In characterizing, and complementing, him, Farson wrote, “It is 
Rogers’ style to let go of ideas, to share them, to avoid ownership, to prevent them from 
becoming dogmatized and identified solely with him.”78 One consequence of this 
perspective, and of Rogers’ general anti-authoritarian orientation, was that people 
continued to take his ideas in directions he hadn’t intended. Farson explained that 
“Rogers’ work has been corrupted over the years by practitioners who have discovered 
the technique but not the philosophy.”79 
THE EXTREMES OF AHP 
Just as the disruptive and sensationalistic styles of Esalen leaders like Perls and 
Schutz diluted the more gentle influences of leaders like Carl Rogers, fad therapies like 
the Erhard Seminar Training (est) overshadowed more reasonable approaches that better 
represented the interests of the organization.80 Est, conceived of and performed by 
Werner Erhard, distorted the original “humanistic” conceptions of group work in favor of 
group indoctrination, replete with bullying and insults waged by the seminar leader.81  
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Erhard attached himself to humanistic psychology, where he found a wealth of 
participants eager for transformation and several leaders whose ethic of toleration 
prevented his exclusion. In August of 1975, Erhard appeared at the best-attended annual 
convention in AHP’s history (there were approximately 2,500 participants) in Estes Park, 
Colorado. For many, including hungry journalists, Erhard’s presence represented AHP’s 
implicit endorsement of his methods. But Rollo May spoke out publicly against Erhard’s 
methods, calling them “anti-humanistic” and asking why he had even been invited. 
George Leonard and others only politely tried to distance themselves from the “Henry 
Ford of Human Potential.” “We certainly don’t endorse ‘est’ by having him here,” 
remarked Leonard.82 
A typical “est” experience involved systematic demoralization and aggressive 
behavioral reconditioning.  Participants typically paid $250 for the training, and spent 15 
hours over the course of two weekends in a large auditorium (with as many as 250 
participants).83 The goal for participants was to “dismantle” their value systems, belief 
structures, and notions of right and wrong and good and evil that had “been screwing up 
[their] lives over all these years.” But what the sessions generally amounted to was the 
experience of being condescended to, ordered around, and assaulted with obscenities. 
According to Peter Marin, who reported on human potential techniques for Harper’s, 
“[est] is a mixture of ideas and techniques borrowed from the behavioral sciences, 
Eastern Philosophy, the traditional American classroom, Marine boot camp and modern 
brainwashing methods.”84 To another journalist, Erhard’s methods appeared, “to be little 
more than scientology without the tin-cans and all the sci-fi horseshit that Hubbard 
indulges in.”85 In comparison to the cultishness of “est”, the journalist found encounter 
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groups to be harmless. He wrote, “they had a kind of innocence to them. They were at 
their worst merely boring or silly.”86 
But participants at Estes Park didn’t stop at encounter groups. In the course of the 
conference, a group of humanistic psychologists that included Stanley Krippner ascended 
a nearby mountain top at sunrise to attempt telepathic communication with a group of 
researchers in Bogota, Columbia. They built a fire, gathered in a circle, and attempted to 
first connect mentally with one another, then with the earth, and, finally, with the group 
in Bogota through their connection with the earth. They each threw a coin from the I 
Ching into the circle to transmit a message to Bogota, which was then interpreted by the 
Bogota researchers using their own I Ching.87 
In spite of these unorthodox practices, Mountain Gazette reporter Mike Moore 
wrote that, though he had attended the conference “with a fistful of prejudgments, 
hellbent on writing a frolicsome satire” and expecting to be “touched, felt, or laid,” he 
instead spent the week in intellectual reverie. He described Rollo May’s talk on personal 
mythology as having made “Jung and Spengler and even Kierkegaard come alive and 
dance.”88 Moore’s experience demonstrated the complicated relationship between the 
intellectual and experiential elements of AHP, one that was tenable only as long as the 
American public maintained an interest in its diverse perspectives and practices. 
DECLINING PARTICIPATION IN AHP 
The excitement of the Estes Park conference marked the peak of cultural and 
professional interest in the Association of Humanistic Psychology. After 1975, AHP 
participation began to decline. In 1976 and 1977, the annual conference attracted about 
2000 participants (down from 2500 in 1975), then 1600 in 1978, 1700 in 1979. Then in 
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1980, the year of Ronald Reagan’s election, 1000 participants attended.89 Explaining the 
comparable decline of interest in Division 32, humanistic psychologists Christopher M. 
Aanstoos, Ilene Serlin and Tom Greening  blamed the “new socio-cultural conservatism” 
of the Reagan era, “for which the term ‘humanistic’ meant something sinister.”90 They 
also recognized the diminishment of “lay interest” in the organization, which returned the 
organization to an association of professionals.91 
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Chapter Eleven: The Residue of Humanistic Psychology 
 
In 1985, a journalist for The New York Times wrote that although, “in its heyday, 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Esalen was a cultural landmark, the point at the 
continent’s edge from which a stream of new ideas and methods emanated … the 
encounter group movement, for which Esalen was a mecca, is moribund today.”1 The 
author described the “graying” Esalen of the 1980s as faced with the possibility of a 
“lasting irrelevance.” Most growth centers modeled on Esalen, of which there were over 
a hundred at the Movement’s peak, had closed, and a mere decade later there were no 
more than a handful.2 The terms “human potential movement” and “humanistic 
psychology” also receded from popular magazines and newspapers. 
Aware of declining cultural interest, Esalen attempted to broaden its significance 
in the 1980s through a renewed intellectual seriousness and a series of programs and 
exchanges that were “more scholarly and more socially aware.”3 As of 1985, Esalen 
offered 500 seminars per year, drawing about 4,000 total participants.4 Michael Murphy, 
described in a 1995 New York Times article as a “somewhat marginalized figure in a 
movement hungry for charismatic leaders and best-selling authors,” remained vital and 
continued to refine Esalen’s program, to publish on human potential, and to advance new 
theories.5  
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Humanistic psychology pressed on, as well. Although conference attendance 
declined and humanistic psychology courses became scarce, hundreds of practitioners 
continued to define themselves as “humanistic psychologists,” defending the significance 
and enduring relevance of their theory and principles. As of 2008, humanistic psychology 
still boasts an active association (with frequent, if not annual, conferences), and Division 
32 maintains an energetic list serve.6   
The work of humanistic psychologists has continued outside of the spotlight. 
Employed almost exclusively by private institutes, most notably the Saybrook Institute 
(which was founded in 1970 by AHP as the Humanistic Psychology Institute, but later 
changed its name to heighten its mainstream appeal), humanistic psychologists expanded 
their interests and advanced their theory in the 1980s.7 Chief among the emergent 
interests of members was the study of spiritual and mystical states of consciousness, 
which was dubbed “transpersonal” psychology.8  
In numerous ways, both the humanistic psychology and human potential 
movements were enduringly, though subtly, successful. Humanistic psychology has 
succeeded through the very process that rendered it culturally insignificant, the process of 
absorption into the mainstream. The greatest testaments to humanistic psychology’s 
enduring significance are the ways in which American mental health professionals have 
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adopted the leading concepts of prominent humanistic psychologists; the way that 
mainstream psychological theory has subtly replicated its values and reproduced its 
goals; and the way that the American vernacular has integrated its language and ideas. 9 
THE MENTAL HEALTH FIELDS’ INCORPORATION OF  HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY’S 
THEORY 
Humanistic psychology’s influence on mental health practice has been 
considerable. The client-centered approach (now referred to as person-centered 
counseling), for example, has come to dominate psychotherapy, social work interventions 
and pastoral counseling.10 Contemporary therapeutic interventions tend to be non-
directive, privileging the meaningful subjective input from “clients” and relying on their 
active involvement in the counseling process. They also reflect strains of Carl Rogers’ 
theories of empathic understanding, present-orientation, and self-direction.11 
In addition, a personalized and humanized concept of professionalism has come to 
define modern therapeutic interactions. Grounded in humanistic psychologists’ view of 
patients as fully human participants in the therapeutic process, this approach has 
supplanted concepts of professionalism from psychoanalysts and behaviorists that relied 
heavily on hierarchical distinctions, experimental control, and notions of a value-free, 
objective science in their interactions with patients and study participants.12  
In terms of specific influence, Rogers’ client-centered theory is most often 
credited for having had tremendous influence over the style and content of social work 
interventions. This theory has been seminal in the establishment of the “core conditions” 
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of effective social work practice, which include empathy, warmth, and genuineness on 
the part of the therapist.13 His theory and approach have informed everything from the 
standard social work interview, intended to establish an effective therapeutic relationship 
based on affirmation of the client’s worth and dignity, to the content of longer-term 
interventions, which regards as their cornerstone the therapist’s continued encouragement 
of and positive regard for the client.14  
Rogers’ theory also made an indelible mark on pastoral counseling. In a turn from 
moralism and in opposition to mass culture, pastoral theologians have adopted a Rogerian 
“ethic of self-realization which defined growth as the primary ethical good,” elevating 
individual growth over competing priorities.15 Rogers’ 1942 publication of Counseling 
and Psychotherapy became a standard text in theological seminaries, and his techniques 
proved a staple in seminary training, effective even in a brief introductory format.16 
While Rogers may have had a greater impact on the mental health fields than his 
fellow founders of the movement, he was certainly not the only humanistic 
psychologypsychologist to provoke theoretical change in therapeutic realms. Maslow’s 
theory, for example, has encouraged psychologists to consider the positive aspects of 
human nature, as evidenced in the strengths and health of clients. George Leonard wrote, 
“Abraham Maslow has done more to change our view of human nature and human 
possibilities than has any other American psychologist of the past fifty years. His 
influence, both direct and indirect, continues to grow, especially in the fields of health, 
                                                
13 R. R. Greene, “The social work interview: Legacy of Carl Rogers and Sigmund Freud,” In Greene, R. R., 
Ed., Human Behavior Theory: A Diversity Framework, ed. R.R. Greene (New York: Aldine De Gruyler, 
1994), 40-41. 
14 Ibid., 37-47. 
15 Holifield, Pastoral Counselingare, 277. 
16 Ibid., 295-299.; LeRoy Aden, “On Carl Rogers’ Becoming,” Theology Today Vol. 36, No. 4 January 
(1980), http://theologytoday.ptsem.edu/jan1980/v36-4-criticscorner2.htm. 
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education, and management theory, and in the personal and social lives of millions of 
Americans.”17  
Rollo May’s theory has also been widely applied within counseling. Considered 
to be the “Father of American Existential Psychology,” May attuned psychotherapists and 
lay readers to the productive value of anxiety and conflict.18 This orientation was most 
visibly adopted in the encounter group movement, which encouraged an individual’s raw 
confrontation with her fears and conflicts, and in the movement’s remnants in individual 
psychotherapy. May’s ideas have also had a strong impact on the practice of psychology. 
In particular, his exploration of empathy in The Art of Counseling directed 
psychotherapists and pastors towards the idea. 19 Also, his consideration of the social 
responsibility of the therapist, as expressed in 1978 in Psychology and the Human 
Dilemma, influences psychologists to reconsider their role in the cultural problems of 
their time, by instigating a dialogue that persists to the present.20  
In addition to informing a contemporary conceptualization of counseling, the 
techniques of humanistic psychology laid a foundation for individual practices outside of 
the psychotherapeutic realm. Body work, like yoga and meditation, for example, has its 
roots in the holistic approaches of humanistic psychology and the Human Potential 
Movement.21  Built in part on the Rogerian ideas of “organismic wholeness” and the 
                                                
17 Leonard, Walking on the Edge, 326.  
18 James F. T. Bugental, “Rollo May (1909-1994),” American Psychologist, Vol. 51, No.4 (1996): 418.  
19 Holifield, Pastoral Counselingare, 297; May’s ideas of empathy were most clearly articulated in Rollo 
May, The Art of Counseling (Nashville : Abington Press, 1939).  
20 Rollo May, Psychology and the Human Dilemma, x. For a more contemporary exploration of the 
problems May considers, see James Hillman and Michael Ventura, We’ve Had a Hundred Years of 
Psychotherapy and the World Keeps Getting Worse (New York: Harper Collins, 1993). 
21Eugene I. Taylor and Frederick Martin, “Humanistic Psychology at the Crossroads, “The Handbook of 
Humanistic Psychology: Leading Edges in Theory, Research and Practice, eds. Kirk J. Schneider, James F. 
T. Bugental and J. Fraser Pierson (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2001), 23. Taylor and Martin 
argued that when humanistic psychology was “absorbed into the psychotherapeutic counterculture,” it 
“fractionated” into 3 unintegrated streams, all of which existed outside of academia. These included 
mediation and altered states of consciousness (which became transpersonal psychology); body work and 
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Maslowian idea of self-actualization, these practices incorporate mind, body, and spirit in 
the service of healing. In valuing an active therapeutic process, emotional integration and 
self-awareness, body work has also integrated the guiding principles of active 
participation, transcendence, and present-orientation.22 
Many of humanistic psychology’s principles and techniques blended seamlessly 
with dominant American practice. As historian Christopher Lasch wrote of Carl Rogers 
specifically, his “approach to therapy […] was ‘as American as apple pie,’” citing 
specifically the ways it tapped into American ideas of free will, human perfectibility and 
rational control.23   
OUTGROWTHS WITHIN PSYCHOLOGY 
The emergence of positive psychology, a field that emerged in 1998 and quickly 
gained adherents in the U.S. and around the world, may be the best evidence of 
humanistic psychology’s enduring academic relevance.24 It’s also, however, a good 
example of the ways in which scholarship based in experimental research has adamantly 
dissociated itself from the Humanistic Psychology Movement.  
Positive psychology, articulated by Martin Seligman and Mihalyi 
Csikszentmihalyi in 2000 as “the study of strength and virtue,” combined the interests of 
                                                                                                                                            
group dynamics (which included the encounter groups and corporate interests); and human science (which 
consisted of political psychology and cultural criticism). The authors attributed this division to Maslow and 
Sutich’s prioritization of the spiritual and their subsequent decision, in 1969 to transfer their loyalties to 
Transpersonal Psychology. 
22 Gordon Wheeler, “Spirit and Shadow,”: Esalen and the Gestalt Model,”; Kripal and Shuck, Edge of the 
Future, 173-174. 
23 Christopher Lasch, The Minimal Self, 211. 
24 James Pawelski, “The Promise of Positive Psychology for the Assessment of Character” The Journal of 
College and Character, Vol. 2 (2OO7), http://www.collegevalues.org/articles.cfm?a=1&id=1141. 
Seligman first described “positive psychology” in his 1998 presidential address to the APA. Martin E.P. 
Seligman, 1998. “The President’s Address,” APA 1998 Annual Report at 
www.positivepsychology.org/aparep98.htm.  
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humanistic psychology and the scientific goals of academic psychology.25 Seeking to 
operationalize virtues, values, and strengths in a way that would allow for their empirical 
identification and measurement, positive psychologists agreed with humanistic 
psychologists’ rejection of a pathology-oriented discipline—which was focused on 
weakness and damage—and following humanistic psychologists in attempting to expand 
psychological study to realms of well-being, contentment, and optimism.26  
The similarities between humanistic psychology and positive psychology are 
numerous. Comparing Seligman to Maslow, one scholar notes the shared desire to “create 
an optimistic psychology, one that sees the human personality as more than just a 
collection of neuroses and tics.”27 In opposition to mainstream psychology’s post-World 
War II focus on pathology, Seligman directed an initiative towards “the empirical study 
of flourishing individuals and thriving communities.”28 Seligman’s theoretical basis for 
such work was strongly reminiscent of Maslow’s contributions. For example, in 
developing a “‘manual of the sanities,’” the Values in Action (VIA) Classification of 
Strengths manual, Seligman, with Christopher Peterson, identified virtuous character 
traits that replicated Maslow’s being values (b-values), and included wisdom, 
transcendence, temperance and justice.29  
Yet despite their extensive similarities, positive psychologists havee 
conspicuously failed to acknowledge the tradition of humanistic psychology that 
preceded it by nearly four decades. In fact, when confronted directly with this apparent 
                                                
25 Martin E. P. Seligman, and Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi. 2000. “Positive Psychology: An Introduction.” In 
American Psychologist 55.1 (2000),): 7. 
26 Martin E. P. Seligman, “Positive Psychology, Positive Prevention, and Positive Therapy,” in Shane J. 
Lopez and C.R. Snyder, eds.  Positive Psychological Assessment: A Handbook of Models and Measures, 
ed. Shane J. Lopez and C.R. Snyder   (Washington, DC : American Psychological Association, 2003), 3.  
27 Milton, Road to Malpsychia, 288.  
28 Pawelski, “The Promise of Positive Psychology.” 
29 Ibid.; Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman, Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and 
Classification (London: Oxford University Press, 2004), positivepsychology.org/taxonomy.htm. 
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debt, positive psychologists have disavowed any connection. Martin Seligman, in 
particular, has distanced his theory from those of the founders of humanistic psychology 
and belittled the movement’s impact. 30  
For Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, an essential component to the program for a 
positive psychology is a commitment to the scientific method, which they presume 
humanistic psychologists to have lacked. In an implicit critique of humanistic 
psychology, Seligman and Csikszentmikhalyi explained that, “in this quest for what is 
best, positive psychology does not rely on wishful thinking, faith, self-deception, fads, or 
hand-waving; it tries to adapt what is best in the scientific method to the unique problems 
that human behavior presents to those who wish to understand it in all its complexity.”31 
Reducing humanistic psychology to its least scholarly elements, Seligman and 
Csikszentmihalyi wrote in 2000 that, “one legacy of the humanism of the 1960s is 
prominently displayed in any large bookstore: Thethe ‘psychology’ section contains at 
least 10 shelves on crystal healing, aromatherapy, and reaching the inner child for every 
selfshelf of books that tries to uphold some scholarly standard.”32 Statements like these 
earned the ire of humanistic psychologists and generated a flood of letters to the 
American Psychologist demanding that the founders of positive psychology acknowledge 
the obvious origins of their ideas in the humanistic psychology movement. One 
respondent wrote, “It was 99.6% pure rejection of their so-called ancestors (even purer 
than Ivory soap!)”33 
Regardless of the justifiable indignation of humanistic psychologists, positive 
psychologists, seeking to forge empirically testable theories within the boundaries of 
                                                
30 Milton, Road to Malpsychia, 288-289. 
31 Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, “Positive Psychology,” 7. 
32 Ibid., 7 
33 Stewart Shapiro, “Illogical Positivism,” American Psychologist, January (2001): 82. 
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scholarly respectability, couldn’t risk being associated with a movement that had become 
disassociated from academic psychology. Tactfully responding to humanistic 
psychologists’ allegations, Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi wrote, “We do not wish […] 
to blur the boundaries completely between the positive psychology we hope to see 
emerge and these worthy traditions. We are, unblushingly, scientists first.”34  
In addition to seeking to evade association with the perception of humanistic 
psychology’s unscientific bases, the founders of positive psychology have tried to 
distance themselves from the movement’s reputation as overly individualistic and 
encouraging of narcissism. Instead, positive psychologists have been pragmatic, 
advocating the inculcation of specific skills to overcome negative thought patterns and to 
act in socially harmonious ways. 35 Positive psychologists have also sought to move 
beyond the study of inner-oriented virtues, extending their study to civic virtues, which 
include altruism, responsibility, nurturance, tolerance, civility, work ethic, and 
moderation.36 
OUTGROWTHS IN SOCIAL WORK 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the proliferation of social work theory that reflected 
themes of self-actualization, striving, and health-seeking suggested the congeniality of 
humanistic psychologists’ theory to the profession. Specific social work approaches that 
incorporated these themes included “solution focused therapy,” a form of brief therapy 
that is thoroughly client-directed and present-focused, and “assets-based community 
development,” a method of identifying and employing a community’s strength to sustain 
                                                
34 Martin E. P. Seligman and Mihaly Cskszentmihalyi, “Reply to Comments,” American Psychologist 56, 
(2001): 89. 
35 Milton, Road to Malpsychia, 289. 
36 Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, “Positive Psychology,” 5. 
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its development37 Another approach, the “strengths” perspective, even more tangibly 
reflects many of the goals of the founders of humanistic psychology. 38 
Based on theoretical and ethical objections to an illness-orientation and the 
hierarchical therapist-client distinctions found in some sectors of the field, the strengths 
perspective construes healing as an innate capability and values the social worker 
primarily as a catalyst in the client’s self-determined change.39 It takes as its goal the 
identification of individual, family and community strengths, primarily in realms of 
dialogue and communication, membership, resilience, healing and wholeness.40 The 
strengths perspective’s elevation of inborn individual drives towards health, rather than 
illness-oriented explanations of individual pathology, echoes the priorities both of 
humanistic psychology and of positive psychology. 
But, like positive psychologists, advocates of the strengths perspective have made 
only scant reference to their intellectual predecessors in humanistic psychology. In fact, 
they claim that the emergence of therapeutic perspectives explicitly oriented toward 
applying a positive view of clients’ innate potential is a fairly recent phenomenon.41 
While strengths perspective advocates haven’t directly criticized humanistic psychology 
or expressed a need for ideological distance from the movement, the discrepancies 
between the movements are implicit in their theory. The consideration of social-political 
forces, for example, is primary among the priorities of strengths perspective social 
                                                
37 Bill O’Connell, Solution-Focused Therapy (London: Sage Publications, 1998), 1.; Karen Cristensen and 
David Levinson, eds., Encyclopedia of Community: From Village to the Virtual World (London: Sage 
Publications, 2003), 262-263. 
38 For a good description of the strengths perspective, see: Dennis Saleebey, “Introduction: Power in the 
People” In,” in Saleebey, D., ed. The Strengths Perspective in Social Work Practice, ed. D. Saleebey, 
second edition , 3-20  (New York: Longman, 1997)., 3-20.   
39 Ann Weick, (1983), “Issues in Overturning a Medical Model of Social Work Practice,” Social Work, 28, 
(1983):  467-471. 
40 Saleeby, “Introduction,” 8-9 
41 Weick “Issues in Overturning,” 467. 
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workers, most of whom would take issue with the assumption of humanistic 
psychologists that social change is a direct result of self-actualization. “Problem-based 
assessments,” argue strengths perceptiveperspective advocates, “encourage 
individualistic rather than social-environmental explanations of human problems.” 42 
ABSORPTION WITHIN WIDER CULTURE  
Of his friend, colleague and mentor, Richard Farson wrote in 1975, “[Carl] 
Rogers has always been a bit puzzled that he is taken more seriously in other fields than 
he is in his own field of psychology. Professionals from education, religion, nursing, 
medicine, psychiatry, law, business, government, public health, law enforcement, race 
relations, social work—the list goes on and on—all came to feel that here, finally was an 
approach which enabled them to succeed on the previously neglected human dimensions 
of their jobs, to reach the people for whom they felt responsible but were often unable to 
help.” Farson went on to detail the Rogers’ accomplishments, among them making 
psychology “the business of normal people” and convincing others of the innate human 
potential for growth and creativity. By prioritizing subjective experience and the value of 
the present, Rogers, along with other humanistic psychologists, offered an empowering 
vision of human nature that emancipated individuals, and groups, from the confines of 
more pathology-oriented psychological approaches.43 
The greatest success of the Humanistic Psychology movement has also been the 
most elusive. The cultural residue of the ideas of humanistic psychologists, as transmitted 
through the human potential movement, spans from the personal to the institutional. In 
American “therapy culture,” the language of psychology is pervasive: ideas of self, 
growth, health, and relation and the theories of psychology inform personal and 
                                                
42 Weick et al., “Strengths Perspective,” 351. 
43 Farson, “Carl Rogers,” xxx-xxxvi, quotation from xxx. 
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institutional practices of encouraging health, satisfaction and productivity.44 As it did in 
the 1960s, the language of humanistic psychology provides the justification for the 
experiential applications associated with it. For example, contemporary practices of yoga 
are often explained in terms of growth, holism and self-actualization.45  
Humanistic psychologists’ theories and techniques have also, for better or worse, 
informed human management by corporations.46 Most employees of major corporations 
have encountered the techniques of humanistic psychologists, in one form or another. 
These applications, ranging from employee retreats to seminars on sensitivity training, 
derive directly from the work of humanistic psychologists like Maslow and research 
institutions like NTL.47 Of this legacy, some humanistic psychologists are proud, 
interpreting this application to be evidence of the humanization of business that resulted 
from the movement.48 But others question the motives of corporations in employing 
humanistic psychology principles and techniques within management strategies. 49 
“The history of our work,” wrote Farson, “is dotted with […] examples of our 
unwittingly serving the interests of the more powerful against the less powerful.” As in 
                                                
44 Peggy Rosenthal, Words and Values: Some Leading Words and Where they Lead Us (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1984), 37-38. 
45 For an example of the use of the language as applied to the practice of yoga: B. K. S. Iyengar, John J. 
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the case of union leaders, who “intuitively knew that ‘communication’ cools out the 
oppressed worker, making it possible for management to maintain something 
approximating the status quo,” Farson argued that the leaders of corporations identified 
the potential efficacy of utilizing the language and techniques of humanistic psychology 
in promoting worker satisfaction and increasing productivity.50 Another scholar suggests 
that in valorizing the use of humanistic psychology theory by corporations, humanistic 
psychologists confused a first order change with a second order change, that is, they 
mistook a mere change of form for a more radical change of structure.51 
In the 1980s and 1990s, humanistic psychologists became more modest in their 
goals, and began to recognize that adoption of their perspective was more complex than 
they had once believed.52 Meanwhile, participation in AHP and Division 32 continued to 
decline, and conferences became more infrequent (the last reported attendance figure was 
approximately 400 participants in AHP’s 1996 conference—down from 2500 in 1975).53 
However, both organizations optimistically persisted, as did the Journal of Humanistic 
Psychology. Disconnected from academia and estranged from the cultural spotlight, 
humanistic psychologists more diligently focused on developing their research and 
reconceptualizing their future. 54 
Humanistic psychologists’ enthusiasm for their work has remained great.55 And, 
in response to changed cultural conditions, some have predicted a resurgence of interest 
in the theories of humanistic psychologists. 56 Even without a renaissance, the founding 
concepts and criticisms of humanistic psychology remain relevant. And in a field driven 
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by pathology, the popularity of contemporary theories like positive psychology and the 
strengths perspective suggest the nagging sense, on the part of mental health 
professionals, that a psychological orientation towards illness and a cultural orientation 
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